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Ansar Allah Captures Mocha and Bab el-Mandeb Islands in Iran War

The ongoing conflict in Iran continues to evolve rapidly, marked by significant developments in recent days. This update dives deep into the current situation, highlighting the actions and reactions entwined in the geopolitical landscape of the region.

UPDATE: 08:23 EDT — I’ve added a couple of Telegram and X embeds to the Ansar Allah on a Roll section, showing their continuous progress. NWT

UPDATE 2: 10:47 EDT — Couldn’t resist adding a few details indicating MBS pleading for assistance from Trump and Iran. These can be found in the Saudi, Turkiye, Pakistan section.

Ansar Allah On a Roll

Yesterday, Yves highlighted Ansar Allah’s advantageous positioning at Camp Khalid and the Taizz–Mokha road, pointing out the Bab el-Mandeb advances as reported but not yet confirmed.

On Thursday, Ansar Allah continued its momentum, capturing what Al Jazeera referred to as the “strategic Red Sea city of Mocha”. Additionally, they illustrated the significance of Mocha in a separate analysis:

Mocha’s position makes its capture a matter of global interest. The city lies roughly 75km (47 miles) north of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, a critical route that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden.

Often called the Gate of Tears, this narrow passage is vital for crude oil and fuel transport from the Gulf to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal and for Asian goods and Russian oil.

Al Jazeera’s Yousef Mawry noted that controlling Mocha could potentially give the Houthis a “stranglehold along the Bab al-Mandeb”.

Moreover, it disrupts essential supply lines against the Houthis, including the “road linking Mocha with Taiz” and supply routes through Mocha’s port.

“This marks a pivotal moment in the war,” defense policy analyst Wolfgang Pusztai remarked to Al Jazeera. “This could result in the disintegration of government forces in southern Yemen.”

“The port of Mocha was the last harbor fully under the internationally recognized government’s control,” Pusztai added.

Al Jazeera also provided a compelling map (note that the Ansar Allah-controlled areas of Yemen constitute a significant majority of the population):

YNet has reported that Ansar Allah has also secured several key islands in the Strait:

According to two military sources from the Yemeni government, the Houthis have reached the Hanish Islands in the Red Sea, and AFP stated that they have seized Zuqar Island. Furthermore, local sources confirmed to the Qatari Al-Araby channel that the Houthis gained control of the significant island of Mayun in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

Another intriguing map:

UPDATE: The advancements are ongoing (unconfirmed):

No Honor Among Gulf State Proxies

/UPDATE

Saudis: Pakistan and Turkiye Are Gonna Beat Ansar Allah Up

As their proxy forces in Yemen dwindle from the crucial Red Sea coast, the Saudis are attempting to enlist their newly incentivized partners from the Mecca Accords alliance — Pakistan and Turkiye. Nevertheless, this plan is facing hurdles. According to Reuters, via Yemen Monitor:

Reuters reported, based on information from a Pakistani source, that Saudi officials convened in Riyadh with senior military representatives from Pakistan and Turkey to discuss a coordinated response to the escalating Houthi attacks.

The source noted that the three nations agreed their forces would not engage in Yemeni territory and any military response would only be initiated from within Saudi Arabia.

As per a second Pakistani source, no decision regarding Pakistan’s involvement in any retaliatory measures has been finalized. The source emphasized that the military agreement between Islamabad and Riyadh is defensive, focused solely on the protection of Saudi territory.

Additionally, the source pointed out that Pakistani forces could offer military and technical assistance, as well as air or ground support within Saudi Arabia, but would not partake in combat operations outside the Kingdom.

The Reuters headline appears less encouraging for the Saudis:

It appears that there is little willingness to support the Saudis in their faltering mission against Yemen. Notably, the Wikipedia entry on the Mecca Accords outlines that “(the Accords) enable Saudi Arabia to fund defense initiatives; Turkey to supply advanced technological defense tools; and Pakistan to provide personnel at the front lines.”

As financial pressures mount for the Saudis, currently seeking $8 billion in loans, one might wonder if Turkish and Pakistani contributions will be as fleeting as the credit rating of the Saudi royal family.

UPDATE 2: It seems MBS was reaching out desperately yesterday, looking for a rescue that might not materialize.

From the Trump court stenographer:

Could Iran offer assistance? No, it seems.

Insight from Sami Hamdi:

Extended insight:

Some Saudis are blaming the UAE for the inability to halt the Houthis’ remarkable advance along the west coast. While Abu Dhabi is likely relishing the Houthi’s success at the cost of Saudi allies (and possibly formulating a roadmap to cooperate with Iran regarding the Bab Al Mandeb, offering the Houthis control of the northern regions of Yemen in exchange for an autonomous southern Yemen for UAE-backed proxies), attributing blame to Bin Zayed may be oversimplified.

