Global Food Crisis: Analyzing the Impact on Capitalism

Greetings, I’m Yves. Today we have the insightful Ruben Bauer Naveira joining us. He has graciously shared his article regarding the looming food crisis, which he has updated in response to the evolving situation of the war in Iran.

Many have been warning, including us, that reduced fertilizer supplies and rising energy costs—particularly for diesel—would lead to increased food prices. Adding to this, the occurrence of a super El Niño is expected to exacerbate yield shortfalls and drive up the prices of staple foods, which may lead not just to widespread hunger but also to starvation. However, it seems that the prevailing discourse has largely overlooked this impending crisis, focusing instead on immediate concerns like military action and the urgent scarcity of oil. Although food shortages are likely to spark desperation and social unrest—similar to the food riots witnessed during the 1997 Asian crisis and the Arab Spring, which was largely ignited by rising food prices—these issues are receiving disturbingly little attention. There seems to be a belief that nothing can be done about it, leading to a general apathy, particularly towards the plight of those in poverty.

Ruben outlines the daunting scope of the intertwined shortages we face and highlights the lack of data on crop planting, leaving officials unaware of the potential collapse in agricultural output. He suggests that the prevalent mindset of “business as usual,” despite the looming disaster, stems from a preference for linear, narrow-thinking individuals in decision-making roles—rather than individuals with a more comprehensive, systems-oriented perspective. Ultimately, he acknowledges that addressing these challenges will involve conflict, arising from differing beliefs and stakes. He proposes that the structured Dialogue process, as developed by David Bohm, could advance contentious issues and foster consensus on solutions. This method has successfully facilitated national reconciliation in places like South Africa and Guatemala, and in brokering the Oslo Accords.

By Ruben Bauer Naveira, a Brazilian activist and pacifist, author of One and all – or none at all: Life after nuclear war. Originally published in Portuguese at: https://aterraeredonda.com.br/63091-2/ and at: https://www.viomundo.com.br/economia/ruben-naveira-surpreendidos-pelo-tsunami.html

This article serves as a serious warning. A global food crisis is on the horizon, fueled by the collapse of supply chains that support the agri-food system due to the war against Iran and the consequent blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. This impending crisis has largely gone unnoticed by many political and economic leaders.

Supply crises generally resolve according to the Law of Supply and Demand. When supply diminishes, prices increase. Those who can afford to pay may grumble but will do so, while those who cannot will either seek cheaper alternatives or go without. However, we’re talking about food—essential for survival.

For those who believe that “the market self-regulates” and that this supply crisis will merely lead to increased prices—the problem lies beyond just high food costs. There comes a threshold; below a certain supply level, the issue shifts from price to actual scarcity—sufficient food becomes unavailable, regardless of purchasing power. An insightful article explores this dynamic deeply. If the Law of Supply and Demand is the economy’s balancing mechanism, then the supply chains represent its Achilles’ heel.

While it’s common for disruptions in supply chains and extreme weather to affect food production in isolated regions, global trade typically compensates these disparities. Yet, we are now in a unique situation where farmers worldwide are simultaneously facing dwindling supplies and surging input prices—fertilizers, pesticides, diesel, transport costs. One thing is clear: farmers are far more attuned to the implications of the Super El Niño than the general population.

Agriculture has always operated on narrow margins and high uncertainty, where individual farmers must make pivotal decisions about whether to plant or reduce their planting each season. Agriculture is a disjointed endeavor, poorly coordinated at best, making it impossible to ascertain how many farmers have opted out of planting altogether. Since February 28th, millions globally have made this decision.

Crops planted today will not be ready for consumption for several months—a reality whose implications will seep into our daily lives much later, possibly extending into next year. The food we consume today was planted months ago, sometimes over a year ago, which includes livestock fed via plant-based feed. This leads us to a critical question: could we already be crossing the line from expensive food to food scarcity? Each day the Strait of Hormuz remains closed worsens the situation.

Massive hunger inevitably breeds social upheaval. The quiet aftermath of conflict against Iran is moving towards what could become the most significant economic and social crisis in recorded history.

