In recent years, the landscape of global conflicts has significantly transformed, shaped by the actions and strategies of non-state actors. These groups, often operating outside traditional state structures, are increasingly influential in regional and international issues. This article delves into various non-state groups’ rising power and the complex dynamics that accompany their presence on the world stage.
Yves here. While the prevalence and efficacy of rebel factions and their foreign supporters are not areas I am particularly familiar with, I encourage readers to weigh in on John Ruehl’s insights. I recall the fearsome Sendero Luminoso in Peru during its peak. Gangs, especially in Colombia, have long held significant power. In Japan, the yakuza have a quasi-official role, permitted to manage prostitution and gambling operations in exchange for keeping hard drugs out of the country. I worked with the Japanese in the 1980s and heard gossip into the 1990s, and I am unsure if that arrangement persists today.
This isn’t to suggest that circumstances have changed dramatically, but how have they evolved? Are we witnessing a greater effectiveness of these actors thanks to the democratization of warfare through cheap and efficient weaponry like drones? Or is there an increase in failed states due to the destabilizing effects of US interventions, leading to power vacuums and warlords? Are major powers, through tacit support, inciting instability to facilitate resource exploitation in regions like Africa that more consolidated states could counter?
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist residing in Washington, DC, and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to various foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X @john_ruehl. Produced byEconomy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
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In early October, Yemen’s civil war reignited as Saudi Arabia sought military support from Turkey and Pakistan to combat the Houthi rebels. The Houthis have established themselves as a de facto governing authority in much of northern Yemen, engaging in guerrilla warfare since 2004. After over a decade of fighting against Saudi-led forces and enduring strikes from the US, UK, and Israel, the Houthis have emerged as a formidable force with strong ties to Iran. Their capability to threaten neighboring countries and disrupt Red Sea shipping was further underscored by recent retaliatory strikes against Saudi infrastructure.
Despite Iran being their chief ally, the Houthis, known as Ansar Allah, are not isolated. In September, a US military spokesperson highlighted the alarming collaboration between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-affiliated group in Somalia—an alliance that poses a significant threat to regional stability. This interaction is noteworthy, considering the ideological differences; the Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, while Al-Shabaab staunchly opposes Shiism. Nonetheless, they have forged links, with the Houthis providing weapons and training to Al-Shabaab, which grants them access to piracy routes along the Somali coast.
In recent years, the Houthis have also formed relationships with other non-state groups in Somalia. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has received Houthi weapons and drones, assisting them in monitoring maritime activities in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis, Al-Shabaab, and ISS have even coordinated with Somali pirates to facilitate smuggling operations, notably during the conflict in Gaza when they rallied together to blockade vessels in the region.
Since 2022, the Houthis have paused fighting with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) amidst the ongoing Yemeni civil war, engaging instead in a transactional collaboration focused on short-term gains: the Houthis can secure funds and smuggling routes, while AQAP gains access to weapons and manufacturing capabilities.
The Houthis’ longstanding relationship with Hezbollah, which also receives Iranian backing, demonstrates that they possess more allies than their current diplomatic isolation might suggest. Support from foreign states remains vital for non-state actors. While much has been made of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” historical instances such as British support for the Arab Revolt during World War I show how outside powers can manipulate local armed groups to further their geopolitical interests. During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviet Union refined proxy warfare, covertly financing and arming foreign militant groups, as seen in examples like the US-backed Nicaraguan Contras and Soviet support for Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC). This involvement frequently pushed militant groups toward drug activities, with superpowers often overlooking the criminal enterprises that sustained their allies.
Supporting non-state factions has also provided smaller states a means to target more formidable adversaries. In the late 20th century, Libya notably supplied the Irish Republican Army with weapons and funding to attack British interests.
The waning of state support shortly after the Cold War compelled many non-state militant groups to become self-sufficient. Globalization, alongside improved communication and financial systems, facilitated increasing contact with organized crime entities, even as state support resumed. This convergence has fostered the “crime-terror nexus,” creating a vast global black market comprising smuggling routes, safe havens, arms dealers, and shared technology. The lines between criminal and militant actions are becoming increasingly indistinguishable; for instance, the Houthis are accused of funding operations through drug smuggling, as reported by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project.
As these non-state groups expand their reach, they have demonstrated the capacity to transform global affairs without reliance on state sponsors. They are also exploiting the global illicit economy, which generated approximately $6 trillion in 2025, providing them an expansive foothold in international commerce and finance. Governments must navigate relationships with these groups infiltrating formal economic sectors; for instance, Gulf traders faced sanctions recently for engaging in charcoal exports from territories under Al-Shabaab control.
The current global order is increasingly unstable due to ongoing conflicts, raising challenges for governments attempting to exert control over non-state actors while also making it difficult for private enterprises to evade their influence.
Pursuing Instability
Africa has been hit hardest by the impact of these developments. The civil war in Sudan, which escalated in 2023 between the Sudanese Armed Forces and rebel Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has seen the involvement of around 150 groups vying for territory and influence, as well as control over the illicit gold trade. This has drawn in tribal militias, foreign mercenaries, and various Islamic factions into the conflict.
These actors tend to shift loyalties between the main warring factions based on their financial interests. The interplay among traders, smugglers, and armed groups is instrumental in sustaining the flow of arms and gold across borders, further entrenching conflict dynamics driven by profit motives.
External powers have also sought to assert their influence in Sudan, often utilizing private military contractors. For instance, the RSF has received backing from Russian PMCs, UAE-linked Colombian companies, and even logistical support from US contractors. However, the shifting alliances locally have thwarted foreign efforts to control the conflict, requiring constant adjustments in external relationships as the power dynamics shift.
