The ongoing conflict between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia continues to escalate, marked by a cycle of retaliatory strikes. High-ranking executives from leading companies in the U.S. and Europe participated in Riyadh’s WPC Energy Congress remotely. Furthermore, it is reported that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is frequently relocating between secure palaces while under strict security measures. Meanwhile, intense ground combat persists in Yemen.
Aramco Experiences a ‘Limited’ Fire
In a recent development, Saudi forces bombed an oil depot in Sanaa, according to Al Jazeera. Ansar Allah claims that there were 119 Saudi airstrikes within just 24 hours on several locations, including Sanaa, al-Jawf, Taiz, and others, utilizing F-15 and Typhoon jets from Khamis Mushait and Taif airbases, along with missile fire from Najran and Jizan. Tragically, these strikes have led to civilian casualties, including women and children.
In a swift retaliation, Ansar Allah targeted an administrative building linked to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco in Dhahran, resulting in a “limited fire,” as reported by the AP.
Additionally, an Ansar Allah spokesperson condemned Saudi Arabia, labeling it the “Kingdom of the Horn of Satan,” and emphasized that true security and stability must be inclusive to all, failing which no one would enjoy them.
Reuters notes that a ballistic missile hit an office tower, causing significant damage to the upper three floors.
According to The Guardian, the Yemeni Oil Company reported that the storage unit that was bombed by the Saudis was empty, and the Riyadh Airport will remain closed at least until Saturday. This follows multiple missile attacks on the airport by Ansar Allah over the past few days.
Over 2000 flights have been affected, with major airlines including Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, Qatar Airways, and SriLankan suspending operations in Riyadh, according to Travel Market Report.
Saudi Oil Events Slightly Disrupted
The New York Times reported that delegates attending the WPC Energy Congress faced disruptions, necessitating rerouting to alternate airports and even countries. Notably, executives from Exxon, Shell, Chevron, and BP canceled their participation.
Reuters added that the Saudi government has made the forthcoming Future Investment Initiative a hybrid event, permitting executives to join remotely if they prefer.
High-profile global leaders such as Goldman Sachs CEO David Solomon, Standard Chartered CEO Bill Winters, and Citi’s CEO Jane Fraser were slated as speakers for the conference, based on a program draft dated October 6. Both Citi and Goldman Sachs have refrained from commenting on their executives’ attendance, while Standard Chartered did not respond immediately.
It remains uncertain if Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will attend either of these conferences, given his reportedly packed schedule of moving between bunkers and palaces with heavy security.
The Crown Prince Is Otherwise Occupied
The Wall Street Journal provided an exclusive insight:
Saudi press officials were unavailable for comment. Over the past decade, Prince Mohammed has invested extensively in projects with complex engineering requirements intended to demonstrate the kingdom’s modernization and attract investment and tourism. These projects include the futuristic city of Neom, a monumental building in Riyadh, and a desert ski resort. However, the overarching cost has soared into the trillions, a daunting figure for a government with an annual budget around $350 billion. Rising defense and infrastructure expenses due to the war with Iran are complicating these financial calculations significantly.
The continued decline in foreign investment in early 2026 has fallen well short of the Crown Prince’s ambitious 2030 targets. Increasing military and infrastructural costs threaten to divert resources crucial for economic diversification. Even initiatives to position the kingdom as an AI hub now face new threats, with data centers becoming potential targets.
Several of the Crown Prince’s large-scale projects are either halted or under scrutiny. For instance, plans to host the 2029 Asian Winter Games have been abandoned. The government is also seeking funding for the World Expo 2030 and the FIFA World Cup in 2034.
According to Capital Economics, the non-oil sector of the economy contracted in the second quarter compared to the first. The Saudi Finance Ministry has now revised its GDP forecast to anticipate a 3.6% decline in 2026.
…Despite Prince Mohammed’s attempts to strengthen his ties with Trump through a promise of $1 trillion in investments in the U.S., the U.S. has held back from granting military assistance to counter the Houthi advances, although it has provided military advisers.
The kingdom is appealing for support from its military ally Pakistan and is actively seeking air defenses worldwide, as well as considering recruitment of foreign fighters to bolster its Yemeni allies. Concurrently, it appears to be exploring avenues for diplomatic resolutions to what seems to be an increasingly intractable conflict.