The Supply Chain Breakdown

It’s essential to clarify that this isn’t solely a global food crisis; it represents a breakdown affecting nearly every global supply chain, as petroleum derivatives are integral to almost all industries:

• Shortages of petrochemical naphtha will impact plastics, paints, and multiple downstream sectors, including automotive manufacturing.
• Jet fuel shortages will harm tourism, and consequently, hospitality and restaurant industries.
• Shortages of bunker fuel—the heavy oil fulfilling cargo ship needs—could disrupt global maritime trade, with unpredictable consequences.
• Lubricants and greases shortages will affect all industrial sectors, as all machinery relies on them.
• Shortages of sulfur—a byproduct of oil refining—will limit sulfuric acid production, a crucial chemical used across numerous production processes. This will severely affect mining operations, leading to losses in copper and nickel mining, which in turn impacts electricity and battery production, stalling the global clean energy transition. Sulfuric acid is also essential for urban water and sewage treatment, oil refinements, and manufacturing operations in steel, textiles, pulp and paper, rubber, leather, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and cosmetics.
• Helium shortages—a byproduct of natural gas liquefaction—will threaten microchip production and thus affect entire electronics supply chains. Medical MRI machines will face limitations as they rely on helium to function (especially since China halted its helium exports).
• Prior to the conflict, Gulf countries supplied a significant share of the world’s aluminum exports.
• The cumulative effect will inevitably destabilize the global financial system.

Such widespread ramifications are so extensive that their implications will only fully manifest as they ripple outward—creating subsequent waves of effects. At the war’s inception (March 4th, merely five days after fighting erupted), Craig Tindale outlined a framework for these interconnected disruptions, estimating twelve sequential transformations over five years that may culminate in a broad reorganization of civilization as we know it.

While these oil- and derivative-dependent supply chains have been temporarily mitigated globally through the depletion of reserves, the real trouble is just beginning. The United States has not only consumed its reserves but has also exported them at decreased rates, which kept prices low. On the other hand, China, the largest importer of oil, has curtailed imports during this time. However, global reserves are critically low, and China has now resumed its purchasing, making the crisis inescapable.

Even if the war were to conclude, the ramifications will persist (for more details, see this video). There’s a general optimism among financial markets for a “return to normal,” but this expectation is likely to end in disappointment. Recovery in maritime traffic will take months, and global supply chains will never revert to previous states. Furthermore, numerous challenges remain:

• Damage incurred to oil and gas facilities will keep parts of the supply offline for years.
• Restoring shut-down wells—a challenge especially for Gulf states—will be slow and incomplete.
• The costs borne by shipowners and insurers will deter them from routing vessels through the Strait until they feel genuinely secure. For instance, despite the Houthis ceasing their attacks on commercial shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait over a year ago, traffic in the Red Sea has not wholly returned to its pre-attack levels (view this video at minute 6′15″). They remain a threat, similar to the situation along Hormuz, limiting visits by commercial shipping.
• Unprecedented factors, such as nationwide bans on nationals joining crews on ships headed to the Persian Gulf will also complicate matters;
• For more on this synthesis of issues, watch this video from minute 27′15″.

The Global Food Crisis

Just as every other industry, supply chains for food—fertilizers, pesticides, agricultural machinery, diesel, lubricants, and transportation—will face disruptions. However, food remains the central concern, as it is essential for survival. Unlike plastic garbage bags, which could be compensated for by manually washing trash cans, there is no alternative for a food shortage. A rupture in food production can swiftly lead to social chaos.

