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The global landscape has changed dramatically, as for the first time in over 50 years, the two largest nuclear powers now operate without binding limits on their arsenals. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and its successors, START II and New START, formed the bedrock of nuclear restraint between the U.S. and Russia, placing caps on the number of deployed warheads while establishing the most comprehensive verification system in arms-control history. As we approach the expiration of New START’s final extension in February 2026, this framework that has underpinned global strategic stability is disintegrating. This article delves into the origins and features of the START treaties and explores the potential ramifications of their dissolution.
MIRV nuclear warheads – The fewer the better
Origins and Evolution of START
START arose from the acknowledgment during the late Cold War that an unrestrained arms race was both financially and politically untenable. Initiated in 1991 and entering into force in 1994, START I necessitated both nations to reduce their deployed strategic warheads to 6,000—a significant decrease from Cold War highs—and introduced measures such as on-site inspections, telemetry sharing, and extensive information exchanges. Its successor, START II (1993), aimed for deeper reductions and a ban on multiple-warhead land-based missiles (MIRVs), but never became effective after Russia withdrew in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Comeback of restraint occurred in 2010 with New START, which capped each side at 1,550 deployed warheads on 700 launchers and modernized verification protocols. Although extended once by mutual agreement in 2021, New START remains the lone U.S.–Russian arms-control treaty, soon to expire with no replacement in sight.
Why START Mattered
- Significant reduction in warheads. The START treaties enabled a substantial drop in the global number of nuclear warheads from over 50,000 to approximately 10,000.
- Predictability. By instituting regular data exchanges, START transformed speculation into established facts. Both nations were aware of each other’s arsenal sizes and compositions, diminishing the motives for countering exaggerated threats.
- Verification. The treaty’s verification framework, which has included over 18,000 on-site visits since 1994, became the benchmark for fostering trust. Inspectors confirmed missile serial numbers, assessed launch-tube counts, and verified base inventories, validating announced reductions.
- Crisis Stability. Establishing quantitative ceilings lessened the advantages of a first strike and contributed to a stable deterrence equilibrium. Leaders could operate with calculations rather than speculation during tense moments.
- Symbolic Power. The success of START served as proof that adversaries could negotiate in good faith, bolstering the credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and inspiring related efforts like the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Arms control was viewed not as an act of generosity but as strategic insurance.
The Rise and Fall of Nuclear Arms Control
The Cuban missile crisis catalyzed a shift towards arms control diplomacy between the U.S. and the USSR. Beginning with the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963, several treaties successfully mitigated tensions among nuclear powers and curbed arms racing. Yet, only a handful of these agreements remain in effect today.
Starting in 2002, escalating tensions between the U.S. and Russia culminated in the repeal or expiration of critical nuclear arms control treaties. Political expediency and military expansion led to the dismantling of crucial safeguards against nuclear conflict, pushing the doomsday clock closer to midnight. The New START treaty, the last of the nuclear arms reduction accords, is set to expire in February 2026.
The disintegration of the START treaties began with a breakdown of trust following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, which, coupled with sanctions, stifled broader communications. The onset of COVID-19 in 2020 halted on-site inspections, and they have not resumed adequately. In February 2023, Russia suspended its participation in New START, citing perceived “hostile actions” by Washington and NATO expansion. The U.S. accused Russia of noncompliance due to their refusal of inspections and data updates. With ongoing conflict in Ukraine and minimal bilateral diplomacy—at its lowest since the 1980s—neither country is preparing a successor treaty. As the 2026 deadline draws near, START remains technically alive but is functionally defunct. Recently, Putin proposed a one-year extension of New START, yet the Trump administration has not responded.
Consequences of New START Expiration
Return of the Arms Race. In the absence of limitations, both powers are likely to expand their arsenals. The U.S. is modernizing all components of its strategic deterrent, including the Sentinel ICBM, B-21 bomber, and Columbia-class submarines. Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new systems like the Sarmat heavy missile and Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle. Without mutual regulations, planners are likely to predict worst-case scenarios and initiate a costly and destabilizing arms buildup reminiscent of the 1960s, with both the U.S. and Russia potentially maximizing their MIRV missile loadouts by adding warheads from existing stocks.
