The recent suggestion by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to consider India as a potential mediator between Iran and the Gulf Kingdoms raises eyebrows. At first glance, it appears curious; however, this move reflects Moscow’s efforts to balance the varied interests of BRICS nations amidst their growing discord, as well as managing relations with both Washington and Tel Aviv.
Despite the aim of BRICS to serve as a cohesive geopolitical counterbalance to the US and its NATO allies, the group struggles to generate a unified stance.
Iran and the United Arab Emirates, both members of BRICS, find themselves in direct conflict, clashing during the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in India. While Saudi Arabia seems more inclined towards peace than the UAE, it has also engaged in hostilities against Iran.
India has historically imported oil from Iran but has simultaneously strengthened its geopolitical ties with Israel and Gulf states. Moreover, it actively participates in the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor project, which aims to fortify US-Israeli digital hegemony in the region. Notably, India is also a member of the US-led Pax Silica initiative.
Consequently, it comes as no surprise that BRICS refrained from condemning the US-Israel actions against Iran, which involve targeted assassinations of Iranian leaders and other forms of aggression. Nonetheless, the group did manage to reaffirm its dedication to the “BRICS spirit of mutual respect, understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, inclusiveness, and consensus.”
As highlighted by John Helmer in a recent post, Lavrov’s remarks hinted towards China’s voting behavior regarding loans for Ukraine at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), while also directing criticism towards India for its hesitance to support Iran publicly during the conflict with the US and Israel. This vividly illustrates the fractured unity and priorities within BRICS.
In essence, BRICS, once seen as a potentially transformative coalition, currently appears disorganized. Through it all, however, the prevailing neoliberal ideology focused on markets over people continues to hold sway.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, under the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published on his website.
Given Iran’s trust in Russia, the latter’s confidence in India might further enhance Iran’s feelings of security. Lavrov suggested during a Q&A session following the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting that India serve as a long-term mediator between Iran and the Gulf Kingdoms. His suggestion emerged amidst discussions about the escalating tension between Iran and the UAE, two members of BRICS.
Lavrov articulated that “India, as chair, is directly reliant on oil supplies from this region. Why not utilize its good offices and invite Iran and the UAE to dialogue and explore ways to reduce hostilities.” This proposal is particularly noteworthy given that BRICS has not yet issued a formal statement on the ongoing conflict, with India condemning Iranian actions against the Gulf states while remaining silent on US and Israeli aggression.
Despite this, Lavrov acknowledged Pakistan’s current role in facilitating dialogue between Iran and the US. He emphasized that India’s long-standing diplomatic experience positions it as an ideal mediator among Iran and its Arab neighbors in the long term. His views suggest that he envisions a more durable solution compared to Pakistan’s mediation, which may not endure beyond the current hostilities.
Critics could argue that India’s recent “strategic defense partnership” with the UAE, established concurrently with Lavrov’s comments, undermines its potential diplomatic role in Iran’s eyes. This, along with its “Major Defense Partnership” with the US, from 2016, raises doubts; however, India holds key distinctions from Pakistan. India is not only a founding member of BRICS but also remains a crucial ally to Russia, which has fostered a “special and privileged” partnership with India despite its growing ties with the US.
Ultimately, Iran’s trust in Russia positions India favorably in this intricate diplomatic landscape. If the political will exists, Lavrov’s proposal could potentially come to fruition. Notably, reports suggest that Saudi Arabia has floated a non-aggression pact reminiscent of Helsinki, which could lead towards actualizing the previously outlined collective security framework for the Gulf that India might help negotiate. While the future remains uncertain, avenues for dialogue are emerging.
Even if Lavrov’s idea fails to materialize, it reinforces the importance of the Russian-Indian Strategic Partnership—particularly in the context of trustworthiness and diplomatic proficiency compared to Pakistan. It’s important to remember that, while Russian-Pakistani relations have improved significantly, India will continue to be regarded as Russia’s top regional partner.
