Conor here: As the United States attempts to replicate its previous strategy against Russia, it now faces a different adversary that holds sway over critical global minerals essential for weapon production. What could possibly go wrong?
In the meantime, the AUKUS Public Inquiry in Australia is currently ongoing, scrutinizing the security pact that commits Canberra to spend hundreds of billions on nuclear-powered submarines that may never materialize. Here’s an evaluation of AUKUS from Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and former submarine officer who conducts war games for the Navy and its allies:
From the US perspective, AUKUS is advantageous. Australia is investing in our submarine industrial base, which is in dire need of support. They’re constructing a maintenance facility at Henderson and developing the pier infrastructure essential for basing submarines in Australia as part of the Submarine Rotational Force–West. Having a submarine positioned there doubles its operational availability compared to being stationed back in the continental US. Moreover, submarines needing repairs won’t have to return to Guam or Hawaii. Australia is funding all these initiatives.
Conversely, from Australia’s standpoint, this arrangement may prove less beneficial, as it will divert a significant amount of their military funding. They will have a fleet of submarines, a limited fighter wing, a handful of tankers, a few AWACS, and a small army primarily focused on border security in neighboring islands. That’s the entirety of their military capability.
If, for instance, Chinese maritime militia were to encircle Christmas Island and declare it a new operational zone, the Australians have only a few ships available to respond. Their readiness is low, and the entire fleet would be required for that single operation, leaving nothing for the protection of shipping routes.
This presents a tale of two cities. Australia is on track to become reliant on the US for its defense as a result of AUKUS, while simultaneously expressing doubts about the US’s capacity and willingness to provide that defense.
On the other hand, the US is depending on Australian bases being both available and defensible if a conflict with China arises, as Australia is one of the few locations where operations can be conducted at a survivable distance—Japan, by contrast, would be under continuous threat. Yet, alarmingly, no one is investing in the necessary infrastructure or defenses that would be required for establishing operational bases in Australia in the event of a military conflict with China.
This scenario aligns with our expectations. Elbridge Colby, “military-strategic mastermind,” indeed.
By Andrew Korybko, a political analyst based in Moscow, specializing in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, an institution affiliated with the Russian Foreign Ministry. This piece was first published on his website
The US is adopting its anti-Russian regional containment strategy against China.
In a significant speech delivered in Manila during the first leg of his Southeast Asia tour in early August, Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby outlined the US’s introduction of the NATO 3.0 concept to the region. He described how the US is shifting more of the responsibility for maintaining regional stability onto its allies and partners that share the common goal of establishing “an Asia free from hegemony.” This unstated aim ultimately seeks to contain China.
Colby referenced the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s address at May’s Shangri-La Dialogue to justify “maintaining a posture of deterrence by denial along the first island chain” from Japan to Borneo. The Philippines occupies a central position in this strategy and is deemed essential for constructing what has been referred to as AUKUS+. For more details on this concept and its US-backed alliance with Japan and the Philippines (and possibly Indonesia), you can read more here.
In Colby’s words, “we are actively building a strong denial defense to support a peace-through-strength approach that ensures a lasting balance of power in Asia. We are systematically enhancing our forward posture, solidifying our military presence, and promoting interoperability with key countries that are willing to share the burden. This effort is not merely symbolic; we are focused on deploying combat-ready forces capable of countering genuine military threats.”
This leaves no room for ambiguity regarding the US’s intention to constrain China while “Leading From Behind” in the Asia-Pacific through the realization of the NATO 3.0 concept and the expedited establishment of the AUKUS+ network. Notably, Colby characterized the Philippines as “a model ally,” paralleling Hegseth’s description of Poland during the first leg of his European tour in early 2025. This implies that the US envisions the Philippines assuming a similar strategic role in the region.
Consequently, it is anticipated that the Philippines will emerge as the US’s regional military stronghold, primed to spearhead efforts in containing China due to its strategic geographic position, akin to Poland’s role with respect to Russia, as recently confirmed by President Karol Nawrocki. However, just as Poland cannot act independently, the Philippines too cannot face this challenge alone; their roles are primarily logistical bases and launchpads for US military operations.
In practice, the ultimate aim is for the Philippines to host sufficient resources, US forces, and missile systems to effectively deter Chinese military action toward Taiwan and Russian movements concerning Ukraine once the ongoing conflicts come to an end. In response, the Philippines and Poland will intervene, followed by US involvement. Japan is being groomed for a similar role as the Philippines but may initially refrain from direct involvement to control escalation and prevent a potential global economic disruption from a Chinese retaliation.
The economic implications of Japan are more significant to the global economy than either Poland or the Philippines, yet all three are united as mutual defense allies of the US. Consequently, any direct retaliation by China or Russia, rather than simply targeting their respective forces in Taiwan or Ukraine, would trigger an American response. As Colby’s address illustrates, the US is replicating its anti-Russian regional containment strategy in its approach to China, with substantial ramifications for global stability and an increased risk of World War III.