Yet, the UAE’s position as one of the world’s largest gold exporters, coupled with Sudan’s vast gold reserves, indicates an incentive structure where the conflict may be deemed more beneficial than pursuing resolution. The UAE’s role as a primary buyer of Sudan’s gold significantly contributes to the ongoing civil strife.
A notable setback for non-state factions in Africa emerged in Mali, where government forces, with the aid of Russian-controlled Africa Corps, reclaimed the city of Kidal in October 2026. This city had been seized months earlier by Al Qaeda-affiliated Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) alongside the Azawad Liberation Front, a secular Tuareg separatist group. The complex interplay of local and international interests has resulted in a fragmented, protracted conflict in the region.
The October offensive in Mali was welcomed by neighboring countries Niger and Burkina Faso, both having experienced military coups in the 2020s that undermined elected governance. The subsequent military juntas have leaned toward cooperation with Russia, promising to tackle insurgencies and assert regional resource control while extracting significant revenues from Western mining corporations. However, groups like JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front continue to wield significant influence across the territory, and the ongoing contest for Kidal showcases the persistent turmoil.
JNIM’s regional ambitions are supported by drug trafficking and human smuggling networks, with the group often providing protection and safe havens for smugglers in exchange for a share of profits. Interestingly, even amid the rivalry between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, their Sahel affiliates have initially collaborated against common threats before focusing on their own regional conflicts.
These factions have proven resilient despite substantial foreign efforts including the French-led Operation Barkhane, UN peacekeeping missions, and interventions by foreign-backed PMCs since the early 2010s. Their adaptability and growing ties with both regional and global partners could enable them to endure recent attempts to quell their influence.
Washington Weighs Its Options
In this expanding network of non-state actors, Washington finds itself struggling to formulate effective responses. In Sudan, US attempts to compel a ceasefire from the Sudanese Armed Forces have thus far been unsuccessful. During the past summer, discussions in the administration explored potential military strikes in Mali to target non-state actors, but their dispersal throughout the Sahel raises concerns regarding the feasibility of such actions. The limited success of the US strikes in Nigeria, aimed at a group associated with the Islamic State, underscores the difficulties inherent in managing these actors through military means alone.
The administration is also attempting to stabilize US relations with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, aiming to establish secure mineral supply chains under the Washington Accords. However, armed groups such as M23, which control these mines, collaborate with smugglers to connect resources with international markets, complicating efforts to create stable supply chains.
Moreover, foreign firms continue to engage eagerly with these networks. Investigations have revealed that commodities traders like Traxys have purchased conflict minerals smuggled from the DRC into the global marketplace, in violation of due diligence provisions.
For now, Washington may have to coexist with these networks, especially given its focus on reasserting its influence across the Americas amid various militant and criminal entities operating there. The administration has designated numerous Latin American criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations and has executed targeted strikes against drug trafficking vessels—efforts that face criticism for their legal justifications and the civilian toll they may incur.
Non-state actors in Latin America have deep ties to organized crime. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have historically collaborated with drug traffickers, and alliance reports suggest connections between FARC splinter groups and various gangs involved in moving drug shipments and arms across borders.
Additionally, Hezbollah-linked networks have been reported throughout Latin America for decades, with recent intelligence ties pointing to collaborations between Hezbollah, Venezuela’s Cartel de Los Soles, and other groups engaged in drug trafficking and money laundering. Investigations have unveiled Hezbollah’s elaborate network operating from the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
The military threat posed by these interconnected criminal organizations is evolving. Cartels have adopted insurgent-like tactics that include the use of explosives, drones, and foreign mercenaries, blurring the lines between organized crime and insurgent warfare.
State policies can inadvertently enable these groups to escalate in power. The rise of Los Zetas, originally a Mexican special forces unit, underscores this trend, as their transition to becoming a significant criminal organization was facilitated by their training and resources linked to US interests.
A New Normal
While many of these networks originate from regions of weak governance, their global extensions make them a challenge for all states. For instance, the Sinaloa cartel has broadened its drug trafficking routes into Africa, even crossing regions controlled by jihadist entities, while establishing touchpoints with European criminal networks for drug distribution. Revenue generated from these activities can further finance operations across various actors, showcasing how non-state groups can combine efforts when mutual interests align.
Al Qaeda’s enduring presence, despite relentless US pressure, illustrates the remarkable resilience of non-state actors. The Houthis face an uncertain future amidst escalating military actions from a Saudi-led coalition, with renewed US engagement looming, highlighting the extent of their influence backed by non-state alliances.
The Taliban, having returned to power after nearly being defeated in 2021, continues as Afghanistan’s de facto government despite limited international legitimacy. Their resurgence has benefited from connections to drug trafficking networks intertwined with both regional and international crime.
While Washington shifts its focus toward great power competition in light of conflicts with Iran, Russia, and China, it cannot overlook the opportunistic collaborations among these non-state actors. Their intricate supply chains have become so vital that states often depend on them for economic sustenance, as evidenced by reports of the Kinahan cartel’s involvement in Russian oil shipments supporting Moscow’s sanctioned economy.
The involvement of non-state groups in fragile areas complicates traditional mediation approaches, as primary actors in conflict frequently emerge as profit-seeking entities and armed factions rather than governments. As these non-state interests foster cross-border partnerships that effectively sidestep governmental authority, states are increasingly relinquishing their roles as principal architects of the global order, allowing business interests to dictate arrangements that align with their needs.
