In recent years, a growing sense of disillusionment has taken hold among voters across Europe and the United States, prompting frustrations from the political elite. This sentiment is exemplified by the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, which continues to gain momentum. This phenomenon raises critical questions about the future of democracy and how established political parties are responding to the changing landscape.
As populist parties gain traction—often characterized as any movement that challenges the status quo—the broader implications for democratic governance come into question. Notably, Adam Tooze recently suggested the idea of disregarding AfD voters entirely, which stirred concern given his previously nuanced understanding of socio-economic factors influencing political shifts.
Tooze’s 2006 publication, The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy, provided profound insights into the socio-economic undercurrents that facilitated the Nazis’ rise to power. He wrote:
The aggression of Hitler’s regime can thus be rationalized as an intelligible response to the tensions stirred up by the uneven development of global capitalism, tensions that are of course still with us today. But at the same time, an understanding of the economic fundamentals also sharpens our appreciation of the profound irrationality of Hitler’s project.
This reference isn’t a direct comparison between the AfD and the Nazis but highlights how historical lessons may be overlooked in a climate of increasing panic regarding political stability. Tooze’s response to the AfD’s recent electoral success in Saxony-Anhalt suggests a growing ambivalence towards engaging with these new voters:
To my mind, if progressive policy hopes to engage with such voters at all – and it is an open question whether it should – it must address not just the material realities of relative economic disadvantage, but above all the “outsider” credentials of the AfD…The more obvious conclusion is that to contest the political terrain with the AfD, if that is indeed something we want to do, we need to offer not more of the same (just better), but an “alternative to the Alternative” that can produce something more than just material benefits. That can produce identity.
These discussions reflect a broader trend seen throughout Europe and the U.S. Should centrist parties cater only to optimistic, diverse, and progressive communities, as Hillary Clinton once implied? Why does the political elite hastily label these voters as unredeemable racists? Are we to believe that a significant portion of the German electorate is truly comprised of irredeemable xenophobes? How does this dynamic reflect on the political strategies of established parties?
So Why Are They Voting for AfD?
To understand the support for the AfD, we must first consider the socio-political and economic conditions in Germany in recent years. Austerity measures have led to declining living standards, as illustrated by Wolfgang Streeck’s analysis:
For Germany, all governments, regardless of their leadership, face intractable issues stemming from a policy of austerity that has resulted in underinvestment in public services. These challenges include stagnant growth, deteriorating infrastructure, a housing crisis, the failure to adapt to climate change, an ineffective immigration policy in light of an aging population, an underfunded education system, and rising income inequality, particularly affecting lower-income families. Anxiety about future state services is widespread, fueling discontent.
In recent years, Germany has welcomed record levels of immigration, peaking at 2.6 million in 2022. In this context, traditional political parties have largely abandoned the working class in their quest for geoeconomic strength, creating fertile ground for the rise of the AfD.
Are all AfD supporters xenophobes? While Tooze claims the party is largely comprised of “racist xenophobes,” data indicates otherwise. A poll by the Instituts für Demoskopie Allensbach found that only 2 percent of Germans held neo-Nazi beliefs. Moreover, nearly 44 percent of AfD supporters do not identify with either neo-Nazi or far-right ideologies. Instead, many express concerns over economic conditions and immigration policies, seeking a political outlet for their dissatisfaction.
Indeed, several voters may support the AfD to voice their grievances with existing policies, express opposition to the ongoing war in Ukraine, or simply convey frustration with the established political class that has long ignored their needs. It signifies a deeper failure of progressivism, which has drifted from its core principles, and a centrist approach that seems to overlook the plight of working-class voters.
Social scientist Manès Weisskircher outlines three primary factors contributing to the AfD’s support in Eastern Germany:
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The neoliberal ‘great transformation’ has drastically altered the Eastern German economy, leading to both emigration and economic anxiety.
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East Germans continue to feel marginalized and resentful of immigration policies that appear to overlook their needs.
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There is widespread disenchantment with the political system and a lack of faith in political participation.
Numerous studies indicate that austerity measures create an environment conducive to the rise of xenophobic parties. A 2021 article in the Journal of Economic History demonstrated a clear correlation between austerity-imposed hardships and increased support for the Nazi Party in early 20th-century Germany. Similarly, more recent studies show that fiscal tightening leads to instability and a surge in votes for parties like the AfD.
