The ongoing conflict between NATO and Ukraine on one side and Russia on the other has been marked by numerous attacks, particularly on energy infrastructure. One notable incident occurred on the night of July 17, when a Liberian-flagged crude oil tanker was hit twice by drones, resulting in a fire on board. This incident forced the tanker to cancel its scheduled stop at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) Black Sea terminal.
The CPC is a crucial 1,510-kilometer oil pipeline that links Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea oil fields to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, facilitating roughly 80% of Kazakhstan’s oil exports to the global market. Throughout the conflict, its operations have faced interruptions due to Ukrainian assaults on pumping stations in Russia and drone strikes on the CPC loading terminal.
Interestingly, Ukraine has denied any involvement in the attacks on Novorossiysk. Ownership of the CPC is not limited to Western companies. The tanker struck by drones was reportedly chartered by ExxonMobil, according to Reuters. This attack follows another incident involving a Chevron-chartered tanker two weeks earlier, which was also struck.
The ownership structure of the CPC is depicted in the following image provided by BlackSea Energy & Commodities:
Attacks on the CPC are not an unusual strategy for NATO-Ukraine. In April, Moscow accused Kyiv of striking the terminal with drones, resulting in a three-day maintenance shutdown. Last year, following multiple attacks, Kazakhstan demanded that Ukraine cease its assaults on pipeline loading facilities.
Despite Ukraine’s efforts, the CPC Terminal in Novorossiysk transshipped a record 70.52 million tonnes of crude oil last year, an increase of 7 million tonnes from the year before.
The CPC accounts for just over one percent of global oil supply; however, it plays a significant role for specific countries. As highlighted by BlackSea Energy & Commodities:
The CPC pipeline is crucial not just for Kazakhstan but also for global oil stability. At its peak, it transports nearly 1.4 million barrels per day to global markets, serving major economies in Europe and Asia. This volume is enough to influence global oil prices and mitigate supply disruptions, thereby positioning the CPC as a stabilizing force in international energy markets.
Kazakhstan’s Balancing Act
Kazakhstan heavily relies on the CPC for its oil exports, with over 80% of its crude routed through the pipeline. However, despite sustained NATO-Ukraine assaults on this economic lifeline, Kazakhstan appears to be moving closer to the West, straining its relationship with Russia.
The country is reportedly constructing NATO-standard shell factories and entered a military cooperation agreement with Türkiye last year. Furthermore, an agreement signed in April allows the transit of military cargo and personnel through Kazakhstan, actions that have drawn disapproval from both Moscow and Beijing, as Türkiye is a NATO member and involved in activities that support the U.S.
Recently, Kazakhstan and American companies clinched $10 billion worth of artificial intelligence agreements.
Additionally, Kazakhstan is entangled in a problematic agreement that benefits U.S. interests in Kazakhstan’s tungsten reserves, a critical mineral in short supply due to China’s restrictions on American military supplies.
During the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) late last year, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan agreed to enhance cooperation in areas such as trade and logistics, which would reduce Russian influence while strengthening ties with the EU and fostering defense collaboration, including joint military drills.
Kazakhstan is also taking steps to affect Russian wheat exports. NATO-Ukraine activities in the Sea of Azov have prompted Russian wheat exporters to consider costlier routes just as the new harvest enters the market. Simultaneously, Kazakhstan is halting its market for six months.
Over 100,000 views for this false claim.
Kazakhstan hasn’t imposed a blanket ban on Russian wheat, what it’s introduced is a partial six-month restriction covering imports from all EAEU members and third countries (Ukraine, China, France, Australia, whoever) with major… https://t.co/v4KB9h1JJZ
— Brian McDonald (@BrianMcDonaldIE) July 19, 2026
While McDonald is technically correct, it’s worth mentioning that nearly all of Kazakhstan’s wheat imports come from Russia. According to The Times of Central Asia, Kazakhstan’s six-month pause risks igniting a trade dispute with Moscow and undermines the Eurasian Economic Union (which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Armenia, the latter of which has threatened to leave):
Kazakhstan’s order is country-neutral and preserves supplies to approved processors. Yet previous countermeasures often arrived through plant-health rules, certificate disputes, and border controls rather than openly declared retaliation.
The broader issue lies within the EAEU… The Eurasian Economic Commission can identify barriers and facilitate negotiations, but it has struggled to halt national protection measures when prices or food security become politically sensitive. Trade disputes increasingly affect a variety of goods, despite common-market regulations…
This wheat ban illustrates the current state of the union operating through exceptions. Northern Kazakhstan’s farmers will benefit from fewer cheap truckloads to support crop prices, but millers will pay more for rail transport. Rail transit remains exempt, yet the debate regarding what the EAEU common market should provide is increasingly complex.
