Hello, this is Yves. The response to Joseph Busby’s initial article for the Reality Based Analysis Group, titled Understanding Iranian Victory, has been overwhelmingly positive. If you missed it when it was published, I encourage you to carve out some time this weekend to delve into its insights. Joseph has an keen ability to pinpoint significant topics, especially in light of recent geopolitical shifts involving Russia and the Arctic. The surprise visit of CIA director John Ratcliffe to the Kremlin, where he was notably snubbed by Putin, indicates that the Trump administration is attempting to exert pressure on Russia regarding Ukraine, NATO, Iran, and other issues. This article illustrates how Russia’s influence is growing, particularly through its control of a critical naval route exposed by climate change.
By Joseph Busby, founder and director of Reality-Based Analysis Group (RBAG), an independent geopolitical analysis firm established in Vienna in 2017. It is affiliated with the Association for the Promotion of International Development and Stability (APIDS, apids.at). Originally published at the Reality-Based Analysis Group website.
I. The Beta Test
In mid-August 2026, as the world focused on escalating crises surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and the partial blockage of the Bab el-Mandeb strait in the Red Sea, a new maritime chokepoint emerged: the Northern Sea Route (NSR), fully managed by the Russian Federation. Over a century in the making, this route along Russia’s Arctic coast was officially opened for business on August 15, when its first international customer set sail from China en route to Britain. Controlled by Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear corporation, the NSR authorized eight inaugural voyages, all targeting Chinese ships for its first operational season. While individual ships have traversed this route before, the new regular schedule transforms it from an ad-hoc passage to a significant maritime chokepoint.
This development holds major implications. Shipping between China and Europe ranks as the largest globally, with Chinese imports constituting a significant portion of trade in European ports like Hamburg and Rotterdam. Approximately 25% of containers at these ports originate from China. The initial eight Chinese voyages along the NSR are testing a vital trade route for China and, if sustainable, promise to revolutionize Chinese-European commerce. Previously, container ships would depart from China, navigate south through the South China Sea, west through the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, north through the Bab el-Mandeb, into the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal, and into the Mediterranean Sea before arriving at European ports—a journey lasting typically between thirty and forty days and involving three chokepoints, two of which are now contested. Insecurity in the Red Sea has compelled many shippers to take the longer route around Africa, adding ten to fourteen more days and thousands of additional nautical miles. The NSR circumvents these issues, eliminating contested chokepoints and reducing transit time from up to eight weeks down to just twenty days.
The three routes from China to northern Europe. The Arctic passage avoids the Malacca Strait, the Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal altogether.
An additional change is noticeable in today’s geopolitical landscape. Since the conclusion of World War II, passage through maritime chokepoints was generally regarded as a right, with few requiring a fee for transit. As discussed in another piece titled “The Monetization of Multipolarity,” one characteristic of the multipolar era is the commodification of geography, along with the control of crucial maritime chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb. Access has shifted from being solely a financial issue to one dependent on a shipper’s alliances with the countries controlling the chokepoint. As a result, access is now politically motivated. The Houthis have obstructed all Israeli and Saudi vessels, and Iran has prohibited U.S. and Israeli ships from crossing the Strait of Hormuz. In contrast, China and Russia’s ships are allowed passage, alongside vessels from other nations disconnected from these conflicts, like India. Numerous reports indicate ships self-identifying as Chinese to the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), the official Iranian body governing the Strait of Hormuz, often even if their names are in English. The possible interdiction of these vessels under U.S. blockade adds further uncertainty regarding navigation in the area, leading the European Union to advise vessels of U.S., Israeli, or Saudi origin to avoid the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden altogether.
Russia, however, imposes no such political allegiance on NSR usage. At the June 2026 Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), Igor Sechin, the head of Russia’s state oil company Rosneft, positioned the NSR as a welcoming alternative amidst ongoing Middle Eastern crises. Shippers, particularly in East Asia, took note. With transit times cut to twenty days between China and Europe and no risks of blockades or conflicts disrupting shipping schedules, the route presents a compelling option. It offers streamlined navigation with a single owner, operator, and permit issuer, along with a specialized nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet ensuring safe passage.
The timing of this development is remarkable. For over a century, both Russia and the Soviet Union have worked to establish a sea route across the Arctic. The NSR has explicitly been designed for Chinese-Russian collaboration over the last decade. In 2017, during a visit to Moscow, Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed naming the route the “Ice Silk Road,” a designation still employed today. Following that, China claimed the title of a “near-Arctic State,” prompting derision from the U.S., which responded by asserting that there were only “Arctic States and non-Arctic States,” dismissing China’s claims as invalid. The Russians focused on actionable steps, naming Rosatom as the route’s operator in 2018, establishing the permit regime in 2020, commencing test runs in 2022, and expanding their ports along the route from four to eleven. Moreover, between 2020 and 2024, they launched four new nuclear-powered icebreakers. Within just a few years of declaring the Ice Silk Road, Chinese vessels are now traversing it under Russian guidance.
