In today’s geopolitical landscape, the issue of nuclear nonproliferation is riddled with contradictions. Joseph Busby highlights the enduring hypocrisy of nuclear weapons states, especially concerning their shifting doctrines and efforts to normalize the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Kevin Kirk’s insightful piece, Armageddon Now! Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program, thoroughly explores Israel’s journey in nuclear weapons development, detailing how nations like France, Great Britain, and South Africa contributed essential knowledge and resources.
This discussion is crucial, especially as we navigate the complexities of the US-Saudi nuclear agreement, which appears to be progressing. A reaction from Trita Parsi, found in Trump’s Saudi nuclear agreement may prolong the Iran war, captures some of the tensions:
A final deal between the United States and Iran is slipping further out of reach….
Even if these obstacles were resolved, profound differences over the nuclear issue would remain, significantly exacerbated by Trump’s nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia. Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association has published an excellent FAQ on its most critical aspects.
The bottom line is that Trump is granting Saudi Arabia access to uranium-enrichment technology that the United States has barred from Iran for over thirty years, imposing a weaker inspection regime on Saudi activities. Essentially, it amounts to Washington paving the way for Riyadh to acquire nuclear weapons while insisting Iran have no enrichment capability at all—the controversial zero-enrichment objective….
The comparison with Iran is particularly striking. When Iran enhanced its enrichment to 20 percent in 2010 to produce fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor, originally provided by the U.S. during the Atoms for Peace program in the late 1960s, Washington cited this as evidence of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
State Department spokesperson Philip Crowley stated on February 11, 2010, that Iran’s decision to enrich at 20 percent “further solidifies… our impression and that of the international community that Iran’s nuclear intentions are anything but peaceful.”…
Now, however, Trump seeks Congress’s approval for a deal with Saudi Arabia that grants access to the same enrichment technology—yet with significantly fewer inspections—while attacking Iran to prevent its possession of any enrichment capabilities.
It’s noteworthy that at least one U.S. President genuinely aimed to curb the proliferation of nuclear arms:
🇺🇸🇮🇱 Fmr CIA Officer John Kiriakou:
“There are 10,000 documents [related to the Kennedy assassination] that are never going to be released [by Trump].
Because every single one of them points directly at Israel.
[JFK] was actively trying to disrupt the Israelis from acquiring… pic.twitter.com/4bUwxCzi7p
— Mario Nawfal (@MarioNawfal) March 25, 2026
By Joseph Busby, the founder and director of Reality-Based Analysis Group (RBAG), an independent geopolitical analysis firm based in Vienna, Austria. RBAG is affiliated with the Association for the Promotion of International Development and Stability (APIDS, apids.at). For more insights, visit rbag.at. Originally published at the Reality-Based Analysis Group website
I. The Lies that Frame the Narrative
For years, a misleading narrative around nuclear nonproliferation has been perpetuated. This isn’t merely a product of intentional deceit; many perpetuating these myths are repeating what they have been taught to believe. The prevalent claim suggests Ukraine relinquished its nuclear arms for territorial assurances, with the West now obligated to protect it, following Russia’s invasion in February 2022. Another myth claims that South Africa voluntarily disarmed to reintegrate into the global community. Both narratives, however, are fabricated, emphasizing the necessity of a Western security umbrella from various perspectives.
Since the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the flawed interpretation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum has gained traction in Ukrainian circles, which has significantly influenced public discourse. At the Soviet Union’s dissolution, around 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads were stationed in what became independent Ukraine. The Budapest Memorandum, signed by Russia, Ukraine, the U.S., and the U.K., facilitated the return of these warheads in exchange for guarantees about Ukraine’s territorial integrity. However, the Memorandum is not, and never was, a binding treaty; it merely provided political assurances—not military guarantees. Crucially, the warheads were never under Ukrainian command, remaining under Soviet authority. Despite Ukraine’s efforts to access launch codes, they ultimately couldn’t use the weapons. The return of these unusable warheads does not equate to a selfless act of sacrifice; instead, it reflects the reality that a state would not trade away a deterrent of its own for non-binding promises. The real lesson is clear: the assurances from major powers often prove meaningless. Ukraine’s territorial aspirations remain precarious, with no guaranteed return to pre-war borders.
This misleading narrative serves Ukraine’s purpose of framing its surrender of nuclear arms as a debt owed to it by the West—creating a compelling case for military and financial support. Under the premise that if Ukraine voluntarily sacrificed its weapons based on a promise of protection, it follows that Russia’s violation of that promise necessitates Western support. For proponents of Ukrainian NATO membership, the argument is further intensified: since the Budapest commitments were ignored, NATO membership becomes imperative for actual defense under Article 5. This rationale makes Western military support seem like a moral obligation to repay a debt.
In contrasting narratives, South Africa’s disarmament is often painted as a conscience-driven choice by a rogue state. Yet, the truth is more complex. When apartheid rule began to wane in 1989, President F.W. de Klerk ordered the dismantling of the country’s nuclear program, which included six operational weapons and an additional one under construction. By February 1990, the African National Congress (ANC) could finally operate freely, and within a year, the nuclear arsenal was eliminated, though this was formally announced only in March 1993 amid a political transition.
