Greetings, readers! This article delves into a pressing issue in contemporary Europe—how educated youth are increasingly turning towards nationalist sentiments. While the author provides valuable insights and data, their perspective can be somewhat narrow, missing broader cultural contexts. This oversimplification may leave readers questioning how deeply ingrained cultural identities persist, regardless of societal changes.
There is undeniable evidence of the resilience of culture, which cannot easily be changed by political campaigns, even when those campaigns attempt to transform societal norms fundamentally. Historical attempts, such as those following the French Revolution—which aimed at altering calendars and instituting land reforms—have largely failed. The Communist Revolution sought to extinguish religious practices, while the Chinese Cultural Revolution aimed to reshape social values. These were more radical and extensive transformations than the initiatives proposed by “Davos Man,” who aspires to craft liberal societies that are favorable to commerce and open borders. What works within specific organizations, like cults, does not scale effectively to nations with rich histories and well-educated populations.
Additionally, it’s telling that the authors view culture solely as a political tool, seemingly oblivious to its profound and historical roots, and bizarrely linking it exclusively to conservative ideologies. Have they overlooked the long-standing European tradition of intellectualism among the working class, typically aligned with the left in advocating reforms to improve labor conditions? Furthermore, have they not recognized how neoliberal policies, which fortify corporate power against the average citizen, heighten economic strains on lower-income groups? Such tensions often lead to a swing towards traditional supports such as family and religious institutions.
This reflection also serves as an excellent exercise in critical thinking for readers, encouraging them to dissect the arguments presented.
By Deniz Torcu, Adjunct Professor of Globalization, Business and Media, IE University. Originally published at The Conversation
Across Europe, a troubling trend is challenging the assumptions held by liberal educators and policymakers alike. Students who are multilingual, well-traveled, and educated in top institutions are increasingly drawn to nationalist narratives. While not all students lean this way, the numbers are significant enough to warrant attention.
The far right now appeals to more than just those feeling the brunt of globalization. Beyond the anger and resentment it stirs, it has tapped into people’s fundamental need for belonging.
And Europe’s institutions have been slow to respond.
Statistics are revealing. The 2024 European Parliament elections resulted in the highest vote share for far-right parties, with these groups now holding 27% of the seats—191 out of 720—in the European Parliament.
This influx of far-right support is not merely a protest vote from marginalized groups. An analysis of the European Election Studies 2024, which surveyed nearly 25,000 voters across 27 countries, reveals that over 21% of young men under 30 support far-right parties, a figure that has consistently increased since 1989.
In Germany, the AfD party grew from 5% support among 18-24 year olds at its inception in 2013 to 19% in 2025. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally emerged as the most favored party among 18-34 year olds in 2024. Across all age demographics, far-right parties now capture nearly 25% of the overall European vote share.
The far right is predominantly Eurosceptic and presents a significant threat to the EU’s cohesion. The 2025 Great Reset report, backed by far-right factions throughout Europe, outlines a clear plan for dismantling the EU from within.
In spite of this existential challenge, the EU’s typical response has relied on value statements, institutional reforms, and economic reassurances—none of which address the critical question that nationalist movements have skillfully leveraged: Who are you, and where do you belong?
The EU’s Narrative Vacuum
Nationalist movements are succeeding not through policy platforms but by dominating the identity discourse. They present a narrative—emotionally resonant, culturally grounded, and often exclusionary—defining who qualifies as a “real” European, German, or Frenchman. In contrast, the EU offers a passport, market, currency, and rights. While these are indispensable, they do not form a compelling narrative.
This observation is not novel. French philosopher Étienne Balibar noted in his 2004 work We, the People of Europe? that European integration has always wrestled with the tension between the universalistic ideals of the European project and the exclusionary narratives of nation, race, and language that it has never fully overcome.
Over recent decades, the EU has largely overlooked cultural aspects, assuming that cultural belonging would naturally evolve from political and economic integration. This assumption has proven misguided, and the lack of a genuine cultural strategy to cultivate belonging has created a narrative vacuum that nationalist movements have adeptly filled.
The current failure is especially striking given that Europe has previously recognized and acted decisively on cultural stakes during earlier serious moments in history.
Capitals of Culture
The Council of Europe signed the European Cultural Convention in 1954, just nine years after the end of World War II. This agreement established a foundation for collective cultural diplomacy among European states, motivated by the belief that political and economic recovery alone would not suffice. Europe required a shared cultural vision.
Perhaps the most significant manifestation of this understanding arose in 1985, when Greek Minister of Culture Melina Mercouri and her French counterpart Jack Lang advocated for the establishment of what would become the European Capital of Culture programme. The principle goal was—to quote the European Commission—to “strengthen the sense of belonging of European citizens to a common cultural area” and to highlight the shared cultural characteristics among all Europeans.
