In our modern world, the complexities of global economics and governance have become increasingly intertwined. The perception of national identities is fading as currency and corporate influence take center stage. The following discussion delves into the current dynamics of power, the implications of the decline of the American state, and the potential repercussions for society at large.
You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples… There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and immane, interwoven, interacting, multivariate, multinational dominion of dollars…. It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet. That is the natural order of things today. That is the atomic and subatomic and galactic structure of things today!
–Arthur Jensen, Network (1976)
Earlier this year, the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center (NJ ROIC), a domestic fusion center, issued a warning regarding the escalating threats faced by American oligarchs. In a report designed to inform executive protection professionals, it highlights the following:
Public discourse increasingly attributes the challenges faced by the middle and lower classes to the actions and influence of wealthy corporate executives. According to a September 2025 Allied Universal survey, there has been a surge in threats against corporate executives, with 66% of U.S. security chiefs reporting an increase in threats to company executives.
Technology, defense, consumer staples, energy, and pharmaceuticals are the sectors with the largest increase in threats of violence.
One might ponder why Americans feel this way. The report continues:
Allied Universal also reports that misinformation/disinformation campaigns have increased and have the potential to put staff at risk.
Ah, misinformation—a convenient scapegoat.
This NJ ROIC report resonated with me as I perused The Secular Decline of the American State in the NYU Law Review, authored by Ganesh Sitaraman, director of the Vanderbilt Policy Accelerator for Political Economy and Regulation, who has also advised Senator Elizabeth Warren. The summary reads:
The Trump Administration’s assault on the administrative state has received significant attention. But it is a mistake to interpret the weakening of the administrative state during the first or second Trump Administration as exceptional, or as a cyclical, asymmetric phenomenon that characterizes Republican administrations. Rather, we are in the midst of a period of secular decline of the American state, albeit one that has become more acute in the second Trump Administration. This Article outlines fifteen dynamics in American politics, law, policy, and society that all push in the direction of secular decline.
Some of these dynamics have been at play for decades, contributing to the already comparatively weak American state. Others are recently emergent or systemic features of decline. The consequences of decline are significant: a rise in harms to consumers, increased economic instability, less innovation, weakened resilience in crises, weakening global power and the rise of the power of adversaries, and social fracturing within society. Disrupting decline will require not just a commitment to building state capacity but understanding and accepting the uncomfortable truth that many of the causes of state decline have been longstanding.
Anyone capable of diagnosing Trump as a symptom rather than the cause has my attention. So, what does Sitaraman mean by the “American state”?
- The state’s ability to operate based on rationality and legality, with decisions grounded in reason and the rule of law, rather than cronyism or corruption.
- Its capacity to deliver positive life outcomes for citizens.
- The ability to deter misconduct by private entities.
- The capacity for institutional reform and evolution.
It’s challenging to recall a time when the American state fulfilled these roles effectively. Sitaraman suggests this decline is a long-term trend:
It is a long-term trend that has been in process for many years and will continue for many years going forward, absent some exceptional disruption. A reasonable baseline for American state capacity might be the late 1960s or early 1970s, a time in which state capacity and ambitions were high along a range of metrics. The exact date is arbitrary, of course, but perhaps the period of moon landings (1969–1972) can operate as a symbolic high-water mark.
We frequently discuss at NC how Washington’s penchant for destruction abroad is often easier than building at home. This short-term thinking prevails, yet it’s not sustainable in the long run. The act of dismantling institutions is much simpler than restoring privatized state functions and finding experienced new hires. Although this destruction might facilitate short-term gains, the long-term repercussions are disproportionately severe, as outlined by the fifteen dynamics of secular decline that Sitaraman identifies. Let’s consider them:
Contagion in Systems.
State programs are often deeply interconnected with various sectors: state and local governments, non-profit organizations, corporations, and individuals. These entities rely on state programs not just for funding but for the infrastructure necessary to function. For instance, if the government weakens the air traffic control system, the implications extend beyond federal spending to impact passenger airlines and tourism, among other sectors. The failure of one system component can lead to cascading effects throughout society, further weakening state capacity in a downward spiral.
The Fragility of Credible Commitments.
Non-agreement capability, both domestically and internationally, is a concern. For example, the Trump Administration’s cancellation of numerous U.S. government contracts raises questions about trust and credibility in future agreements.
The Red Queen Effect.
This hypothesis stems from the Red Queen’s assertion in Alice in Wonderland that it takes all the running you can do to stay in the same place. Yet over decades, the American state has been experiencing erosion.
American Skepticism of the State.
In my view, skepticism can be a positive attribute; it indicates the presence of healthy skepticism that necessitates a high bar for trust. Programs that benefit the public, despite repeated efforts to undermine them, remain remarkably popular.
Neoliberalism.
This concept requires no introduction, but Sitaraman succinctly summarizes:
Privatization grants excessive power to corporations, while deregulation removes checks and balances. Trade liberalization depletes communities, and austerity inhibits economic growth and social programs.
Bureaucratic Reputation: Denigration, Disregard, and Decay.
