Yves here. The appealing branding associated with recent revolutionary movements highlights extensive meddling by NGOs and the US. Given the lackluster response to previous color-coded revolutions, it seems that adjustments are necessary this time around.
On a more serious note, John Ruell’s writings tend to spark considerable reader engagement due to their wealth of information, notwithstanding some occasional issues with framing and the omission of key details. Personally, I haven’t managed to delve into the controversy surrounding the attempted acquisition of Kushner Island in Albania, which has sparked fierce resistance, including instances of vandalism against efforts to secure land on the island. Insights from informed readers would be highly appreciated.
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist residing in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to various foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X @john_ruehl. Produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.
On April 29, Miami-based Affinity Partners obtained their initial building permit for significant developments on Albania’s coast, sparking growing outrage in the small Balkan nation.
In the following weeks, a video showing a protestor being beaten and forcefully removed by private security guards went viral, igniting what has become popularly known as Albania’s “Flamingo Revolution.” On July 4, tens of thousands of Albanians marched in Tirana, with similar demonstrations occurring throughout the country.
The movement is sparked by two major projects: a $1.7 billion luxury resort on Sazan Island and a $4.6 billion development around the Zvërnec Peninsula and Vjosë-Nartë wetlands. Similar protests have emerged in other parts of the Balkans in recent years, often fueled by broader economic and corruption concerns.
The Flamingo Revolution lacks a centralized organization. It stems from a decentralized network of environmental groups, anti-corruption advocates, and ordinary citizens, many of whom are associated with civic organizations that Western governments helped establish over three decades but now operate independently.
The financing behind these projects has drawn particular scrutiny. Affinity Partners, led by Jared Kushner, son-in-law of former US President Donald Trump and his informal advisor, is at the helm of both developments. Since its inception in 2021, the firm has primarily operated with funds from sovereign wealth sources in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.
In recent years, Gulf states have increased their investments in substantial tourism projects to diversify their economies beyond oil. Political economist Karen E. Young notes that these sovereign wealth investments are often utilized to extend political influence. Affinity Partners effectively serves as an informal link between Middle Eastern capitals and the White House.
For investors, Albania’s trajectory towards EU membership could substantially elevate the value of proposed tourism and infrastructure projects. Sazan Island holds a strategic location at the entrance of the Adriatic Sea, and the introduction of new ports, marinas, and other developments could serve dual purposes for security in this critical region.
However, as relations between Brussels and Washington have soured during Trump’s second term, Albania’s EU aspirations have added sensitivity to these projects. On June 17, the European Parliament criticized the 2024 amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas, which facilitated the projects, and requested their retraction. It also called for a halt in construction within protected areas and emphasized compliance with EU environmental protection standards. Additionally, several EU parliament members cautioned that Albania’s EU accession could be endangered if the developments proceed.
The EU has compelling reasons to uphold its standards in candidate countries. Failing to do so would undermine its credibility and pave the way for foreign-backed projects approved through questionable means. Yet, Brussels has refrained from supporting calls from many protesters for the resignation of Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. Many demonstrators also dismiss the mainstream opposition, indicating that political instability could persist regardless of the ruling party, complicating the EU’s broader expansion efforts in the Balkans.
Albania’s EU ambitions are now at odds with the expanding interests of the US and investments from Gulf countries. As divisions within the Western alliance have intensified, nations that once comfortably resided within its influence have become arenas of competition and volatility.
The Serbian Precedent
The protests in Albania have underscored the growing independence of the transnational civil society network that the West has spent over three decades cultivating in the Balkans. NGOs such as the European Endowment for Democracy and agencies like USAID helped to bolster local institutions, watchdogs, and media outlets tailored to drive NATO and EU integration. When institution-building fell flat, Western support extended to protest movements to encourage leadership change.
Serbia, another candidate for EU membership, was the first testing ground for the “color revolution” model—broad public protests aimed at achieving political reform—despite the term now being more frequently associated with former Soviet states. During the 2000 overthrow of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milošević, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives articulated its effort to “fund programs and media channels that disseminated messages advocating immediate political change.”
Following Milošević’s removal, the number of Western NGOs in Serbia increased significantly in the 2000s, strengthening the local civic landscape. A 2015 article in the Law Explorer shed light on how, contrary to the belief that these nonprofits represented “a major progressive force countering the crude nationalism of the general public and guiding Serbia towards eventual European Union membership,” many in fact played a compromised, co-opted, and at times detrimental role in paving the way for and reinforcing neoliberal restructuring.
Although relations with many Western governments began to deteriorate after Kosovo’s independence was recognized in 2008, the nonprofit networks remained intact. They resurfaced during anti-government protests in 2011 in Belgrade and again during demonstrations against the UAE-backed redevelopment of the Belgrade Waterfront in 2015, foreshadowing Albania’s current movement. Protests against Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić have erupted repeatedly since 2017.
