The recent signing of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement has created a striking image of three prominent leaders—Muhammad bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia; Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey; and Shehbaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan—praying together against the backdrop of Mecca. This moment holds significant symbolism for Muslim communities, who represent nearly a quarter of the global population.
Often referred to as the ‘Islamic NATO’, this agreement aims to combine Saudi financial resources, Turkey’s defense industry, and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. Yet, as many analysts, including Conor Gallagher on this blog, have emphasized, the alliance is unlikely to generate substantial military power in the near future. A key impediment is that the countries involved have existing defense agreements primarily with the United States, which restricts their ability to operate autonomously.
Israeli and Iranian analysts perceive this pact as a strategic counterbalance to their regional aspirations. This newly formed ‘Sunni bloc’ has come together in reaction to Israel’s setbacks in the region, including its actions in Gaza, the ongoing annexation of the West Bank, and its occupations in southern Lebanon and parts of Syria, all of which contribute to the ‘Greater Israel’ initiative. The pact could provide a credible counterfront, especially if additional nations like Egypt and Qatar join.
The agreement is also a response to Iran’s rising regional power status, which is increasingly recognized on the international stage. Iran has not only survived confrontations with Israel and the U.S. but has also dealt them a strategic setback. This has bolstered Iran’s regional authority and equipped it to demand concessions, such as control over the vital Strait of Hormuz. If the current trajectory of conflict continues—which appears likely—Iran could emerge even stronger, albeit more distanced from its immediate neighbors.
Israel might be hoping for such an outcome. Tel Aviv would prefer to fragment Iran, but absent that possibility, it cannot allow Iranian relations with other Arab nations to normalize. Israel does not particularly fear an isolated Iran, nor is it overly concerned about the emergence of a ‘Sunni bloc’ aligned with the U.S. Its primary apprehension lies in a partnership between Iran and its Arab Sunni counterparts.
This is why Washington has reacted positively to the agreement. The involved nations, along with potential future members, are deeply integrated into the U.S. security framework in the region. For the time being, the pact seems likely to align either in cooperation or direct partnership with U.S. interests—and by extension, Israeli objectives.
However, this alliance has the potential to evolve beyond its initial intentions. It is built upon established regional projects such as the Hejaz Railway, which links Istanbul to Mecca via Syria and Jordan. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative aims to connect Iran and Turkey to Europe. The Road Development Project also proposes to link the Persian Gulf with Europe. Should these infrastructure and trade networks come to fruition, we could see the dawn of a new Middle East. However, for this transformation to occur, Iran must be a crucial participant.
Such a ‘New Middle East’ would contradict the vision held by Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders. They have actively sought to sever connections with Iran to prevent its integration into the region. This argument was articulated in a paper published by the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS) shortly before the ‘Ramadan War’.
In essence, the paper contended that the perceived ‘victories’ achieved by the U.S. and Israel were tipping the balance of power toward Tel Aviv, thus prompting the formation of a Sunni bloc in response. More alarmingly, this bloc appeared willing to collaborate with Iran to contain Israeli influence—a scenario they deemed unacceptable. From their perspective, U.S. and Israeli forces must confront Iran, regardless of immediate outcomes, as this could either weaken Iran or distance it from its neighbors.
While they were able to unite three key regional actors, this coalition is not solely focused on opposing them; it also positions itself against Iran. They seem to assume the questionable idea that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” A significant oversight is that Iran could emerge not only as a regional power but also gain ideological influence among many Sunni Muslims.
The U.S. and Israel have accomplished something that no amount of Iranian propaganda could achieve. By resisting them, Iran has gained legitimacy in the eyes of numerous Sunni Muslims. The devastation wrought by the U.S. over the years, resulting in countless casualties from its futile military actions, along with the atrocities committed by Israel—especially in Gaza—has led many Muslims to view Iran as an avenger. The Iranian regime has adeptly leveraged this perception in its wartime messaging.
For instance, the Yaqeen Institute, a U.S.-based Sunni research organization, produced a series of videos discussing the theological and historical divisions between Sunni and Shia Islam. However, the series faced criticism not only from Shias but also from Sunnis, prompting them to retract one episode and issue an apology. The underlying sentiment was clear: now is not the time for sectarian divisions; unity with Iran is of utmost importance.
Similarly, Yasir Qadhi, a noted U.S. Muslim scholar and former proponent of Salafi ideology, engaged in open dialogue with Shaykh Mahdi Rastani, a prominent Shia scholar. Such conversations would have been inconceivable before recent events, largely because Muslims have increasingly become targets of hostility in the West, while Iran has stood out as a nation publicly championing Muslim causes against U.S. and Israeli aggression.
Of course, resentment still exists on both sides. Recent conflicts in the Middle East have exploited and intensified Sunni-Shia tensions for geopolitical gain, a strategy Israel has employed—demonstrated by the aforementioned paper—while typically dismissing both sects. Nevertheless, Iran has gained unprecedented legitimacy. I have encountered Sunni Muslims who, despite their rejection of Shia theology, are reassessing their political alignments, influenced by Iran’s model.
The image of the three leaders—representing some of the most significant Muslim-majority nations—is aimed at countering this shifting narrative. By standing united in front of the Kaaba, these leaders project a cohesive Sunni front with claims to represent nearly a quarter of the global population. This declaration bears not only religious significance but geopolitical weight. Yet, no visual representation can overshadow the reality of Iranian military capabilities.
The potential for the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement to reshape the geopolitical landscape or establish a new security framework in the Middle East hinges on the inclusion of Iran. I assert that nation-states cannot wholly embody a religious order, as divergent claims to sovereignty exist. Therefore, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, and others must transcend their theological disputes, affirm their national identities, and collaborate for mutual benefit.
Ultimately, no narrative will resonate with the majority of Muslims if it does not fundamentally oppose Israel and its genocidal actions.
