On August 7, the leaders of Pakistan, Türkiye, and Saudi Arabia convened in Mecca to sign a trilateral joint defense agreement. This accord, termed the Mecca Joint Deterrence Agreement or colloquially referred to as “Islamic NATO,” asserts that any armed attack against a member country will be considered an attack on all members.
However, this commitment has already been undermined, as Ansarallah attacks on Saudi Arabia have gone largely unaddressed—except for Jeddah meetings aimed at forming an international coalition to safeguard Red Sea shipping, which bears a resemblance to NATO.
On Thursday, Türkiye’s Defense Ministry announced that the three nations will conduct joint military exercises and enhance cooperation in the defense sector under this agreement. The rationale? Officials from the involved countries have emphasized that this initiative is not aimed at any specific adversary.
Some analysts suggest that the agreement is primarily intended to counteract Israel, even though these nations share some level of alignment with the US-Israel partnership. Notably, this pact was not a response to the ongoing Palestinian genocide, Zionist violence in the West Bank, or devastation in Lebanon, but rather emerged as Iran gained influence in the region. Former President Trump endorsed the agreement on Sunday, and it appears that Zionist interests are largely unconcerned about the implications of this “Islamic NATO.”
As we have frequently pointed out, while Turkish public sentiment may predominantly oppose Israel, the Turkish elite remain influenced by Western interests, thereby contributing to support for Israel’s actions against Palestinians and other regional aggressions.
Those who signed the deterrence agreement have indicated that it stems partially from the United States’ diminishing security commitment. However, it is worth examining how distinct this new alliance will truly be from the influence of the US.
First, the Obvious: Türkiye Is a Member of Non-Islamic NATO
Just over a month ago, Ankara hosted the NATO summit, where Turkish National Defense Minister Yasar Guler stressed the need for a stronger European contribution to NATO while asserting the “indispensable” transatlantic bond with the US. Despite claims that “Islamic NATO” aims to establish regional security independently of external influences, Turkey remains host to American nuclear weapons at the Incirlik Air Base, and Kürecik base houses a US AN/TPY‑2 X‑band radar, designed in 2012 for NATO as an early-warning sensor against ballistic missiles, particularly those from Iran.
Evidence Iran and Its Allies Are the Targets
Discussions about this alliance intensified during the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, held from April 17-19 in Türkiye. The common narrative pitched it as an initiative to reduce regional tensions, suggesting that local states (excluding the US) should be responsible for West Asian security. But responsible for what, if not the influence of the US?
Türkiye and its new allies have consistently denounced Iran for its actions in the region, showing more concern over Iran’s self-defense than for the atrocities of genocide or unlawful wars. This raises potential red flags.
While Türkiye and Pakistan attempt to position themselves as peacemakers, their methods raise eyebrows. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, prior to the Antalya meetings, expressed views on conflict resolution that seem aligned with the agenda of wanting Iran’s government to capitulate—mirroring the stance of Washington and Tel Aviv. According to Fidan:
“A new leadership structure may reshape Iran’s decision-making and create an opportunity to stop the war,” Fidan said during a live broadcast on TRT Haber. “The new leadership in Iran may show greater flexibility at this stage…This could be a window of opportunity, if used wisely.”
This highlights Ankara’s aim for Iranian capitulation, a sentiment echoed by hardliners in Iran, who view this alliance with skepticism and have generally been correct in their assessments regarding the strategies of the US-Israel coalition.
According to Hamidreza Azizi, commentators closer to the hardline faction argue that the three signatories are primarily focused on immediate threats such as Yemen and Iran, rather than Israel. They believe the Mecca agreement is directed mostly at Iran and the Houthi movement, serving as a warning.
Economic Ties That Bind
Some commentators note that Türkiye’s involvement in both a defense pact with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, as well as NATO, could imply entanglement in conflicts involving these countries. Moreover, the intertwining of defense industries and financial interests cannot be overlooked.
Focusing on Türkiye—where I have lived and worked—its strategy to revitalize its faltering economy is closely linked to the ambition of developing a homegrown defense industry. This initiative seeks to draw more Western investment to bolster the economy and elevate Türkiye’s geopolitical standing. Despite public friction with the West, Ankara has leaned back into its alliances. Following a tough reelection campaign, President Erdogan appointed neoliberal champion Mehmet Simsek as Treasury and Finance Minister, who swiftly moved to increase interest rates and attract Western capital.
Umit Akcay, a Turkish political economist, summarizes the situation: “Between 2021 and 2023, Ankara pursued an unorthodox monetary policy of lowering interest rates despite rising inflation, which, while temporarily successful, eventually faltered under heavy inflation and dwindling reserves.”
This dependency extends to geopolitical realms, as Türkiye has scaled back its previous attempts at an independent path in favor of re-establishing ties with global financial players.
Attracting foreign investment has become the governmental priority. Together, the US and Europe account for around 82 percent of Türkiye’s foreign direct investments. The Mecca agreement might augment this, but it cannot substitute what the West offers.
This strategy aims to make Türkiye indispensable militarily to US-NATO interests, which commensurately aligns with its development into a defense industry exporter. Consequently, NATO’s tightening grip, sometimes referred to as NATO 3.0, deepens Türkiye’s economic entanglements.
Joint ventures, such as the collaboration between Turkish drone manufacturer Baykar and Italian defense contractor Leonardo, exemplify this growing interdependence. Meanwhile, NATO’s recent summit announced Türkiye’s inclusion in several high-visibility defense projects aimed at bolstering military effectiveness.
Rich Outzen, a retired US Army officer and fellow at the Atlantic Council, noted that Türkiye’s role in these alliances could eventually pave the way for broader Turkish defense exports to Europe while also strengthening strategic cooperation with European NATO allies.
Iran Blockade
Shifting focus from economic concerns, while the joint defense agreement may appear weak on paper, Tehran is particularly worried about the potential economic repercussions. According to Hamidreza Azizi, the geography of the three signatories opens up a land dimension to the naval blockade already imposed by the United States. Overland routes through Pakistan and Türkiye carry crucial volumes of Iranian trade, which have become increasingly significant due to complications faced in traditional channels.
Ankara and Islamabad could potentially limit Iranian trade without directly engaging in hostilities, exacerbating Iran’s economic vulnerabilities. This asymmetry places Iran at a significant disadvantage, as its capability for military retaliation against Türkiye and Pakistan is considerably lower than against Gulf states due to Türkiye’s NATO membership and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities.
In light of this, the Mecca agreement signifies Türkiye’s firm step into a role within the established Washington-led security framework, rather than a departure from it.
While there is little concern that Türkiye and Pakistan would attack Iran in retaliation for Iranian actions against Saudi Arabia, Tehran remains apprehensive about the impacts of a potentially restricted trade landscape.
As Azizi highlights, Ankara and Islamabad would not need to engage militarily against Iran, but arrangements that limit Iranian commerce could suffocate the country economically.
In essence, NATO’s influence is not what primarily unsettles Iran; rather, it is the impending military-industrial expectations from this new alliance. As Turkey adapts to its pivotal responsibilities in both NATO and Islamic NATO, the question remains: Can it truly fulfill these obligations? The following discussions will delve deeper into this vital query.