Since Athens first became the inaugural city in 1985, more than 70 cities spanning over 30 countries have embraced the title. From Florence to Istanbul, Glasgow, Krakow, Valletta, and Timișoara, each city curates a year filled with cultural events aimed specifically at fostering a collective European identity. Independent assessments consistently validate this programme’s success in enhancing intercultural exchange and civic participation.
What set this earlier approach apart was a markedly different perception of European integration. The pioneers of the European project—Schuman, Monnet, De Gasperi—recognized the necessity of cultural legitimacy for the survival of political and economic structures. Culture was not an ancillary concern; it formed the foundation upon which all else rested.
In contrast, contemporary EU funding data underscores how little importance is ascribed to culture. The Creative Europe programme, the EU’s primary cultural financial initiative, has a budget of €2.44 billion for the period 2021–2027. While this may seem considerable, it represents only around 0.15% of the total EU budget.
In sharp contrast, Culture Action Europe reports that in 2024 alone, Russia allocated over €1 billion for cultural propaganda—three times the total annual budget of the EU’s Creative Europe. This does not even factor in the billions more Russia spends on media influence operations targeting European audiences.
In essence, Europe is being significantly outspent in areas that matter most.
Media Landscape
The media environment of the EU’s early days has all but vanished. While flawed and fragmented, the media landscape of the 60s, 70s, and 80s allowed public broadcasting, shared cultural references, and common spaces of meaning to flourish.
Today, algorithm-driven platforms dominate how young Europeans engage with the world. However, these platforms are not devoid of cultural slants. They are engineered to maximize emotional engagement, giving nationalistic narratives an advantageous edge.
Initiatives like the European Capital of Culture were conceived for an era when cultural exchanges moved among cities and institutions; they have not adapted to the current realities where culture spreads via online feeds.
EU data reveals this disconnect. A 2021 European Parliament youth survey indicated that 64% of young people use Instagram, while 25% turn to TikTok as primary sources of information. A Eurobarometer study found that 79% of young Europeans aged 15 to 24 rely on influencers or content creators for news.
A separate 2024 study revealed that leading up to the 2024 elections, far-right parties consistently outperformed mainstream parties on engagement metrics on platforms like Facebook and Instagram across Germany, Sweden, Hungary, and Poland. This trend is partly due to the structure of current platform algorithms that reward provocative negative content.
Erasmus and Identity
The failure here represents not just a policy shortcoming but also an educational lapse. Signs are visible for anyone involved in teaching internationally.
In my own classroom, I notice a complex dynamic. Students who have lived in Berlin, studied in Copenhagen, and interned in Amsterdam still refer to “our people” and “their culture.” This language suggests that the mobility they’ve experienced have introduced them to diverse environments but hasn’t fostered a sense of integration. They are adept at navigating various differences yet uncertain about their shared identity.
Much of this is rooted in how students experience Europe. Research on student exchanges consistently reveals a “selection effect”—those who go abroad often already hold pro-European views. Consequently, exchanges like the Erasmus programme do not forge a new identity but merely reinforce existing ones.
The students who would benefit most from exposure to diverse European contexts—those who are economically disadvantaged, less educated, or more entrenched in their national narratives—frequently miss out on such opportunities.
An analysis of Erasmus exchange patterns from 2008 to 2014 found that student flows are markedly stratified according to academic prestige and financial means. Prestigious universities send their students to similarly elite institutions, perpetuating existing hierarchies rather than disrupting them.
This results in a cosmopolitan education system that primarily communicates within its own circles. Even at top global universities, student populations may boast diversity in nationality but often remain homogeneous in social class. When we celebrate producing globally minded graduates, we may actually be referencing a demographic of European youth that was never genuinely at risk of embracing nationalist ideologies.
The more concerning issue is what occurs when even this group begins to fragment. Research on European identity reveals that students who have studied in multiple countries sometimes express heightened resentment towards “Brussels” and stronger ties to their national cultural identities than expected.
International experiences have not cultivated a consistent loyalty to cosmopolitanism but rather generated a more ambivalent response: familiarity with diversity coinciding with a desire for rootedness that remains unfulfilled by institutions. Nationalist movements are keenly aware of this longing, while universities and business schools often overlook it.
Who Could Fill the Void Today?
The far right is not the only force that can fill Europe’s institutional and narrative voids. Three key groups have the authority, reach, or capacity to alter the continent’s cultural trajectory.
1. European Institutions
EU institutions possess the mandate but often lack the necessary resources or direction. In late 2024, the European Commission revealed plans for the forthcoming Culture Compass, described by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen as a framework to humanize the European project to foster identification with it.
Inspired by the Culture Compass for Europe, the Joint Declaration “Europe for Culture-Culture for Europe” sets out a shared political commitment for EU cultural policy.@Europarl_EN, @EUCouncil & @EU_Commission together for culture. 🎨🎭
Read🔗https://t.co/qOK7UdgEgP pic.twitter.com/WIQLvwqB8T
— Creative Europe (@europe_creative) June 18, 2026
This ambitious framing is promising, but the Culture Compass will only be effective if it is backed by substantial resources. With a mere 0.15% of the total EU budget allocated to Creative Europe, it is more of an afterthought than a comprehensive cultural strategy.