Here’s a summary of the key factors contributing to the global food crisis:

• Before the war, Gulf countries represented approximately 35% of global urea production, 40% of sulfur production, and 20% of liquefied natural gas (LNG) output. Urea is the main source for nitrogen fertilizers; sulfuric acid, derived from sulfur, is critical for phosphate fertilizers; LNG serves as feedstock for urea production. For example, Bangladesh’s urea plants relied on LNG from Qatar—one of the hardest-hit sectors in the conflict—and are now dormant. The blockade has tokened global fertilizer chains, with consequent impacts on food supply chains.
• Major exporters of fertilizers—Russia and China—have enacted export suspensions to safeguard their own food security. India urgently sought fertilizer supplies from China, but was denied due to Beijing’s own pressing needs.
• In the aftermath of the war, global fertilizer prices soared. While they have recently begun to decline, this drop results from demand destruction; a plethora of farmers have halted planting, leading to excessive fertilizer build-up.
• The United States recently declared a national emergency in relation to fertilizers. For further detail, see this reference and here).
• China, being the number one producer and exporter of sulfuric acid (across 40% of worldwide production), has halted exports—putting copper mining in Chile and the Democratic Republic of Congo, nickel mining in Indonesia, and uranium mining in Kazakhstan at risk. About half of all sulfuric acid produced globally serves phosphate fertilizer production.
• Crops around the world have planting windows directly tied to seasons. While plantings completed before the onset of the war remain unaffected, the harvests will not be ready for months. Presently, we are consuming food planted or harvested months ago. After the war began, plantings could proceed normally, provided fertilizers were pre-stocked. Yet, those reliant on shipments via the Suez Canal faced roughly a 20-day delay as ships rerouted around the generally longer Cape of Good Hope. Even with some fertilizers purchased at a premium, this timing led to applications outside optimal windows, resulting in reduced yields. The worst scenarios arise where rising input prices lead to farming abandonment altogether—evidenced in the U.S. (soybeans) and Thailand (rice) (see this video, from minutes 12′ to 15′).
• If the Strait of Hormuz endures blockage until around September or October, the global sulfur shortage will drain reserves in nations lacking domestic production capabilities, shutting down phosphate fertilizer plants.
• Reducing fertilizer use—while trying to cultivate the same land—is not feasible. Soils have become depleted after years of continuous cultivation; without nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium (NPK), crops will fail. Furthermore, the relationship is not linear; a 10% reduction in fertilizer can lead to a 30% drop in yield, varying by crop type (with corn usually requiring more fertilizer than soybeans). Large producers face a complete lack of alternatives to fertilizers, which are currently both expensive and scarce; smaller farmers are finding innovative means to cope (see here, here, and here).
• One important consequence is the switch in crops: corn producers may choose soybeans, and in Thailand, some farmers are inundating rice fields to raise fish instead. Consumers will eventually have to adapt their diets to accommodate these shifts.
• In addition to fertilizers, agricultural pesticide supply chains will also face significant disruption. Pesticide production relies heavily on petrochemical naphtha—where toluene and xylene-rich reformate is derived from heavy naphtha; benzene-rich pyrolysis gasoline emerges from light naphtha through steam-cracking. The three components—benzene, toluene, and xylene (collectively known as BTX)—are crucial for nearly all commercial herbicides, fungicides, and insecticides. Moreover, effective application necessitates heavy aromatic solvents as carriers for active ingredients, which are also derived from BTX. Today’s agricultural practices depend on these chemical protections, as modern crop varieties are not resilient against pests without them.
• Operating margins in agriculture are razor-thin, made even more precarious by skyrocketing fertilizer and pesticide prices. Farmers now face the burden of surging diesel costs, increased lubrication prices for tractors, and heightened transportation expenses. As conditions worsen, many are opting to forgo planting for the season, potentially waiting for years for better conditions, or exiting the industry entirely. This suffering will continue long before governments comprehend the crisis’s scale and respond. The repercussions of current planting decisions (or lack thereof)—not harvestable yet—won’t hit until 2027.
• Predictably, small farmers with limited capital will be the most affected, which could lead to the rise of black and gray markets for diverted or counterfeit fertilizers and pesticides.
• Livestock farming will suffer equally as crop production. With the grain shortage, premature liquidation of poultry and hog populations will occur, as corn and soybeans form the foundation of the meat industry.
• Countries everywhere will scramble to import food, driving prices up both in global and domestic markets. Any nation with grain, potash, phosphates, or pesticides will treat these resources as strategic rather than tradeable commodities—China has already commenced hoarding sulfuric acid. Export restrictions, emergency rationing, and hoarding will replace normal trading patterns. Governments, facing urgent food security demands domestically, will likely hoard essential input materials, finished fertilizers, pesticides, and food overall.
• As if this weren’t complex enough, extreme climate events will intensify significantly in the latter half of 2026 and into 2027—coinciding with the peak of the food crisis. The result may manifest as a genuine perfect storm. Meteorologists deem a “Super El Niño” all but certain, anticipated to bring about droughts, floods, and severe heat waves across the globe (the effects of heat on food production have been observed at this site, here, and here), potentially rivaling the Great Famine of 1877—also linked to an El Niño event—which caused over 50 million deaths globally. By then, it will be assured that we will face a disastrous weather event (see this report and this analysis).
• Both extremes—drought and floods—will seriously undermine fertilizer efficiency. In drought-stricken areas, water serves as the medium for nutrients to dissolve and reach plant roots; inadequate moisture means fertilizers cannot be absorbed. Alternately, heavy rains in flooded areas will leach soluble nitrogen and phosphate from the soil before plants can utilize them.
• Farmers, already traumatized by climate changes, may cease planting altogether in anticipation of El Niño’s harsh effects.
• El Niño, stemming from an anomaly in the equatorial Pacific, disrupts the upwelling of nutrient-rich deep waters, hence impacting the Peruvian anchovy fishery, critical for global fishmeal and oil production. This leads to a protein deficit impacting livestock and aquaculture feed markets. Products derived from fishmeal are also valued as premium organic fertilizers and soil conditioners. The simultaneous loss of both synthetic fertilizers (from sulfuric acid and urea) and organic substitutes (driven by the deterioration of fisheries due to El Niño, compounded by escalating fuel costs for vessels—see also here) creates yet another perfect storm for global agriculture.
• Unforeseen factors further complicate the scenario: the conflict in Ukraine halted Russia’s wheat exports through the Black Sea.