Official narratives claim the disarmament stemmed from a post-Cold War environment and peace settlements. While these statements hold grains of truth, the decision ultimately reflected South Africa’s unique transition, aimed at preventing a nuclear arsenal from falling into the hands of its former adversaries. The Afrikaner government was primarily motivated by the desire to retain exclusive control—an action rooted in the same racist ideologies that perpetuated their regime.
The misleading nature of this narrative reinforces a flawed understanding of disarmament as a moral choice, which is often cited to justify pressures applied on other nations, like Iraq, Libya, Iran, and North Korea. In actuality, South Africa’s motives debunk the narrative surrounding successful nuclear disarmament driven by persuasion, showcasing that no state has willingly surrendered its deterrent capability without a shift in power dynamics or authority.
These accounts bolster the overarching narrative that nations should submit to the Western security umbrella—the idea that unilateral disarmament aligns them under its protective shield. Conversely, a lack of such protection leaves states vulnerable to invasion. Attempts to build a nuclear deterrent often result in sanctions or military action, as seen in the US and Israeli assaults on Iran in 2025 and 2026.
Decoding these stories yields an alarming message: the only instance of a state relinquishing a functional nuclear arsenal occurred when change was inevitable for the ruling regime. Critically, no nation today finds itself in that exact predicament; no government would opt to give up its deterrent in favor of someone else’s unreliable protective promises.
II. An Eroding Deterrence
The concept of credible nuclear deterrence traditionally maintained that no nuclear-armed state could be invaded or overthrown—a stance that held true throughout the Cold War. Yet, this belief was profoundly challenged by the escalation in Ukraine beginning in late 2022, culminating in an unprecedented attack against the Engels strategic bomber base deep within Russia. This represented a substantial portion of Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities.
This was soon followed by assaults on critical Russian radar installations essential for missile detection. Targeting these installations compromises Russia’s ability to respond effectively to perceived threats and raises the risk of miscalculations in a crisis, as the state would have limited time to deliberate before launching a counterstrike. Notably, these radars were not employed in the Ukraine conflict, making their destruction a considerable escalation—with Russia having previously laid out conditions under which nuclear responses would be warranted. This chain of events marked an unprecedented risk within a nuclear context.
The culmination of these assaults occurred on June 1, 2025, when Ukraine claimed responsibility for an audacious strike on Russian airfields, utilizing specially modified trucks to release a large number of drones targeting strategic bombers. Regardless of the debate surrounding the operation’s success, the essential fact remains: Ukraine, with Western backing, attacked Russian nuclear assets. Furthermore, the precedent of Ukrainian forces invading Russian territory in Kursk demonstrated that such actions, once unthinkable during the Cold War, had become viable under the current geopolitical climate. Remarkably, these offensive maneuvers occurred despite Russia’s status as the world’s foremost nuclear power, raising questions about the deterrent capacity of such an arsenal. This leads to unsettling implications: Russian deterrence has demonstrably failed, as these actions have incited further escalations, suggesting that nuclear weapons might be more likely to be used than previously assumed.
What stands out is that none of the Russian nuclear responses anticipated or followed these tactics; rather, a series of conventional retaliations ensued, which included advanced military assets like the jet-powered Geran-4 drones. This absence of nuclear engagement points to a troubling conclusion: while nuclear arms may effectively dissuade regime changes, they appear to hold little weight in broader conflict scenarios—implying an alarming normalization of tactical nuclear weapon use.
III. A New Threshold
In response to the erosion of deterrence values, Moscow has been vocal about the need for strategic shifts. Recognizing that traditional nuclear capabilities primarily deter attempts to subjugate a state, Russian officials have stirred discussions around lowering the threshold for nuclear engagement. This shift began taking shape in November 2024, alongside an increased deployment of nuclear weapons dispersed across geopolitical backdrops, notably areas like Belarus. The operational debut of the unique Oreshnik weapon illustrated this change, marking a significant reduction in strategic deterrence effectiveness.
The initial discussions surrounding this transition originated from Dr. Sergei Karaganov. His public musings argued that the anxiety historically associated with nuclear capabilities had substantially lessened since the Cold War. His contention—that the decades post-Soviet dissolution had led to strategic negligence, undermining the intended deterrent effects of nuclear arms—though conceptually sound, faced palpable resistance. President Putin quickly distanced himself from such extreme recommendations, which nevertheless laid the groundwork for gradual policy shifts. With ongoing escalations arising from Ukrainian-NATO operations against Russia, the space for that hesitance dwindled over time.
Pursuing this direction, the United States publicly explored similar concepts in August 2026—eerily coinciding with the anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing. Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary of War for Policy, revealed plans directed at regional nuclear strategies, moving away from grand-scale strategic deployments. Though stopping short of utilizing the term “tactical,” the logic underlying this transition suggested that adversaries need to foresee the potential for nuclear engagement, distinguishing it from traditional deterrence scenarios. Under this logic, should a nation’s nuclear deployment equate to urban destruction, it essentially removes itself from consideration as a credible deterrent in localized conflicts. On the other hand, smaller-yield tactical capabilities are perceived as actionable threats easily grasped by adversaries—potentially incentivizing their utilization.