It is Bin Salman who has grappled for years over which scenario holds worse implications for him: a pro-Iran Houthi governance in Sanaa or a liberated Yemen where the populace might elect a government he disapproves of (akin to the Arab Spring). He has regarded both as equally perilous.

The Houthis’ longstanding struggle consists of six previous wars attempting to capture Yemen, repeatedly thwarted by the central government (with Saudi assistance), and pushed back to their home territory in Saada in the north. The distinction in this ongoing seventh conflict is that Bin Salman chose first to constrain, undermine, and weaken the government in an attempt to mold it to his preferences, thereby inadvertently providing an unparalleled opportunity to the Houthis to solidify their power and entrench their positions.

Instead of permitting a cohesive central authority to arise, Riyadh has enabled fragmented warlord territories, sponsoring individual fiefdoms as a strategy to prevent unity. This represents perhaps the most significant inadvertent gift that Riyadh has granted the Houthis. Rather than confronting a unified governing body, the Houthis have only faced disparate factions, taking them down one by one without reinforcement from others.

Saudi troubles in Yemen stem not from particularly robust Houthis or Iranian strength but from Bin Salman’s decision to diminish Yemen’s capacity to resist. His apprehensions about a liberated Yemen are as substantial as his fears regarding the Houthis. Consequently, he finds himself trapped in a fiscal quagmire, driving the kingdom’s debt to unprecedented levels while Iran methodically surrounds Saudi Arabia.

/UPDATE 2

As Saudi oil production falls to its lowest levels since 1990… it’s reasonable to assume that some Sheiks may not be too displeased about oil futures surging above $100 for the first time since July.

Brent oil futures pushed to $108 on Sept 10, 2026

The financial outlook for Saudi Arabia appears dire if the subsequent reports hold true.

Investing Live has cautioned that “no official confirmation from Aramco or Saudi authorities has emerged, and this claim should be treated as unverified market speculation for the time being.”

Iran Debuts Electro-Optical Missiles

This next section is a bit older, but Yves had much to cover and it didn’t fit into previous discussions.

Let’s turn towards another Strait where Iran is reported to have introduced a new weapon, as noted by The Telegraph (archived) a few days back:

Iran has employed electro-optical missiles against American naval vessels for the first time.

Iranian officials assert they are utilizing newly developed missiles with advanced features to target these warships.
However, Centcom reported on Wednesday that all attempted assaults had been unsuccessful.

The missiles are likely equipped with electro-optical seekers, employing cameras and light sensors to accurately locate, track, and engage targets with high precision.
Tehran revealed the Qassem Bassir, a new medium-range ballistic missile utilizing this technology, last year. It remains unclear whether this was the specific type used in the attacks on U.S. ships.

The solid-fuel missile is designed with a warhead weighing around half a ton, intended for precision strikes and penetrating layered air defenses rather than sheer explosive power.

Haig Hovaness has cautioned that the reduction in the cost of precision guidance may represent one of the most transformative shifts in contemporary warfare in his March article “Cheap Guidance and Big Consequences” (also see his May piece “Endangered Warships“).

Iran likely deployed more traditional weaponry to engage two additional tankers Thursday.

Moreover, we have received confirmations from mainstream media outlets regarding the damage inflicted by the Iranian assault on the U.S. base in Jordan.

According to CBS:

One A-10 Thunderbolt, an attack aircraft, suffered a wing loss, while around eight F-15s endured minor damage but were returned to service, as reported by sources familiar with the incident, who spoke to CBS News under confidentiality due to lack of authorization for public discourse.

No U.S. fatalities have been reported from the strikes in Jordan.

Aerotime provides detailed insights that could interest enthusiasts of military tactics.

Global Security’s report on the Iran War, day 195, offers crucial updates that counter U.S. government rhetoric regarding casualties and damage to American installations.

Moreover, regarding the underestimated damage, Military Times asserts the most substantial claims regarding damage to the 5th Fleet HQ in Bahrain:

The Navy’s highest-ranking officer informed sailors during a recent town hall that the service would not return to its primary logistics center in the Middle East for some time after it sustained severe damage early in the Iran war.

In response to a question from a displaced service member regarding securing personal items from the base they once inhabited, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Daryl Caudle remarked, “We’re not resuming operations there anytime soon. I want to be honest about that.”

On February 28, Iran targeted NSA Bahrain with missiles and one-way attack drones following strikes by the U.S. and Israeli militaries on the Islamic Republic.

The Pentagon initially reported no fatalities and downplayed the impact on military operations.

Deception seems to be a recurring theme in these reports.