The Shortage of Systems Thinking

Humans navigate complexity by striving for simplification—because simplification is the path toward predictability.

In the face of systems perceived as complicated, we break the whole down into parts and study each part independently, often assuming the interactions among these parts can be disregarded. We then seek linear cause-and-effect relationships within these components, hoping to extract the clarity we crave.

This approach works adequately under relatively stable conditions and within acceptable error margins. The world’s complexity allows us to treat it as if it were simpler than reality. A farmer might calculate they need to apply X units of fertilizer within a Y-week window to achieve a W-ton harvest with an expected profit of Z, which continues ad infinitum: cause-and-effect, linear reasoning.

Good linear thinkers—usually specialists rather than generalists—are often valued socially and ascend to higher roles in businesses and governments. Their ability to produce predictability yields results that in turn generate rewards.

However, the world has always been fundamentally complex, and at certain times, it reorganizes itself in ways that overwhelm simple analytical tools—this is the current situation with the impending food crisis. The world hasn’t become more complex; it has always retained this level of intricacy. What changes is that complexity can rise to a level that hampers our capacity for predictability, dropping it to mere wishful thinking. The current hope for “normalization”, stemming from a return to pre-war export rates from the Gulf, is a prime example.

In the absence of predictability, people—along with companies, governments, and societies—are effectively blinded.

Complexity science has long asserted that systems classed as genuinely complex do not offer predictability. No mathematical model can encapsulate the interactions of myriad interdependent variables. Nevertheless, complexity science presents an alternative attainable goal: understanding—qualitative, rather than quantitative—of a system’s behavioral patterns as a whole.

In typical circumstances, it may have been reasonable to consider the food production supply chain as a self-contained study unit. Indeed, externalities exist—such as credit and insurance markets, transport costs, and governmental influence—but their impact is typically muted during stable times. However, moving forward, shocks will propagate until they eventually impact the global financial system (it’s merely a matter of time), transport costs will fluctuate unpredictably, and governments will intervene economically—restricting inputs that otherwise would have been traded. Therefore, the ideal approach for understanding food security questions is now the global economic system as a whole. This translates to zero predictability.