The foundational lesson seems straightforward: the political center pretends that market-driven neoliberal policies reflect democratic ideals, while many voters express dissent. While Tooze highlights the economic anxieties among AfD supporters, he also acknowledges their concerns regarding foreigners and societal issues. He observes:
If you ask AfD voters what they worry about, alongside their xenophobic concerns about “too many foreigners,” they will mention the cost of living, climate change, and other insecurities. However, they rarely cite economic issues as a primary reason for their vote.
Political analysts often compartmentalize issues like immigration and the economy; however, the interplay between these factors is complex. Growing up or living within working-class communities reveals how economic stress can sap vitality, leading to anger and resentment, further complicating political alignments.
Did AfD’s Rise Cause Political Crisis, or Was Germany Already in Crisis?
Tooze writes that the AfD’s impact poses a significant threat to Germany’s political structure, signifying a disintegration of familiar political norms:
This result shakes Germany’s political system. It demonstrates how far the established norms of the Federal Republic have collapsed… The crisis of German democracy has long been forecast. It now seems to be upon us.
However, one could argue that this crisis has been unfolding for years. The past five years, marked by robust military support against Russia that has hampered the German economy and heightened austerity, may indicate a pre-existing crisis. Public support for aggression abroad, ascendant censorship, and historical unresolved tensions have compounded the climate of mistrust.
As Tooze notes, a decline in trust began during the 2000s, primarily due to the Red-Green government’s significant overhaul of Germany’s welfare model:
…the breakdown of trust happened in the 2000s due to the Red-Green government’s dramatic assault on the German model of welfare and labor market administration – known as the “Hartz IV reforms”…
Consequently, when traditional leftist parties abandon their constituents, ignoring their struggles and demonizing immigrants, it creates a ripe environment for parties like the AfD to flourish.
Furthermore, it raises the question of wisdom in adopting high immigration levels while concurrently slashing social services and allowing the financialization of the economy. Opposition to increased immigration doesn’t equate to xenophobia, especially in a context where the state struggles to fund essential services. How high must immigration numbers rise before opposing them isn’t deemed xenophobic? Is there a universal threshold, or is unconditional support expected across all cases?
While we shouldn’t fault immigrants seeking a better life, the responsibility lies with a political class that has pursued these policies. We must also remember many immigrants come from regions devastated by conflicts involving powerful Western nations.
Tooze suggests that those concerned about the economy should vote for other parties:
If you are hard up and working-class it would, after all, be nothing short of bizarre to vote for the AfD in the hope of improved social protection. There are parties in Sachsen-Anhalt offering a progressive welfarist program – notably Die Linke and arguably the SPD and the Greens as well – and the voters are not flocking to them.
Tooze may have a valid point to some extent; however, it is crucial to recognize that these parties have also moved away from worker-centric policies toward identity politics and neoliberalism. For instance, the Greens, represented by former Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock’s controversial remark:
That moment when Annalena Baerbock, former German Foreign Minister, said: “I will put Ukraine first no matter what my German voters think or how hard their life gets” pic.twitter.com/suaJGf0sEz
This lack of trustworthiness among established parties complicates the landscape for voters. Although the AfD may not be a trustworthy alternative, its unpredictable nature might appeal to those disillusioned with the political status quo. The principle of “the enemy of my enemy” could be driving support for the AfD.
A Deepening Crisis
If Germany was already in crisis, the AfD’s rise may exacerbate it further. The party’s narrative fails to provide meaningful solutions, focusing instead on scapegoating foreigners and aligning with wealthy interests. This approach isn’t a viable remedy for Germany’s challenges.
There is speculation that the AfD could steer Germany away from military escalation, but skeptics remain unconvinced. The party has begun to make controversial calls for the removal of Ukrainian refugees, which suggests alignment with harmful nationalist outlooks rather than constructive policy-making.
This reality underscores an uncomfortable truth that the political establishment prefers to overlook: the incoming administration may not differ significantly from the previous one. What remains is the urgent question of how to build a democracy that acknowledges and engages a broader spectrum of the electorate rather than dismissing a substantial portion as irredeemable.
Wolfgang Streeck offers some compelling recommendations for proponents of genuine democracy:
What should those on the side of ‘democracy’ do? A first step would be to admit that, after all these years of ‘credit-pump capitalism,’ as Ralf Dahrendorf called it, there can be no magic formula; and a second would be to stop making promises everyone knows are hollow: that we will ‘kickstart the economy’… Above all, questions must be asked—particularly by the left—before an audience we must still regard as capable of reason if democracy is to exist.
The pressing concerns surrounding social inequality, declining public services, and disillusionment with the political process call for robust dialogue and systematic reforms. The present moment necessitates mature engagement with voters, rather than the superficiality all too common in modern political discourse.