That provides enough context for today’s update. Now let’s analyze the oil export figures.

Regarding US Claims About Oil Leaving The Persian Gulf

Tanker Trackers does not fully endorse U.S. Energy Secretary Wright’s assessments regarding oil flows:

Now that we have revisited the consensus regarding the war update, let’s delve into the discourse surrounding the Trump 2.0 regime’s perspectives.

Vance and Rubio Not So Sure About Trump’s Midterms Claim

Yves noted yesterday Trump’s assertion that the war would conclude following the midterms.

According to the WSJ (archived), Vance and Rubio foresee a potentially longer duration:

In the Oval Office and Situation Room, Vice President JD Vance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and others have deliberated with the president about the likelihood that Tehran could maintain its resistance to U.S. pressure under the blockade and other military tactics, possibly extending the conflict beyond Inauguration Day in January 2029, the officials indicated.

These closed-door discussions come amidst Trump’s declaration to the press on Wednesday that the war would cease “immediately” following the midterm elections in November, stating, “because they can’t hold out any longer.”

Global Security reported on the White House’s spokesperson’s comments and accompanying analysis:

A White House spokesperson responded, stating, “President Trump has obliterated Iran’s military capabilities and is crippling what remains of its ailing economy with the most significant naval blockade in history, coupled with stringent sanctions.” The statements do not conflict regarding facts but diverge concerning timeframes, with an eight-week versus a 28-month disparity showcasing the broad gap between publicly stated American war objectives and privately expected timelines.

Amidst Trump’s provocative remarks regarding Pickaxe Mountain, concerns about potential nuclear involvement have arisen, receiving additional media attention. It appears the Iranians may share similar apprehensions.

According to CNN:

Recent satellite imagery indicates a noticeable increase in construction activity at a suspected Iranian nuclear site hidden beneath granite this year, coinciding with the progress of the ongoing war with the U.S.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank has indicated that this facility is “likely” designed to serve as a secure location for Iran’s nuclear initiatives.

Al Jazeera offers a unique rationale for pursuing the destruction of Pickaxe Mountain, akin to Mallory’s famed response about Everest: “Why is Trump threatening to strike Iran’s Pickaxe Mountain again, now?”

Why does Pickaxe Mountain matter?
Because it remains intact.

The site evaded damage during the U.S.’s June 2025 assaults on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, and has largely escaped the current conflict; the Institute for Science and International Security has documented only the destruction of a vehicle on a nearby spoil pile.

As Iran’s centrifuge production facilities and enrichment halls at other sites were compromised in the conflict, analysts view the tunnels beneath Pickaxe Mountain as the prime location for Tehran to restore its capabilities: whether for component production, assembly, or uranium enrichment.

The article also presents captivating claims regarding the state of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure:

The European Council on Foreign Relations estimates that the 2025 strikes likely resulted in the destruction of many of the approximately 18,000 centrifuges that were operational at Iran’s Natanz and Fordow facilities, as well as several centrifuge manufacturing engagements and Ardakan, Iran’s sole yellowcake milling operation. Yellowcake is a powdered concentrate of uranium derived from milled uranium ore.

Approximately 4,000 additional centrifuges were installed but inactive at the time, although many of these may have survived the attacks.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) corroborated additional damage to the access buildings of Natanz’s underground enrichment site in March 2026, but recorded no further adverse effects on the facility itself.

The Institute for Science and International Security stated in June that tunnel entrances at all three main sites remain sealed, indicating no evidence of enrichment activities, and that the centrifuge program appears to be effectively dismantled.

Additionally, a valuable map of Iranian nuclear sites:

Iranian nuclear facilities (map)

Next, let’s address the domestic repercussions of Trump’s war.

Diesel Prices Soar!

Oil analysts have warned that disruptions in the Persian Gulf will significantly affect diesel availability, and the impacts are hitting hard.

Here’s a brief overview of recent headlines and links:

We’ll close with a few videos.

YouTube Roundup

Jon Elmer, contributing editor for Electronic Intifada, reports on the developing tanker war in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian missile attacks on U.S. naval vessels in the Arabian Sea, and strikes on U.S. airbases in Jordan.

Nima Alkhorshid of Dialogue Work hosts Lt. Col. Anthony Aguilar.

Historian Gerald Horne and investigative journalist Kit Klarenberg join the BettBeat crew for a conversation centered on three of the most underreported aspects of U.S. foreign policy today: the expansion of AFRICOM and clandestine Western operations across Africa, Ukraine’s shadow conflict in the Sahel collaborating with jihadist elements, and the ongoing U.S.-Israeli war against Iran.

That’s all for today. Stay strong, everyone!

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