Decision-makers in business and government will continue to cling to whatever fragments of predictability they can salvage. Their tools include risk dashboards, crisis committees, and situation rooms. These measures are essential and should not be disregarded. Nonetheless, the underlying approach must shift—prior to global stabilization—away from prediction and towards understanding behavioral patterns. The instrument for this transformation is systems thinking, rather than linear thinking.

Systems thinkers—generally generalists rather than specialists—construct understanding of behavioral patterns by identifying correlations among seemingly unrelated events, rather than attempting to trace direct causal chains.

Craig Tindale exemplifies a systems thinker. He has detailed the cascading shocks in the global economy instigated by the Hormuz blockade and produced further analyses, including one on the structural vulnerabilities of the U.S. economy. Regarding the food crisis, he has organized his comprehension of behavioral patterns in agri-food systems under stress into a collection of diagrams designed to clarify systemic dynamics for linear thinkers.

Another key systems thinker is economist Michael Hudson, whose writings and videos are highly recommended for anyone seeking to grasp the crisis’s implications for the global financial system (see, for instance, here, here, and here). For those interested in geopolitics, key systems thinkers include Arnaud Bertrand, Emmanuel Todd, and Alastair Crooke.

Due to constructs within conventional training, systems thinkers are uncommon—especially in leadership roles. Rather than simply appointing systems thinkers and empowering them (though that would assist), we need to establish coherent systems thinking from the existing strands of linear thinking.

The failure of linear thinking among complex issues is evident through the U.S. government’s decisions—choices which have contributed significantly to creating the current situation.

The U.S. enjoys self-sufficiency in oil, leading leaders to conclude they would be insulated from supply shocks. The mindset even dictated that the Hormuz blockade was primarily a problem for others, excluding the U.S. The figure below (source) illustrates where this rationale fails:

This article expands upon Point “5” of this reasoning (U.S. refineries require heavy, sour crude) to illustrate how a surplus of light, sweet crude (which the U.S. produces) can be just as problematic as a deficit of heavy, sour crude (which the U.S. imports): systemic repercussions difficult to foresee.

Yet, less than three months after the blockade’s onset, lubricant supply chains in the U.S. begin to collapse (see here, here, and here, also check this article). Such developments are nearly impossible to foresee using linear reasoning, yet through systemic introspection, some aspects could have been predicted. The shortage of diesel is also becoming apparent for American consumers (further, Russia just imposed a diesel export ban—see here, here, and here).

What would the implications of such a collapse look like? Lubricants extend beyond merely motor oil for passenger vehicles—they also facilitate agricultural machinery, aircraft control systems, industrial elevators, hydraulic cylinders, excavators, and much more. In terms of food supply, shortages may arise not merely from production failures, but from underlying distribution failures: a lack of lubricants could diminish the operational capacity of forklifts essential for food movement within distribution centers.

Another instance showcasing the limits of linear prediction lies in the assumption that the Hormuz Strait would swiftly reopen to avoid immense economic shocks. On this basis, the U.S. released oil and gas from its strategic reserves into global markets at below-market prices, attempting to stabilize international prices and shield American consumers from fuel spikes ahead of upcoming midterm elections. This ultimately led other nations to underestimate the severity of the global crisis. Hormuz may still be a long way from reopening, and is unlikely to return to even pre-war levels; however, the U.S. has already depleted its buffer against supply shocks, leaving it in a significantly vulnerable position (watch this video, from minutes 13′45″ to 19′50″; see also here, and here).

Additionally, the most egregious linear-thought error was the assumption that the physical elimination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran’s civilian and military leadership through massive bombing would ensure the regime’s collapse and compel surrender.

The Failure of the Models, and the Need for New Ones

From the crisis’s onset to its inflection point, there will be limited opportunity for anything beyond emergency measures and stopgap solutions. However, as the crisis progresses along its path, broader, macro-level inquiries will gain traction regarding the necessity of new models. The current, large-scale industrial agriculture model suffers from myriad disadvantages and externalities, including: reliance on long-distance transportation (between producer and consumer); the creation of low-nutritional value food compared to traditional practices; public health hazards from chemical exposure for both farmers and consumers; soil degradation; over-extraction of aquifers due to intensive irrigation; and soil and water pollution, along with severe greenhouse gas emissions. This systemic analysis discusses this spectrum of vulnerabilities comprehensively. Thus far, these issues were tolerated under the guise of the need to produce enough food for the populace globally (despite rampant hunger). Yet, as climate change escalates into catastrophe (the Super El Niño will make these vulnerabilities undeniable), the push to evaluate and possibly abandon this model will rise to the forefront.