Collapse of Verification. The end of inspections implies that intelligence estimates will take on a larger role. While satellite imagery may identify silos, it cannot determine the number of warheads; furthermore, telemetry data can be manipulated. The elimination of verified data will compel both sides to maintain excess capacity, escalating mistrust.
Crisis Instability. In the event of a confrontation between nuclear states, leaders will operate under heightened uncertainty. Doubts regarding the survivability of their arsenals may lead both nations to adopt launch-on-warning strategies, reducing decision-making time and increasing the chance of miscalculation.
Global Ripple Effects. The restraint shown by major powers has been a cornerstone of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, whereby non-nuclear states agree to forgo weapons in exchange for the disarmament commitments of nuclear powers. Should Washington and Moscow withdraw from these limits, countries like Beijing, New Delhi, Islamabad, and Pyongyang might feel justified in expanding their own arsenals unchecked. U.S. allies may also begin to question the reliability of extended deterrence, leading to calls for independent nuclear capabilities.
Breakdown of Nuclear Diplomacy. Since the signing of SALT I (1972), a series of treaties have underscored that nuclear excess is both dangerous and reversible. The collective unraveling of these agreements, with the demise of the INF, withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty, and the impending expiration of START, reveals a disheartening trend toward diplomatic nihilism, where sheer power dictates nuclear numbers.
China’s Nuclear Deterrent and a Three-Body Problem
One of the gravest implications of START’s dissolution would be an increased impetus for China to enhance its nuclear capabilities. Traditionally, China has maintained a policy of “minimum deterrence” (around 400–500 warheads, projected to rise to approximately 1,000 by the early 2030s, according to U.S. Department of Defense estimates) that relies on the principle of assured retaliation. The end of START would drastically change this paradigm.
If the U.S. and Russia both surpass 1,550 deployed warheads, the disparity between Chinese and other superpower arsenals would widen considerably. The credibility of China’s second-strike capability would diminish, as U.S. and Russian counterforce strategies could outmatch China’s survivable forces. Additionally, China would face a daunting challenge of defending against the possibility of a united strike from both the U.S. and Russia. This precarious situation can be likened to a “three-body problem,” in which each entity’s efforts to counterbalance the other two lead to asymmetrical growth and a runaway arms race.
China’s DF-61 ICBM – A potential crisis for arms control
Prospects for Renewal or Replacement
Reviving formal arms control will likely encounter significant political challenges. In Washington, deep partisan divisions make Congress apprehensive about treaties. Meanwhile, Moscow views strategic arms talks as concessions amid sanctions and wartime stricture. Nonetheless, relatively modest confidence-building measures could be possible, including limited data transparency agreements, mutual test notifications, and moratoriums on new categories of deployments (for instance, space-based weapons). In the long run, achieving stability will necessitate tripartite discussions involving China, as its arsenal complicates the existing bilateral limits. However, Beijing is unlikely to accept verification parity until its military capabilities are close to U.S. and Russian levels. Absent a comprehensive treaty, policymakers may have to rely on informal norms and reciprocal statements, which serve as a fragile alternative to legally binding limitations.
Conclusion
The expiration of START symbolizes more than a lapsed agreement; it signifies the collapse of the remaining structure that kept structured deterrence in place amidst growing rivalry. The absence of the START verification mechanism will lead to conservative assumptions taking precedence, igniting a renewed nuclear arms race that could result in escalating defense expenditures, hair-trigger readiness, and crises that threaten catastrophic outcomes. Restoring even a modest level of arms control treaties is an urgent imperative. Transparency is far less costly than rearmament, and treaties, despite their imperfections, are more dependable than theoretical deterrence. It is vital for humanity’s safety that the New START treaty be renewed and that additional arms control frameworks be established. The establishment of nuclear trust took decades to develop; allowing START to lapse could plunge us into a dangerously uncertain era of nuclear peril.