Many analysts argue that Central Asian states need to balance their interests and navigate various alliances, but the situation appears to go beyond simple diplomacy.
While these issues may seem minor in isolation, when considered alongside ongoing Ukrainian strikes, tensions in Armenia, issues in the Baltics, the seizure of “shadow fleet” tankers, Central Asia’s EAEU challenges, and Turkish movements in the Black Sea and Central Asia, they form a larger, troubling picture.
NATO’s Aspirations for the Black Sea
Returning to the Black Sea, NATO has long endeavored to assert control over this strategic body of water, aiming to effectively turn it into a “NATO lake.” This objective has existed for years, reflecting a historical conflict over control of the Black Sea.
Efforts to “contain” Russia have often focused on limiting its maritime access. Glenn Diesen, a Norwegian political scientist specializing in Russian foreign policy, remarks:
In the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Samuel Huntington argued:
“The immediate source of Western expansion was technological: the invention of the means of ocean navigation for reaching distant peoples and the development of military capabilities for conquering those peoples… The West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas but rather by its organized violence. The West often forgets this; non-Westerners never do.”
Russia’s economic progress has been hindered since the Kievan Rus disintegration, which disrupted its access to vital maritime trade routes. Historically, Russia’s resurgence and rise as a great power came from gaining access to the Baltic Sea under Peter the Great. Efforts to contain Russia have relied significantly on denying it reliable sea access.
In Europe, NATO has played a key role in expanding U.S. control over the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic. NATO’s expansion into Bulgaria, Romania, and potentially Ukraine aims to convert the Black Sea into a NATO-controlled area.
Yet, despite its ambitions, Project Ukraine has been significantly unsuccessful in achieving this goal. As noted by GIS Reports, “Russia currently holds its strongest position in the Black Sea region since 1991 and is preparing to strengthen it further.”
However, NATO-Ukraine remains active in affecting global food supplies.
1.5 million metric tons – a 29% decrease year-on-year; down 62% compared to July 2024. That’s SovEcon’s forecast for Russian #wheat exports this July – the lowest since 2017. Disruptions in the Azov/Black Sea and soft demand are the driving factors. If shallow-water terminals remain closed, the situation could worsen in August, coinciding with the new export season.
— Andrey Sizov (@sizov_andre) July 21, 2026
Ukraine’s grain exports, which typically flow predominantly through Odessa, are also at a standstill. With the Strait of Hormuz currently closed, the NATO-Ukraine alliance seems intent on severely impacting a significant portion of global wheat supplies.
Turkey’s Strategic Moves
Recently, we featured an article by Andrew Korybko discussing the potential for Türkiye to test Russia’s resolve by escorting Ukrainian commercial vessels or permitting NATO warships to transit through the Turkish Straits, something it has thus far denied during the Ukraine conflict.
Escorting ships would be a significant gamble for Türkiye, especially as Russia intensifies its blockade of Odessa by targeting ships attempting to dock there. It raises questions about the fate of such ships post-war, especially with the likelihood of Russia gaining control over all of Ukraine’s Black Sea coast.
Furthermore, Moscow issued a warning to Türkiye on July 17, shortly after Turkish FM Hakan Fidan spoke about Black Sea security. Russian officials announced restrictions on stone fruit (including peaches, nectarines, and cherries) imports from five Turkish exporters, a significant blow to Türkiye’s agricultural sector. To elaborate, Türkiye Today notes:
Türkiye ranks among the world’s largest exporters of stone fruit, with shipments valued at approximately $336.6 million in 2025, with Russia accounting for over 40%, or $140.6 million, of the total.
On the energy front, nearly half of Türkiye’s oil imports in 2025 originated from Russia, with less than 40 percent of its natural gas coming from the same source. However, these figures are declining as Türkiye signs substantial LNG contracts with the U.S. and others while collaborating with Washington to facilitate oil imports from Iraq.
If the current EU commitment to halt imports of Russian fossil fuels by 2027 is maintained, Türkiye might lose its position as a significant exporter of Russian gas to Europe by the end of this year.
Additionally, ongoing discussions between Turkish and U.S. officials suggest that the protracted dispute concerning Türkiye’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defense system may soon reach a resolution.
According to Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Levent Gümrükçü, a solution is nearing, potentially allowing Ankara back into the F-35 fighter jet program and lifting sanctions imposed by the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