Adopting an alternative model—agroecology—may even be beneficial. While it may not match the productivity of the current system, it possesses a crucial advantage: it is labor-intensive, providing employment and subsistence for countless families facing chronic food insecurity.

Most significantly, agroecology sustains biodiversity, in stark contrast to the monocultures prevalent today. A universal transition to the agroecological approach could facilitate extensive global reforestation—potentially one of the surest routes toward mitigating climate change.

The widespread crisis affecting global supply chains (not limited to just food production) will also have far-reaching impacts on the global financial system. Parallel to the agri-food model, the financial system—particularly in the West following the move from industrial to financial capitalism—will reveal clear signs of exhaustion.

One already noticeable symptom is the global unawareness of the impending disaster. Ideally, the financial sector, which should still be somewhat connected to the real economy, would have long been raising alarms regarding the plethora of challenges soon to afflict society. Instead, it operates almost in denial (especially reflected in this video by Steve Keen, and in the article indicating that JP Morgan had modeled the oil price trajectory under sustained Strait of Hormuz restrictions, but deemed the findings too troublesome to publish).

The market values large technology companies based on symbolic bits within computers, whereas values of entities in the real economy hinge on the presence of petroleum derivatives in their supply chains—values derived from tangible hydrocarbon molecules. The disparity matters little; while “money” might price a bit at a thousand times the worth of a molecule, the impending hydrocarbon shortage will become excruciatingly clear: no amount of digital “bits” can constitute a single hydrocarbon molecule. The market—having long prioritized monetary wealth—will confront the reality that only a real, functioning economy can sustain human lives, which should be its true objective.

When that moment arrives, the “autopilot” behavior of governments, especially in the West, will persist: they will likely pursue financial rescue rather than supporting the actual economy.

Hence, with food prices surging, central banks will focus on “inflation!” They will respond by raising interest rates. Nevertheless, as demand diminishes due to the oil supply and pricing shock, companies within the real economy will falter, laying off employees and shuttering operations—leading to a deflationary environment. At that point, any interest rate hikes could become the very medicine that catalyzes economic collapse.

It’s merely a question of when discussions will arise about adopting alternative models—perhaps similar to China’s, where the financial system serves as a tool for advancing industrial capitalism rather than an end in itself (though it does have a private financial sector, it operates under the aegis of a public system).

Finally, I will venture a prediction: the profound denial of economic dysfunction (across the financial and agri-food systems) will result in many attributing any crises stemming from El Niño to environmental causes. Nature’s extreme manifestations will be abundantly visible, misdirecting attention from institutional failings that have remained largely unnoticed by the public (this is already occurring).

A Proposal

To monitor the development of the crisis, anticipate forthcoming problems, and ascertain potential solutions, I propose supplementing conventional crisis management methods—like risk committees, situation rooms, and emergency cabinets—with a robust capacity for genuine systems thinking. Specifically, this does not imply merely appointing systems thinkers to positions of authority (though this could be beneficial). It requires developing coherent systems thinking from an amalgamation of the existing strands of linear thinking—each specialized yet confined.

The instruments for this transformation are rooted in the dialogue methodology devised by quantum physicist David Bohm over forty years ago—a process that has yet to gain significant traction. To illuminate why I propose this methodology, let’s first establish some context.

Quantum physics studies the behavior of subatomic particles, the universe’s foundational components, characterized as both matter and energy. One noteworthy finding is that two particles, however distant, can influence each other’s behaviors due to the principle of non-locality. This counterintuitive concept raises questions: How can particles “communicate” across distances? I illustrate this principle with an example documented in this video: a dog who can sense when its owner decides to return home, no matter the distance.

