Yves here. Andrew Korybko offers a thought-provoking analysis of how European NATO members are pursuing what can only be described as fanciful self-defense strategies, predicated on the unsubstantiated notion that Russia might launch an offensive against them.
While it’s true that France possesses nuclear weapons, experts have consistently pointed out that the continent’s depleted industrial capacity would render it incapable of adequately arming itself for at least a decade under present conditions.
The situation regarding weaponry is even more concerning. Stanislav Krapivnik elaborates that what are purported to be European weapons systems often rely on critical components sourced from the United States, accounting for approximately 30% to 40% of their make-up. Krapivnik estimates that developing a genuinely autonomous arms industry in Europe could take around 20 years.
There’s also the significant issue of force structure. NATO’s framework relies on the United States to oversee and coordinate the military operations of its member nations. Aurelien has previously examined the considerable obstacles to the formation of a unified NATO army, notably the contentious debates regarding which nation would take precedence in the command hierarchy.
It’s essential to recognize that NATO remains a rather fragile alliance. Historically, even during the height of U.S. power, European nations were reluctant to yield substantial sovereignty to NATO. Decisions within NATO operate on a consensus basis; there is no provision for a qualified majority to bind all states, unlike many EU proposals. Furthermore, Article 5 offers limited guarantees; its stipulation merely encourages members to consider defensive actions in the event of an attack on a fellow member, rather than mandating them to act.
As the saying goes in Maine, “You can’t get there from here.”
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the global shift towards multipolarity amid the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, which operates under the Russian Foreign Ministry. This article was originally published on his website.
The proposal by the EU to create an Article 4-like mechanism suggests that European NATO members doubt their American counterparts may share the same perception of threats—specifically regarding Russia—that leads them to seek urgent consultations.
According to a recent report by the Financial Times, the EU is moving forward with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s proposal to establish an Article 4-like mechanism among its members. As stated in the NATO Charter, “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.” Given that many EU nations are also NATO members, this proposal might seem unnecessary.
While that is indeed the case, the implications are significant; it reveals a sense of mistrust that E-NATO may have toward the U.S. leadership regarding the assessment of threats—specifically those emanating from Russia. This suspicion indicates a concern that the United States may not unequivocally back them with military support should tensions escalate into an open conflict.
In response, E-NATO is establishing parallel decision-making mechanisms to prepare for actions against Russia without U.S. involvement, in which the U.S. could opt to remain neutral, advising against such measures during their consultations. Nonetheless, in adherence to the spirit of Article 5, the U.S. may still provide military supplies, intelligence, and logistical support, similar to its current involvement in aiding Ukraine.
E-NATO leaders have raised alarms that Russia may soon challenge their resolve, with assessments that this could occur as early as around 2030, prompting urgency in advancing von der Leyen’s proposal. Compounding this sense of urgency is the U.S.’s reported plans to withdraw up to 40,000 of its 80,000 troops stationed in Europe, further emphasizing the need for E-NATO to act swiftly, despite any potential establishment of a permanent U.S. base in Poland.
Poland’s ruling liberal coalition has been at the forefront of E-NATO’s alarmist rhetoric regarding a potential Russian threat, yet the Foreign Minister’s recent meeting with his Belarusian counterpart on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly marks the first such dialogue in a decade. Their so-called “snowdrop diplomacy,” inspired by Radek Sikorski’s observation that “a snowdrop can bloom if the weather is favorable,” may help mitigate the anxieties ignited by the ruling coalition if it achieves success.
Even in this optimistic scenario, Poland and other E-NATO members will likely continue to harbor doubts about Russia, fueled by ingrained fears among their liberal elites. Thus, establishing an Article 4-like mechanism must remain a priority. Poland will likely play a pivotal role in this framework due to its critical position on the western flank of what can be termed a “cordon sanitaire” around Russia, which gives it an outsized significance in the evolving security landscape.
With that in mind, a feasible path towards stability could involve a simultaneous reduction of some forces from both E-NATO troops in the Baltic States and Russian forces in Belarus, particularly if the U.S. also withdraws some of its troops from the Baltic region. In this scenario, Poland would assume responsibility for the security of these states during a crisis. Establishing a crisis-management dialogue encompassing Russia, E-NATO (led by Poland), and the U.S. could help maintain peace.