The Telegraph criticized the perceived timidity of MBS, questioning the effectiveness of the kingdom’s defense spending:
Saudi officials are reportedly running low on their stock of the costly Patriot interceptors, which are used to neutralize incoming ballistic missiles.
On paper, the Saudi military should overwhelmingly outmatch the Houthi fighters it has been battling intermittently for over a decade.
Holding the eighth-largest defense budget globally, Saudi Arabia spent around $83 billion on its armed forces in 2025 alone.
With a formidable air force and with the U.S. agreeing in November 2025 to sell F-35 stealth fighters for its fleet, one might expect better results.
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Thomas Juneau, a security analyst at the University of Ottawa, remarked: “Though Saudi air defenses have intercepted some Houthi missile and drone attacks, the expansive nature of Saudi Arabia makes consistent defense impossible.”Analysts suggest that despite substantial defense expenditures, the Saudi forces are fragmented and poorly coordinated.
Heavy investment in prestigious weapons systems has not compensated for organizational weaknesses, leading to a military primarily focused on safeguarding the royal family rather than effective external defense.
Munaeem Jamal reported on speculation that MBS has attributed failures against Ansar Allah to his brother, Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman, hinting at claims of corruption and embezzlement within the royal family. Reports suggest that Khalid responded by indicating that funds and weapons cannot rectify the strategic missteps initiated by Mohammed in the conflict with Yemen.
However, Munaeem also mentioned the challenging historical context of blaming Khalid for these issues, as he has only been defense minister since 2022, and the war’s inception falls squarely on Mohammed bin Salman’s shoulders.
Alastair Crooke anticipates potential “insurrection and regime change” in Saudi Arabia, emphasizing the fragile and artificial nature of the kingdom, alongside the multitude of adversaries within the royal family and among the diverse tribes populating the country.
The NY Times noted that “Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has offered to mediate between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, cautioning that the overlapping regional conflicts lack a military solution.”
In his recent remarks, President Trump stated:
“The Houthis are acting very disruptively. I believed they learned their lesson last year when we decisively struck against them. They had been quiet for some time, but now they’ve resurfaced, likely on Iran’s orders—an increasingly failing nation grappling with issues like rampant inflation and a lack of military capabilities—all while trying to escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia and manipulate oil prices prior to the U.S. elections. It’s imperative they understand I’m not on the ballot; I’ve already secured a monumental victory, and I will return after the elections, and I will remember this!”
Now, let’s delve into the evolving situation in Yemen.
Taiz Faces Encirclement, Saudi-Aligned Forces Report Gains in Marib
According to AP News, Ansar Allah has surrounded Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city. Multiple sources assert that Ansar Allah successfully captured the Al-Hangar checkpoint at the city’s western entrance. However, other accounts have disputed these claims. YNP has reported that Ansar Allah militants have also taken control of the city’s central prison.
Saudi-aligned outlets report that the defenders of Taiz are maintaining their positions. On October 13, the Taiz military command announced that nine airstrikes were conducted, five targeting Ansar Allah positions in al-Dhabab valley and four in al-Misrakh to the south. Airstrikes on October 12 targeted Milat, Tabbat al-Khalwa, and al-Karba, as Ansar Allah reportedly advanced toward Najd Qasim and the Hanjar checkpoint at the city’s southwest entrance, continuing to assault al-Dhabab and al-Aqroud. Coalition spokesperson Col. Majed al-Nuzaili claimed that 950 Ansar Allah fighters were “neutralized” and 380 vehicles destroyed during nine days of the “Dawn of Yemen” campaign. Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance outlet, al-Sahil al-Gharbi, asserted that Brig. Mujahid Ahmed Ali and 25 of his escorts were killed at al-Dhabab, with “dozens” taken prisoner; they noted that the southwestern entrance is now “secured” and claimed more than 150 Ansar Allah fighters were killed in an ambush at al-Sirari. These figures remain unverified independently, and Anadolu reports that fighting is still ongoing on the al-Shaqab front south of the city.