Bohm proposed the idea of Wholeness: the notion that all subatomic particles are interconnected, forming a cohesive totality. He designated this underlying reality as the implicate order, which exists below our accessible world—the explicate order that includes all distinct entities—living beings, trees, stones, and so forth—each possessing relative autonomy within the Whole and temporary existence. All elements, even stars, eventually cease to exist, causing their particles to reintegrate into the Whole.

Bohm further contended that mental states—thoughts and knowledge—are composed of subatomic particles, making them part of the coherence of the Whole. In his later years, he worked to reconnect individual cognition to a collective human consciousness, asserting that human problems result from the fallacy of thinking we are isolated from one another—mistaking relative autonomy within the Whole for actual separateness.

He developed what he called “dialogue”—which differs significantly from common perceptions of conversation. Dialogue, in Bohm’s realm, entails systematic, collaborative training of individual minds to engage with a shared stream of collective thought. This collective thought cannot be fabricated or engineered; it spontaneously emerges—an aspect that complexity theory recognizes as an emergent property of the whole group participating in dialogue.

In a group comprising 20 to 40 members (this size bears methodological importance), meetings occur regularly—Bohm recommended weekly or biweekly—guided by specific protocols. Over time, each participant’s thought processes align with the shared mental flow unique to the group, as every participant undergoes this training simultaneously.

This methodology has not found its way into widespread use for two primary reasons. The first is its demand—requiring both psychic energy from participants (hence the training’s discipline) and time. Bohm estimated that a group might take a year to achieve optimal results. The pressing matters of the world, however, seem to call for immediate results. Had we the patience to let dialogue yield its fruits, these results would likely surpass those achieved through quicker methods. Yet, many struggle to understand that collective thought belongs to the implicate order, while immediate results appear to be available through the explicate order.

The second issue is fundamental: the collective thought that arises from dialogue is accessible only to those in the group—not to those outside it. In the context of the ongoing food crisis, a dialogue group would eventually propose highly valuable solutions. However, any decision-maker—who must ignite action—typically would not be part of that group and may fail to recognize the full significance of these solutions through their linear lens.

Bohm believed that through dialogue, we could resolve any human challenge. It was his methodology that came closest to resolving the perceived intractable conflict at the heart of the war against Iran: the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Between 1992 and 1993, delegations from both groups, each about twenty members strong, engaged in confidential dialogue meetings in Oslo, culminating in a peace agreement. Signed on September 13, 1993, by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, this agreement would struggle to withstand outside interference. Despite party leaders endorsing it, the collective understanding developed by that dialogue group proved inaccessible to those not present, leading to sabotage and, ultimately, collapse. Both leaders fell—Rabin shot by an assassin believed to be enabled by his own security, and Arafat poisoned.

The Oslo Accords, along with other applications of this methodology—including national reconciliations in South Africa and Guatemala—reveal that dialogue groups can be especially effective in conflict situations. Each clash of differing thoughts among members provides fertile ground for progress; after all, conflict is an intrinsic part of human existence. Resolutions to conflicts cannot emerge from individuals alone; they arise from the collective thought of the group. This is precisely why the dialogue process requires time.

Dialogue is well-suited for addressing complex problems like the global food crisis, as such challenges are invariably perceived differently by individuals. The inevitable clashes among diverse viewpoints form a type of conflict—even in the absence of personal animosity.

The dialogue process can be challenging, especially initially. Nonetheless, it grows increasingly rewarding, leading to a collective intelligence that is new and enlightening for every participant. Over time, dialogue adopts unexpected rhythms and tempos; discussions become richer, and collective insights naturally surface. The entire group harmonizes around the essential elements. The resultant collective thoughts will inherently be systemic, even as individual thinking variably remains linear.

A dialogue group alone will not act as a panacea for the global food crisis. While the world may experience diminished food supplies, resulting in hunger and suffering, a dialogue group could help bridge our profound incapacity: the inability to construct an accurate future picture from comprehensive data, knowledge, and experience; to timely update that picture; and to derive necessary solutions that are both actionable and achievable.