China quickly responded, underscoring the inherent risks in these policy shifts from both the United States and Russia. The implications of lowering nuclear thresholds and normalizing usage could precipitate a dangerous arms race, posing global threats while undermining nuclear stability. All these developments reveal an unsettling transition towards a new era of nuclear policy, raising serious concerns regarding the future.
IV. The Double Standard
An enduring layer of contradiction within nuclear nonproliferation discourse lies in the double standards upheld by Western powers. A telling example occurred in July 2026 when U.S. President Trump proclaimed that Iran could “never” acquire nuclear weapons, yet simultaneously paved the way for an Iranian ally, Saudi Arabia. While Iran had made extensive concessions under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), limiting enrichment levels and subjecting itself to strict inspections, Saudi Arabia’s track record appears dubious. Having shown no genuine renunciation of enrichment or reprocessing and only cooperating with inspections since 2024, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia proceeded to ink a “123 Agreement,” permitting nuclear material transfers. This scenario starkly contrasts the treatment of Iran, which complied with stringent provisions and was met with military aggression.
In this tortured logic, the United States finds itself affirming Israeli nuclear capabilities by glancing over their incongruities—Israel’s arsenal of approximately ninety nuclear warheads remains unacknowledged, while the U.S. disregards its implications entirely. The inequities extend to India and Pakistan, who built their nuclear programs outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and later drew acceptance. Meanwhile, nations like Iran, which accepted a rigorous inspections regime, are demonized and attacked. The consequences of these inconsistencies resonate, shaping trends as other U.S. allies express desires for similar pathways toward nuclear capabilities, particularly South Korea, followed closely by the UAE, Turkey, and Egypt.
This double standard inadvertently heightens the likelihood of nuclear weapons use, as U.S. allies gain access to pathways for developing nuclear capabilities, creating a grim scenario. Such allowances, coupled with punitive actions against compliant states like Iran, will likely lead to increased proliferation and a dangerous arms race on the horizon.
V. Lessons Learned
Countries observing these developments are drawing consequential lessons. Libya, which surrendered its inchoate nuclear program to ensure international support, faces the tragic reality that it was instead doomed, with Gaddafi’s brutal end serving as a stark warning. In contrast, North Korea, fully armed, has maintained its sovereignty unchallenged, demonstrating the varying responses to disarmament and defiance.
The narratives emerging in Libya and Ukraine highlight that assurances of safety and respect from hegemonic powers are not only hollow but often manipulated for political gain. The consequences of such duplicity reinforce skepticism and breed mistrust, particularly towards Western commitments. Similar historical patterns reveal that states precariously navigating the nuclear landscape may absorb these lessons differently, influenced by their experiences with power dynamics and the potential for international exploitation.
VI. The Wild Card
As these doctrinal transitions unfold, they occur amid a dismantling of the legal frameworks surrounding nonproliferation. The New START treaty, which provided some control over nuclear arsenals, lapsed as of February 5, 2026, without a clear successor on the horizon, leaving a perilous void regarding limits on nuclear weaponry. Notably, smaller-yield tactical weapons lie entirely outside previous agreements—they weren’t capped under New START. Thus, the discussions now center around deploying these unrestricted tactical weapons, raising red flags about preparedness and accountability.
VII. The Danger Zone
The cumulative effect of these dynamics has plunged the global arena into an increasingly perilous state. Nuclear threats have become commonplace, reflecting the reality that states no longer regard them as uniquely catastrophic. The absence of meaningful repercussions for aggressive actions, such as those observed in the Ukrainian context, bear witness to the diminishing efficacy of traditional deterrence. During the December 2025 drone incident aimed at the Russian President, retaliation fell short of nuclear engagement, illustrating the shift toward conventional responses.
In the wake of such provocations, Russia fortified its defenses without escalating to nuclear levels, suggesting a clear departure from established deterrence models. This suggests that the evolving doctrine is shifting away from mutual restraint, marking a new era within the nuclear strategy that casts a long shadow over global security. The ongoing shifts towards and normalization of tactical nuclear weapons, especially in the context of U.S.-aligned partners, indicate a transformational phase at a critical juncture of history. Expect an uptick in nuclear-capable states, not just in the Middle East but globally, as the landscape continues to shift and evolve.
In summary, the dynamics at play in nuclear proliferation today signal a disturbing transformation. With the dissolution of prior constraints, the normalization of tactical nuclear weapons, and the evident double standards in the international community, the prospects for stability appear increasingly wobbly. Moreover, the motivations behind these shifts are unlikely to vanish; instead, they will likely pave the way for a turbulent era characterized by heightened tensions and potential use of nuclear arms on the battlefield. Those who control and exploit these shifting landscapes will always find a justification for their actions—tactical nuclear weapons will be no exception.