In recent decades, leaders from both political parties have neglected and degraded bureaucracy, resulting in a decline in its reputation. When agencies lose credibility, their ability to operate effectively diminishes.
Consider the CDC’s performance during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Legislative Gridlock.
Interestingly, there’s no gridlock regarding war, serving oligarch interests, and enforcement measures. The lack of deadlock in these cases propels a downward spiral.
Alec Karakatsanis, author of Usual Cruelty, identifies three primary harms:
The corrosive effects of the punishment bureaucracy on hope for a democratic, participatory society that promotes equality, selectively targeting vulnerable groups and preserving inequality;
How the punishment bureaucracy is used by explicitly authoritarian forces;
How it has been wielded to oppose, infiltrate, and suppress every progressive social movement in modern U.S. history.
Submerged and Technocratic Policymaking.
Some policymakers, particularly Democrats, often propose complex and technocratic policies that are difficult to comprehend or implement. Such policies are vulnerable to legal challenges and tend to favor powerful private actors who can afford expert lawyers, leading to potential failures.
As these policies fail—if the Democrats aim to suppress the Left while appearing to engage in conflict—their effectiveness is called into question.
Proceduralism.
Many policymakers embed significant procedural demands in government activities, which, while essential for rational execution, can evolve into overly complicated systems that hinder state capacity. Over-complexity results in delayed actions, making it simpler for these actions to be legally challenged over minor infractions.
Elite Institutional Norms, Culture, Incentives, and Biases.
The emphasis on adhering to established institutional norms, without questioning their validity, cultivates a risk-averse culture. Such timidity among politicians can substantially contribute to secular decline, as they hesitate to quickly and effectively deliver social goods or regulate corporate misdeeds.
Indeed, the prevailing norm appears to be neoliberal “polite” violence, with the supposed resistance against Trump’s more overt tactics diminishing as he continues the empire’s conflicts.
The Collapse of Countervailing Powers.
Historically, social and political movements in the United States advocated for state-building initiatives to counter oligarchic power. The populists, including farmers and workers, pushed for expanded federal regulatory authority, while the Progressive movement sought to establish a bureaucracy grounded in professionalism and expertise.
The dismantling of these countervailing powers is concerning, as effective state-building requires a supportive constituency. The general public, while favoring a well-functioning state, is often too diffuse to organize effectively around more abstract reform causes.
This disarray seems by design—amplified by identity politics, clickbait algorithms, and a media landscape that diverts attention while the foundational structures crumble.
Judicial Politics and Ideology.
In the realm of administrative law, there are emerging doctrines threatening the independence of the administrative state, such as restricting Congress’s powers and transforming essential duties into discretionary privileges. These shifts further diminish the rational-legal framework that effectively administers benefits and regulates private behaviors.
Oligarchic Influence.
This concept requires little exposition—the billionaires are indeed calling the shots. It’s crucial to remember:
If the state fails to regulate harmful private behavior, society risks becoming “nasty, brutish, and short,” characterized more by white-collar crime and social degradation than by outright violence.
Factional Divisions on Right and Left.
While divisions exist among both sides, the dominant factions ultimately serve oligarchic interests.
And here we find ourselves: the persistent assaults on the secular state have been predominantly driven by oligarchic agendas. Meanwhile, both political parties in the so-called “Greatest Democracy in History” continue the dismantling efforts.
Director of the Office of Management and Budget Russell Vought has claimed the aim is not merely to reduce the civil service size but to create a culture where civil servants feel “traumatically affected,” discouraging them from remaining in public service.
Conversely, the “Abundance Democrats” advocate for a “deregulatory agenda.” Sitaraman comments:
If taken seriously, this approach risks exacerbating wealth and power disparities by subsidizing corporations without imposing conditions for their responsible use, potentially enriching executives at the expense of wage growth and employee benefits, thus deepening economic inequality and insecurity.
Insecurity; an issue now troubling the oligarchs.
“Gradually and then Suddenly.”
Returning to the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center report, it is unsurprising that the decades-long assaults by financial elites on the American populace receive scant attention.
For years, Americans have endured growing insecurity at the hands of those wealthiest individuals, who not only neglected the state but actively sought to undermine it. Now, they express concern about potential backlash.
Rarely is it acknowledged that if oligarchs wish to avoid being targeted, they should cease their assault on the broader society. Instead, they seek to implement increased surveillance, acquire more weapons, and resort to violence.
If the long-term neoliberal attacks represent the “gradual,” then the “sudden” could also occur abruptly.
Sitaraman argues that a shift from our current trajectory toward an extractive police state could be achieved by transitioning toward an antimonopoly state. Yet the response under Biden has proven insufficient and delayed, and the backlash from billionaires is palpable. The greater likelihood, amidst this advanced state of decline, is that significant upheaval may be necessary for real change:
Reversing secular decline will likely require large-scale social and political disruption—a crisis that compels political leaders and citizens to advocate for rebuilding the American state. This approach aligns with historical precedents. As Charles Tilly noted, “[w]ar made the state, and the state made war.” Previous parties have initiated major state-building efforts in response to monumental crises: wars and economic depressions.
