In light of recent developments, it’s clear that Turkiye is determined to prevent the Black Sea from being dominated by Russian influence. The implications of this stance raise critical questions about regional security dynamics and international relations.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global shift toward multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, part of the Russian Foreign Ministry system. Originally published at his website
During a recent press conference alongside his Ukrainian counterpart, Turkish Foreign Minister and former intelligence chief Hakan Fidan stated that Turkiye is committed to safeguarding Ukraine’s maritime security once the ongoing conflict concludes. According to him, “Türkiye has agreed to lead the maritime component, and we have a common understanding on this with our allies. Planning efforts on this issue are also being carried out by the naval forces of the relevant allied countries.” This development poses a significant threat to Russian interests in the region.
While the precise nature of Turkiye’s involvement remains uncertain, there is a possibility that Turkish naval forces may begin escorting Ukrainian grain-exporting ships even before the conflict reaches its resolution. Following Russia’s “systematic strikes,” which have incapacitated a third of Ukraine’s export capabilities, the urgency for maritime support has increased. As reported by Reuters, agricultural products—especially grains and vegetable oils—are crucial for Ukraine’s foreign currency earnings. Consequently, NATO’s European members have a vested interest in supporting any Turkish-led maritime missions.
Moreover, the U.S. may also leverage this situation to encourage Turkiye’s involvement as part of a potential agreement regarding F-35 sales. Following Trump’s recent shift in strategy to “escalate to de-escalate,” it is plausible that he might call upon allies like Turkiye to assume a greater role in these efforts. Currently, Turkiye is positioned within a “cordon sanitaire” that extends across Russia’s southern borders, including the South Caucasus, Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. Thus, extending this strategy to the Black Sea is a conceivable next step.
If Turkiye’s efforts to secure maritime routes occur during wartime, it would undoubtedly provoke a strong reaction from Russia. Whether or not Russia would risk conflict by targeting Turkish ships remains to be seen, particularly if Turkiye attempts to safeguard Ukrainian ports against further Russian aggression, potentially hiding military logistics behind a façade of deterrence.
The long-term consequences of Turkiye guaranteeing Ukraine’s maritime security may prove to be even more alarming for Russia than any immediate impact during the current conflict. The 1936 Montreux Convention restricts the number of foreign warships permitted in the Black Sea to nine, but NATO members, including Turkiye, Bulgaria, and Romania, are exempt from these limitations due to their geographical position. This could lead to an accelerated enhancement of their naval capabilities in the coming years.
NATO has longstanding ambitions to transform the Black Sea into a “NATO lake,” similar to its perceived domination of the Baltic Sea following the formal accession of Finland and Sweden. With Turkiye’s assistance, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine might develop their naval forces strategically to collectively counterbalance Russia’s dwindling Black Sea Fleet, which has suffered due to Western-backed operations against it.
Despite any official rhetoric, Turkiye undeniably poses a growing threat to Russian interests. As Turkiye undertakes more responsibilities in line with its role within the “cordon sanitaire,” Russia faces the challenge of either accepting this as the “new normal” and making unilateral concessions—contradicting the objectives of its special operation—or competing with Turkiye across the southern front to defend its regional interests.
