Yves here. As many of our readers are aware, our enthusiasm for BRICS has been tempered. On one hand, the bloc has facilitated an important initiative: establishing bilateral payment mechanisms for trade partners eager to bypass US dollar sanctions. However, it was never poised to challenge the established post-World War II global structures. The diverse backgrounds of its members make consensus challenging, and several countries, both small and large, are hesitant to take sides in global disputes. For example, India resisted US pressure early in the Special Military Operation, opting to follow its own interests. The characterization of BRICS as anti-US and EU complicates this delicate balancing act further.
Moreover, BRICS has not set overly ambitious objectives. A close examination of the Kazan Declaration and subsequent statements reveals that the group does not aspire to replace institutions like the UN, IMF, or World Bank. Instead, BRICS aims to reform these governance structures, ensuring that the increasingly influential developing nations in Asia, Africa, and South America have a more significant voice in global governance.
By Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Nurina Malek. Originally published at Jomo’s website
The leadership of the Global South has been dwindling since the 1980s. While some look to BRICS+ to fill this void, its structure and mission cast doubt on whether those hopes are well founded. A revitalized Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) may be the most promising path forward.
Golden Age
The Keynesian “Golden Age” after World War II marked a significant period of reconstruction and development, especially in South Asia.
In 1964, developing nations united to form the G77 caucus and established the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) within the UN framework.
The UN General Assembly called for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974, following President Nixon’s termination of the Bretton Woods monetary system in 1971.
In 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve sharply increased interest rates in response to Western stagflation, leading to fiscal and sovereign debt crises in Latin America and Africa. Many countries were compelled to seek IMF emergency funds to manage these crises.
Simultaneously, the counter-revolution inspired by Thatcher and Reagan against Keynesian economics ushered in ‘neoliberal’ Washington Consensus reforms, exacerbating economic contraction.
At New York’s Plaza Hotel, the U.S. convened its G7 coalition, which comprises the world’s seven largest allied economies, to address the issue of the overvalued dollar, requiring significant appreciation of Japanese and German currencies.
The financial liberalization promoted by the G7, particularly through IMF initiatives in the 1990s to open national capital accounts, increased both the frequency and severity of economic crises.
In response to legitimacy concerns following the financial crises in East Asia, Russia, and elsewhere between 1997 and 1999, G7 finance ministers agreed in 1999 to establish a more inclusive G20, representing the finance ministers of the world’s 20 largest economies.
Shortly after the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, the inaugural G20 leaders’ summit took place at the White House in November.
Making BRICS
The term ‘BRICs’ was introduced in late 2001 by Jim O’Neill, then head of Global Economic Research at Goldman Sachs, to denote Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
Upon inviting South Africa to join, BRICs evolved into a coalition of five independent, large ‘emerging market’ economies aimed at strengthening their collective influence.
As a subgroup within the G20, BRICS has sought to enhance international monetary and financial relations. It has since expanded into BRICS+, allowing for different tiers of membership.
It’s important to note that neither BRICS nor BRICS+ initially set out to represent the vast array of interests of the entire Global South, primarily serving its economically significant members.
BRICS and the South
BRICS holds the potential to create a world less dominated by the affluent and powerful nations of the Global North, particularly the West.
Since the end of World War II, and especially after the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained a dominant position in global affairs, with its European NATO allies often content to play supporting roles.
Numerous developing countries have expressed concerns that existing global frameworks do not cater to their best interests. BRICS seems to offer a platform for representation and alternative avenues for international economic cooperation.
Indeed, BRICS has strengthened the Global South’s voice and created new arrangements to address the interests of developing nations, particularly regarding financing development.
The BRICS nations have also advocated for various international issues affecting the Global South, and all five member countries have led collective efforts on specific topics with varying degrees of success.
Consequently, many developing countries recognize and appreciate the significant role BRICS plays in such matters, leading some to publicly align with and even join the coalition.
However, the expansion to BRICS+ is unlikely to alleviate many challenges faced by developing nations due to persistent international power imbalances.
Potential and Problems
The wide-ranging diversity within the Global South complicates any group’s claim to represent it effectively.
BRICS+ unites countries with differing political systems, economic priorities, and development goals, making it attractive yet challenging to guarantee consistent advocacy for all developing nations.
This issue becomes especially evident when contrasting the interests of weaker developing countries with those of the prominent BRICS+ members.
Many vulnerable nations are grappling with issues like food security, structural transformation, deindustrialization, environmental sustainability, climate change, and financialization.
At the same time, BRICS members are focused on advancing their strategic interests, securing financing and investments, enhancing exports, and amplifying their international influence.
While these objectives aren’t inherently conflicting, they seldom fully align. This reality hampers efforts to pursue shared goals, advocate collectively, and maintain cooperation.
The selective nature of BRICS+ membership further limits its accountability to the broader Global South. It is unrealistic to expect BRICS+ to consistently represent the comprehensive interests of all developing countries, especially the most vulnerable and least influential.
The Global South should certainly strive to leverage the economic weight and voice of BRICS+. However, advancing its collective interests may best be achieved through a revitalized NAM, tailored for objectives that prioritize peace, development, and justice.