The U.S. response was not limited to mere mockery; it officially contested Russian claims over the passage, arguing that the Vilkitsky Strait and others constitute “international straits” and are not Russian territory. The Russian government, however, maintains that the NSR is a continuous passage within its own territorial seas and exclusive economic zone, operating under consistent laws, rules, and Rosatom administration. The U.S. has applied similar principles to straits it wants open, arguing against Canada regarding the Northwest Passage and against Iran in the Strait of Hormuz. Yet in none of these cases has the U.S. succeeded in changing the fact that these passages are effectively controlled by the countries governing the surrounding territories.
II. The Fleet
Navigating ice-laden waters presents a unique challenge, particularly since the route is often covered with up to three meters of solid ice. Breaking through requires specialized designs that can exert sustained force over an extended period and necessitates more power than conventional diesel ships can provide without refueling. The answer lies in nuclear power. The Soviet Union built the world’s first nuclear-powered surface ship, the icebreaker Lenin, in 1959. Since then, Russia’s fleet has expanded alongside its technology. Currently, it operates thirty-four diesel-powered icebreakers, alongside eight nuclear vessels, including four of earlier Soviet designs and four of the innovative “Project 22220” class: Arktika(2020), Sibir(2021), Ural(2022), and Yakutia(2024). These ships stand unique worldwide, capable of navigating both deep waters and shallow coastal regions. This year marks the first instance where all eight nuclear vessels are deployed on the same route concurrently, with three more of the same class under construction. This timing underscores another attribute of the multipolar dynamic: while for nearly a century Russia and the Soviet Union operated the NSR with aging diesel and nuclear icebreakers insufficient for both coastal and deep-sea travel, the introduction of advanced Project 22220 icebreakers has transformed the NSR from a mere possibility into a functional maritime chokepoint.
No other nation has a nuclear icebreaker fleet. The U.S. possesses two non-nuclear icebreakers, one dating back fifty years and the other built in 2000. It acquired a third, secondhand vessel the previous year and has ordered three more ships, slated for delivery in 2030 at a cost of around five billion dollars. A common misconception is that only Russia has the capability to construct such vessels. President Putin clarified this on Navy Day, July 27, 2026, explaining that other technologically advanced nations could build nuclear icebreakers, but that doing so would take years, if not decades. His statement highlights the significant challenges the U.S. faces: the workforce that built its last heavy icebreaker has since retired, taking their expertise with them. Consequently, when the U.S. ordered its newest icebreaker in 2025, it turned to Finland, which has become a hub for constructing icebreakers—eighty percent globally—though none are nuclear-powered.
However, Russia’s shipbuilding industry has not evaded the challenges posed by current events. The ongoing war in Ukraine has greatly reduced the rate of new vessel deliveries, from one per year to one every three years, due to the destruction of key factories and increased component costs. The completion of the new nuclear icebreaker Rossiya, part of a planned expansion of the fleet to fifteen to seventeen icebreakers, is pushed back to 2030. This vessel, weighing seventy thousand tons and powered by two nuclear reactors, can break through up to four meters of solid ice and is designed to accommodate larger container ships following in its wake. Ships like these will enable the NSR to transition from a seasonal route to a reliable year-round passage. As President Putin remarked, while other nations may someday construct similar fleets, Russia’s icebreakers are operational and expanding right now. No other country can open a new maritime chokepoint; Russia has just achieved that.
III. The Ice Silk Road
The title “Ice Silk Road,” used by China to describe this uniquely Russian chokepoint, symbolizes the growing partnership between these two superpowers. Integrating the NSR into their Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), even if only rhetorically, underscores the importance of vital connectivity corridors between major powers while also reflecting their non-Western identity. Here, the United States is not a factor; payments are made in rubles, accepted in renminbi, and U.S. dollars are irrelevant. This development is another step toward the gradual dedollarization of the global economy—not by undermining the dollar, but by making it obsolete. The route is not anti-Western; as emphasized by Igor Sechin of Rosneft, it is open to any customers, regardless of their alliances. South Korea, recognizing the advantages, purchased a vessel to engage with the route. Its first voyage along the NSR, aboard the newly renamed PanStar Acro, has received Rosatom’s permit and is scheduled to depart from Busan, South Korea, in late August, visiting various ports in northern Europe before returning home.
China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, throughout its different phases, fundamentally aims at fostering connectivity, ensuring that Chinese goods, services, and influence are pervasive around the globe. As the multipolar era takes root, cooperation between major powers solidifies, with China and Russia deepening their relationship. Just as Russia leveraged the Power of Siberia pipelines, shifting its energy sales to China following Western sanctions, China is now relying on Russia to utilize the NSR to mitigate instability in key maritime chokepoints of West Asia. Only Russia can effectively provide the reliable transportation that China needs to maintain and grow its commercial flow to Europe. Without clients, this route loses its significance; without the route, trade becomes vulnerable to political turbulence and pricing shocks from conflicts. This partnership exemplifies how the NSR fosters collaboration in a multipolar framework.