By 2021, these networks extended their focus beyond local governments. Major international resource projects became the targets of protests, with demonstrations against the Anglo-Australian company Rio Tinto’s proposed lithium mine in Serbia prompting a suspension of the project in 2022. The mine’s revival in 2024 ignited further demonstrations. Ultimately, work on the project was halted in 2025.
The civic networks that the West had initially established demonstrated their capability to organize substantial protests without Western backing, increasingly opposing Western interests. The EU viewed the lithium mine as crucial to reducing dependence on Chinese critical minerals, thus transforming a local environmental dispute into a geopolitical quandary for the bloc.
In response to the protests against the mine in 2024, former US Ambassador to Serbia, Christopher R. Hill, remarked that “Russia exploited this situation to try and create division between Serbia and the West,” while Moscow and Belgrade accused the West of instigating “preparations for mass unrest and an attempted coup,” as reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
The competing narratives symbolize rising uncertainty regarding a civil society network that has matured into an increasingly autonomous and self-sustaining entity through international alliances. The 2022 Jadar Declaration, labeled by Balkan Green Energy News as “a demonstration of international solidarity against lithium mining and in favor of environmental protection,” was endorsed by dozens of Serbian organizations, including Ne damo Jadar, alongside global groups like Extinction Rebellion, illustrating this transition. Serbia also shares key lithium deposits with Bosnia, and activists have initiated limited instances of cross-border collaboration, despite long-standing ethnic tensions.
Affinity Partners confronted this burgeoning activist network in Serbia in 2025. Its initiative with the UAE’s Eagle Hills for developing a Trump-branded hotel at Belgrade’s General Staff complex—targeted during NATO’s 1999 air campaign—became a rallying point for thousands of demonstrators. While Brussels grappled with its increasing tensions with Washington, the European Parliament condemned the proposal in a resolution, leading Affinity to ultimately scrap the deal in December 2025.
A New Albanian Battleground
Currently, all eyes are on Albania, where Affinity Partners is facing intensified resistance. Prime Minister Rama has claimed that the ongoing protests reflect not political dissent but rather a “hybrid war fueled by external influences and digital manipulation,” implicating state-sponsored actors from countries like Iran, according to Deutsche Welle. Concurrently, other Albanian officials have suggested ties to Russia regarding the demonstrators. While foreign influence is not to be dismissed outright, Albania’s hosting of the Iranian opposition group MEK continues to strain relations with Tehran.
However, these nations have valid concerns about the potential for similar movements to emerge in their own territories or among their allies. China, in particular, has little interest in further regional instability following a renovation project of Serbia’s Novi Sad railway station, which collapsed in 2024 and sparked widespread protests.
The local protest networks, developed over decades with Western backing, have proven to be more influential than anticipated. Since 1995, USAID alone has invested over $500 million in Albania, according to a 2025 report by the China-CEE Institute, and these civil society networks have shown resilience even amid funding cuts. For instance, the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network Albania evolved from USAID funding and has played a prominent role in the recent protests alongside other USAID-connected organizations.
The EU has bolstered Albania’s civil society framework through funding initiatives like LIFE and environmental organizations such as EuroNatur, Birdlife International, and the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund, which have supported Albanian groups like the Protection and Preservation of Natural Environment in Albania (PPNEA) and EcoAlbania.
In the past, movements like the Flamingo Revolution might have received greater direct support from formal Western organizations and political backing. Nowadays, the civil society networks nurtured by Western governments are increasingly able to dictate their own agendas, creating a sense of caution in Brussels. Simultaneously, Washington has significantly diminished its support that once underpinned these networks.
Rather than undercutting these civil society networks, the withdrawal of unilateral Western support may have spurred their independence. As observed by scholars Nikolaos Tsifakis and Anastasios Valvis in their analysis of civil society in neighboring Greece, “The reduction of state funding prompted CSOs (civil society organizations) to reorganize, compete in a more challenging environment, and enhance their autonomy.”
The Regional Alliance to Defend the Nature of the Balkans comprises over 30 organizations, including the Alliance of Ecological Organizations of Serbia, and it has publicly backed Albanian activists and local communities. This underscores the increasing cross-ethnic and cross-national cooperation of protest campaigns that have traditionally been shaped by Balkan politics, fostering a new perspective on integration, as stated by Aleksandar Matković, a researcher at the Institute for Economic Sciences in Belgrade.
Affinity Partners may still need to adapt or abandon one of its major projects, alleviating some pressure on the Albanian government. Yet, the protests signify deeper issues; they encapsulate a broad coalition disenchanted with corruption and the influence of foreign political and business interests on Albania’s future. Operating within Europe has provided this movement with legal protections and visibility, bolstered by a regionally interconnected activist network trained in Western ideals.
The turmoil in Albania reflects similar trends in Serbia and across the Balkans, where anti-hydropower campaigns have been organized over the past decade. As these movements gain independence concurrently with diverging US and EU interests, they are evolving into a political force that both Washington and Brussels struggle to influence.
