Welcome to a critical examination of the current geopolitical tensions in Europe, particularly concerning the actions of France and its implications for Russia. The situation presents a chaotic landscape where strategic decisions could lead to significant consequences.
Yves here. The ongoing spectacle of European elites becoming increasingly unhinged about Russia, with discussions of rapid tactical nuclear strikes, reflects a disturbing new normal. This self-destructive behavior appears to be gaining traction.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global transition to a multipolar world amidst the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, part of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website.
France’s strategic plan to deploy nuclear-armed Rafale jets across the Arctic, Central Europe, and potentially the Balkans introduces a significant new threat to Russia.
The announcement made in late April regarding France and Poland conducting regular nuclear drills, presumably targeted at Russia (specifically Kaliningrad) and Belarus, marks the implementation of what French President Emmanuel Macron calls “forward deterrence.” This follows his earlier speech introducing this concept, which essentially extends France’s nuclear umbrella over Europe, surfacing soon after the expiration of the New START treaty.
The Telegraph elaborates on Macron’s vision in their article, “How France took the nuclear option to make Putin think twice.” Rafale jets, equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, are set to deploy not only to Poland but also likely to the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, with each expressing interest in Macron’s “forward deterrence” initiative. Soon after the publication of this report, Norway announced its participation, likely joining Poland in regular nuclear drills.
The tactical nature of the nuclear weapons contemplated for deployment by France with its Rafales is noteworthy, as pointed out by the Telegraph. These tactical nukes are intended to serve as a “nuclear warning shot,” aimed at military targets. The objective is to intimidate the target—presumably Russia—into halting military operations and seeking diplomatic avenues for dispute resolution.
Additionally, Romania has confirmed that it was invited to join the “forward deterrence” initiative; however, its new president unexpectedly declined the offer to host nuclear components, despite already housing French troops. If Romania reconsiders, the strategic landscape alters significantly: Rafales in Norway could threaten Russian Arctic bases, those in Poland could menace Kaliningrad and Belarus, and Romanian-based Rafales could pose a risk to Crimea. This development signifies a qualitatively new threat to Russia.
On the conventional front, a “cordon sanitaire” is being formed in the Arctic-Baltic region through UK-led initiatives, in Central Europe through Polish-led efforts, and across its southern perimeter via Turkish initiatives, possibly extending into Romania as seen here. Concurrently, Germany and Poland are in a race to build the largest army within European NATO (currently, Poland has the largest), but Germany could pose a significant threat to Russia should it gain an advantage.
These escalating trends pose considerable risks for Russia as they unfold right on its border. Compounding the danger, the traditionally anti-Russian Baltic States may feel emboldened by these developments to either provoke a crisis with Russia or support Ukraine by opening a second front if the current conflict resumes, risking a nuclear confrontation if France reinforces its “forward deterrence” stance against Russia. This scenario could lead Russia to initiate a first nuclear strike against NATO.
The last historical instance when France agreed to defend a European nation was when it abandoned Poland to the Nazis during the “phony war.” This historical precedent raises concerns that similar behavior could occur again. Countries along NATO’s Eastern Flank, participating in France’s “forward deterrence” initiative—like Poland, Romania, and possibly Finland and the Baltic States—should remain cautious and consider the implications of provoking Russia, even under the guise of France’s protective nuclear umbrella.