Additionally, this relationship neutralizes some of the economic tools the West has used against Russia, particularly sanctions. Russia’s flagship Arctic energy initiative, the “Arctic LNG 2,” is a substantial liquid natural gas facility capable of delivering twenty million tons of LNG to tankers in Ob Bay, northwestern Siberia. The impact of Western sanctions halted this project for nearly two years. However, since August 2025, shipments to Beihai in southern China have resumed, totaling forty-one. Another port designed specifically for NSR integration is set to open in Longkou this October. This makes economic sense only because of the NSR. Despite ongoing sanctions, the cooperation between Russia and China along the NSR has rendered these restrictions ineffective. Transactions along this route do not require U.S. dollars; they occur in either yuan (renminbi) or rubles, utilizing entirely non-Western systems. In 2021, only a quarter of Russian-Chinese trade was conducted using local currencies; now, that figure stands at about 99%. Instead of isolating Russia, Western attempts have inadvertently strengthened the bonds between these two great poles of the multipolar world, with the NSR serving as a testament to their burgeoning partnership.
IV. Greenland
A frequently misinterpreted aspect of President Trump’s second term is his assertion that Greenland should belong to the United States instead of Denmark (or pursue independence). The U.S. has shown interest in Greenland for over a century, attempting to purchase it in both 1867 and 1946. Trump has perpetuated this discussion since 2018, with his rationale evolving from mere land acquisition to focus on vital minerals and the influence of Chinese and Russian activity in the NSR. During the NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026, he mentioned that Greenland was “surrounded by Chinese and Russian ships,” suggesting a potential threat to U.S. sovereignty.
The United States is already classified as an Arctic State, as underscored by Pompeo, with the narrowest distance between the U.S. and Russia located in the Arctic, between Big and Little Diomede Islands, separated by less than four kilometers of ocean. These islands are located in the Bering Strait, where the distance between Alaska and Asian Russia eventually stretches to 82 kilometers. The NSR traverses the Bering Strait, uncontested by any nation, and extends to Europe without approaching Greenland. What, then, is driving President Trump’s interest in Greenland, and how does it connect to the NSR?
The Northern Sea Route spans approximately 5,600 km from the Kara Strait to the Bering Strait, along a single country’s coast.
There are three primary reasons for this interest. First, the conventional wisdom regarding U.S. interest cites the need for critical rare earth minerals crucial for military equipment, which the U.S. currently lacks. Greenland possesses proven reserves of some of the world’s largest deposits, including neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, yttrium, and gadolinium—key components for items like electric vehicle motors, wind turbine generators, missiles, and jet engines. Current Greenlandic laws impose restrictions on extraction; however, U.S. jurisdiction would not.
The second reason pertains to Greenland’s strategic location. It is situated at one end of the “GIUK Gap,” the area where Russian submarines and warships traverse to and from the North Atlantic, which encompasses U.S. military facilities, including the significant Pituffik radar installation monitoring missile activity aimed at the pole.
The third reason involves the Arctic passage, although not via the Ice Silk Road. Climate scientists predict that as ice patterns evolve, a passage may soon open between Svalbard in Norway and Greenland due to retreating ice. Should this theory hold true, Greenland would become pivotal as another Arctic maritime chokepoint corridor, independent of the NSR. However, this theory remains unproven and may take years, if not decades, to materialize. Meanwhile, the U.S. lacks a fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers, which requires far more time and investment compared to claiming territory from a weaker ally. Acquiring Greenland aligns well with election cycles, while establishing an appropriate fleet does not appear feasible within a predictable timeframe.
This approach echoes Trump’s claims regarding Canada, where the Arctic coastline grants access to the top passage of the world. However, it does not afford nearly a century’s worth of development, expertise, or a robust permitting regime and specialized fleet capable of breaking through three meters of solid ice with commercial vessels following behind. Pursuing control over Greenland and Canada is not a viable response to the emergence of the Northern Sea Route, which remains a unique ensemble of geography, technology, initiative, and history firmly rooted in Russia.
V. The Precedent
The NSR, dubbed the Ice Silk Road, has now officially commenced its first scheduled commercial season. It is being affectionately referred to by several names, including “The Arctic Express.” Currently in a beta-testing phase, this inaugural season is deliberately small to allow the identification and resolution of issues as systems are fine-tuned. The timing of its launch could not be better, aligning with geopolitical events that have complicated or blocked passage through existing chokepoints like Suez, Hormuz, and Bab el-Mandeb, which only heightens the appeal of this expedited passage—especially considering its single management for ownership, permits, operations, and insurance.
At a time when the world witnessed Tehran closing a strait and other nations consider monetizing their chokepoints, Russia stands alone as the only nation to open a new passage. The NSR is operational, effective, and set to become an all-season corridor with the introduction of advanced icebreakers. It offers a faster alternative to other routes while mitigating war risk premiums, drawing allies like South Korea closer to Russia’s orbit away from the United States. Russia has made it clear that this passage is accessible to all, regardless of country of origin or political position… at least for the time being.
