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Yves here. Andrew Korybko often uncovers significant insights but may draw unconventional conclusions from them. One such instance is his analysis of Putin’s motivations regarding Ukraine.
In my view, attributing primarily economic motivations to Putin in what Russia deems an existential conflict is fundamentally misguided.
While I don’t claim to have all the answers on this complex issue, I do offer some alternative perspectives. From the very beginning, it was apparent that Putin aimed not to seize Ukraine, but rather to ensure its neutrality—something that the Istanbul accord, undermined by the U.S. and the UK, could have achieved. The complete intransigence of Ukrainian and European NATO leaders to make any security concessions to Russia has compelled Russia to take drastic measures against Ukraine. What the ultimate outcome will be remains uncertain, but it seems Russia is poised to control Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, rendering Kiev less tenable through damage to its Dnieper bridges, potentially allowing it to set the terms.
I’ve long observed that Russia’s overtures toward the Trump administration—often laden with promises of economic advantages—fail to address Russia’s fundamental security needs. This has led to accusations of pandering, particularly as Lavrov has expressed frustration, leading to Kiril Dmitriev stepping forward in discussions with the Kushner/Witkoff contingent. While Russia may regard resource agreements with the U.S. as significant, they serve more as instruments for advancing security rather than purely economic interests. Such deals could provide Trump a narrative of victory, legitimizing the subjugation of Ukraine and creating some distance from NATO allies intent on continuing hostilities with Russia.
Additionally, Korybko’s mention of “after nearly five years” in his headline could suggest that Russia had the means to subdue Ukraine earlier. John Helmer reported that the General Staff was displeased with Putin’s restraint in waging the electricity war, which could have led to a swift capitulation of Ukraine. However, Helmer did not acknowledge that such an approach would have resulted in a humanitarian catastrophe, likely classified as a war crime. Both Putin and much of the leadership appear to be meticulous in justifying their strikes against military and dual-use targets.
But how could Russia have intervened effectively when its armed forces lacked the capacity to control the local populace or provide emergency aid? The deliberate, gradual dismantling of Ukraine is, in fact, leading many citizens to flee the country.
Notably, Alexander Mercouris has been articulating his belief that what is currently unfolding represents the culmination of a three-year strategy and military escalation. Observers often forget that clearing the densely populated and fortified Donbass region is a labor-intensive endeavor, as evidenced by Israel’s challenges in the less militarized Gaza using far more brutal tactics.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global shift towards multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, operated under the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website.
Regardless of why Putin may have postponed these actions, it is now evident that he could be at least partly motivated by the prospect of lucrative resource deals with the U.S. following the resolution of the conflict, negotiations which have been ongoing between his representatives and Trump’s for over a year.
The New York Times has reported allegedly intercepted communications indicating that Russia plans to dismantle Ukraine’s power, heating, and water infrastructure this winter. While this claim is unverified, it aligns with Putin’s subtle escalation of tactics over the summer in response to Zelensky’s military operations, which have increasingly focused on infrastructure. If the rumors hold true, Russia intends not only to disrupt Ukraine’s military logistics but to effectively incapacitate the nation.
So far, Putin has refrained from this course of action, perhaps out of a belief that Russians and Ukrainians share a bond. There are suggestions that early in the conflict, Russia may not have possessed the drone or missile capabilities necessary for such extensive attacks, possibly due to low production levels and strategy adjustments in anticipation of a war with NATO. Nonetheless, Putin now seems to have come to terms with the humanitarian ramifications of concluding the war favorably for Russia, if not entirely on its original terms.
His motivations could extend beyond merely countering Ukraine’s prolonged aggression, which started over the summer with U.S. backing and notable involvement from France. Reports indicate that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent advised his Russian counterpart during the summer that no business arrangements would be possible as long as the conflict continued. Since then, Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff met with Putin to explore potential agreements, after which Kiril Dmitriev traveled to the U.S. for follow-up discussions related to both energy and the war.
For context, Putin boasted in late February 2025 that American firms “will reap significant profits” from investments in Russia’s resource sector, and Trump’s Special Envoy to Belarus, John Coale, recently confirmed that he has been authorized to propose a deal similar to Belarus to Putin. This would involve sanction relief in return for the release of “political prisoners.” Putin’s ally, Alexander Lukashenko, has already initiated several such arrangements and is negotiating a massive potash deal with Trump.
Last week, Lukashenko also suggested a trilateral agreement involving Belarus, Russia, and the U.S. focused on fertilizer production, contingent on the U.S. lifting sanctions against Gazprom. Putin and other Russian officials have consistently called for the West to remove sanctions, and while the U.S. might consider lifting some in exchange for a Belarusian-style quid pro quo, the Ukrainian Conflict must first conclude for this to occur widely. A resulting resource-oriented strategic partnership could potentially transform global economic systems.
Despite facing unprecedented sanctions from the West, the Russian economy has remained resilient, largely due to its wealth of natural resources and an independent payment system. However, the Economic Development Ministry predicts only a 0.6% GDP growth this year. United Russia’s recent electoral victory in the Duma elections—the first following the escalation of the Ukrainian Conflict—provides Putin the mandate to navigate the war and ensure greater prosperity for his people afterward.
Therefore, it is plausible that, in line with Russia’s demand for the lifting of Western sanctions, Putin is driven, at least in part, to conclude the conflict on as many favorable terms as possible sooner rather than later to negotiate lucrative resource deals with the U.S. This motivation, which could reshape global economic structures and enhance prosperity for his citizens, provides context for the New York Times’ report on his intentions to bring Ukraine to its knees.