Moreover, a necessary shift in direction is warranted. The EU has primarily viewed cultural diplomacy as an external mechanism, projecting European values onto external nations. It must adopt a similar approach internally to foster belonging among its own citizens.
2. Erasmus+
The second influential force is the EU’s Erasmus+ programme. Despite its limitations, this initiative remains the most solid proof of concept for the EU’s vision. Research published in the Journal of Common Market Studies shows that participation in Erasmus is consistently linked to stronger identification as a European. Nonetheless, as previously mentioned, Erasmus exchanges do not create a European identity from scratch.
Typically, those young men opting for the AfD or Rassemblement National do not hail from Erasmus backgrounds. Expanding Erasmus-style exchanges beyond universities to include vocational training, secondary education, and community initiatives could be crucial to enhancing Europe’s cultural connections. The programme’s mobility is not the issue; its limited reach is.
3. Universities and Business Schools
These institutions have a particular duty to address this gap. Global universities, including my own, often tout their role in cultivating “global citizens” and “intercultural leaders.” However, possessing cosmopolitan credentials does not equate to genuine cultural belonging.
Creating a tangible experience of European identity requires intentional development rather than an assumption that it arises naturally from international exposure. A student body featuring numerous nationalities isn’t, by itself, a cultural education; it is merely an impressive logistical accomplishment. Institutions that claim to be training the next generation of European leaders must confront the question of what fundamentally unites Europe.
Europe’s Cultural Turn
The Spring 2025 Eurobarometer shows an encouraging upward trend: 75% of Europeans now identify as EU citizens, a record high, and nearly 60% of those aged 15 to 24 express trust in the EU. While these statistics are positive, they mask a more complex reality.
Feeling like a citizen is distinct from possessing a genuine sense of belonging. Trust in institutions does not necessarily translate to cultural loyalty to a shared vision. The demographic most likely to express confidence in the EU—educated, mobile young Europeans—is the same group whose cultural formation is being neglected entirely.
The far right has grasped two crucial aspects of this moment. First, questions of identity cannot solely be settled through frameworks of prosperity or rights. Second, institutions that disregard the cultural aspects of politics will invariably be outflanked by movements that embrace them. Far-right parties in Europe did not secure 27% of the European Parliament by presenting superior economic policies; they did so by articulating a compelling narrative.
A striking recent example comes from Romania, where virtually unknown independent candidate Călin Georgescu won the first round of the 2024 presidential elections thanks to a heavily marketed narrative rooted in Orthodox identity, national sovereignty, and spiritual distinction from Western liberalism.
While the election’s subsequent annulment didn’t diminish the reality that a significant number of Romanian voters, especially the youth, were drawn to a cultural story that existing parties failed to provide. Romania serves as an extreme but not isolated example. Without a compelling European cultural narrative, other stories will take its place.
Lessons from China and Russia
A geopolitical aspect of EU cultural policy has also surfaced, one that the bloc has been slow to recognize. As the EU lags in cultural expenditure, Russia invests billions in propaganda—aimed partially at influencing audiences inside Europe.
Conversely, China operates its extensive network of Confucius Institute education centers, effectively disseminating Chinese culture and language throughout European universities and cities.
Meanwhile, the EU’s own cultural institutions ponder whether they have the mandate to focus on internal belonging at all. The EU has treated cultural diplomacy as a refinement, a way of projecting values externally once political objectives are met. In contrast, Europe’s geopolitical competitors view culture as foundational infrastructure, essential for influence just like roads are for trade.
Furthermore, the urgency extends beyond electoral timelines. Culture Action Europe has noted that far-right parties, now represented on the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education, are reshaping cultural debates within EU institutions. They are normalizing terms like “gender propaganda,” questioning funding for migration-related projects, and advancing a vision of European culture that is exclusionary rather than pluralistic.
An Urgent Need for Cultural Diplomacy
According to the V-Dem Institute’s Democracy Report 2026, around a quarter of the world’s nations were experiencing autocratization in 2025, many of them in Europe.
The opportunity for a transformed cultural strategy is dwindling. Each year that passes without such a strategy represents a year in which the framework for belonging either falls into the hands of those uninterested in a genuinely unified Europe or is actively dismantled by forces wishing to see the EU fragment.
By championing Europe’s post-war cultural initiatives, Melina Mercouri understood something that current EU leaders seem to have forgotten: Europe’s appeal to individuals’ loyalty cannot rest solely on technocratic effectiveness; it must resonate personally.
The pressing question is not whether cultural diplomacy is too soft a strategy for this moment; it is whether Europe can afford to overlook the very weapon its opponents have wielded all along.