On the Bab al-Mandab front, little has changed. The Center for Threat Analysis indicates that Saudi-aligned forces have not made any headway past Dhubab airport since October 5 and observed no territorial shifts on the coastal plain following events on the 12th. Ansar Allah has held control of Mocha since September 10, with the status of Mayun (Perim) island remaining contested: Saudi ambassador Mohammed Al Jaber declared Bab al-Mandab “cleared” on October 9, though Saudi-aligned military sources informed AFP the following day that the island remains in Ansar Allah’s control. According to Ansar Allah’s Hizam al-Asad, “our forces maintain control over Bab al-Mandab and Mayun Island.” AFP reported at least 63 casualties over a 24-hour period around the strait: 35 Saudi-aligned troops and 28 Ansar Allah fighters. A Saudi-aligned commander informed the BBC that approximately 500 Ansar Allah fighters are positioned on the high ground overlooking the strait. Fighting has also spread inland towards Lahj, where Ansar Allah seeks to outflank coastal forces: YNP reported the Subaiha front fell on October 13, while elements of the Giants Brigades withdrew from al-Saqiya and Ras al-Ara. Nonetheless, Khabar states the attack was thwarted with “some units” making “tactical withdrawals,” prompting thousands of families to flee towards Tur al-Baha and Aden. Shipping activities have largely continued uninterrupted, with no incidents reported in the Red Sea since a small vessel engaged the container ship CUL Klang on October 7, and carriers are returning to Suez ahead of schedule.
UAE Forces Receiving Western Attention
Last week, The Telegraph provided coverage for the UAE:
On a windswept beach by the Red Sea, a flag emblazoned with crossed swords and a shield was raised, displaying the Arabic text: “The Southern Giants Brigade.”
This marked the resurgence of the most feared militia in Yemen, highlighting a significant shift in the dynamics between three dominant regional powers – Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – playing out on Yemeni soil.
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Recognized as a militia fighting under Yemen’s internationally acknowledged government, they are in practice orchestrated and financed by the UAE.Estimates of the Giants Brigade’s strength range from 20,000 to 30,000 fighters, possibly swelling to as many as 70,000. They are organized into numerous brigades with their own training facilities, intelligence units, and media operations.
The militias, known in Arabic as Alwiya al-Amaliqa, were formed amid the chaos of Yemen’s civil war beginning in 2015.Rooted in Salafism, a conservative strand of Sunni Islam, these groups strive to emulate the lives of the earliest Muslims – the salaf, or “pious predecessors.”
GIS Reports provides an elevated perspective:
Ongoing tensions between the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) and the Saudi-backed internationally recognized Yemeni government continue to manifest. Each side blames the other for recent territorial losses to Ansar Allah.
This power struggle is not a new phenomenon; since the STC’s formation in 2017 with Emirati backing, it has fueled friction between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. The rivalry intensified in December 2025 and January 2026 when armed confrontations erupted in southern and eastern Yemen. Those developments signaled a significant shift, with the STC, the main separatist group, seemingly imploding, causing Saudi Arabia to assume a more dominant role in the south.
The conflict was sparked by the STC’s advance into Hadramawt and al-Mahra, regions beyond their established strongholds, which Saudi Arabia perceived as a direct threat to its territorial security. As a result, it exerted military and political pressure, culminating in the STC’s announced dissolution in Riyadh on January 9, 2026. However, several council leaders deemed this announcement illegitimate.
Despite setbacks in early 2026, the STC remains a significant force in southern Yemen. Any meaningful dialogue between groups in Yemen must include their representation. Even post-“dissolution,” the STC continues to rally grassroots support, mobilizing large numbers towards its separatist objectives. Recurring pro-STC demonstrations in Aden, Mukalla, and Seiyun reveal that the faction retains considerable influence and has not been extinguished. These protests also highlight Riyadh’s challenge in converting military and political dominance into a sustained influence in southern Yemen.
The STC’s aspirations for an independent South Yemen resonate with many who remember the separate state from 1967 to 1990. Attempts at unity in Yemen post-Cold War have proven tenuous, and numerous southerners still harbor grievances from the unification era. Although the STC is one faction in a broader independence movement, it seeks to serve as the overarching representative for all pro-independence groups in southern Yemen, even amid rival factions challenging its leadership.
As the situation unfolds, the complexities and challenges facing Yemen remain formidable. The continued conflict underscores the fragility of regional dynamics and the impact of international interests.
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