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Strait of Hormuz Tensions: Oman Route Challenges Iran’s Control Amid GCC Rejection and Ongoing Israel Ceasefire Violations

  • 2026年6月25日
  • Estimated read time 15 min read
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Introduction: The situation surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is critical as Iran faces significant challenges to its maritime authority. The complexities of regional relationships, particularly with Oman and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, create a dynamic landscape of political maneuvering and naval logistics. This analysis delves into these tensions and their implications for maritime navigation in the region.

[Today’s Iran war post was posted before being completed. Please return at 8:00 AM EDT for a finalized version.]

Iran is currently grappling with a critical test of its capabilities and determination. A pressing question remains: can Iran maintain effective control over the Strait of Hormuz in a peaceful context? We have highlighted that Oman, unlike Iran, is a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which obliges Oman to allow the passage of vessels through its territorial waters. Furthermore, Oman has been notably circumspect regarding Iran’s intentions, which include a proposal for joint management of the Strait of Hormuz.

Should Oman refuse to collaborate—which it seems to be doing—it significantly weakens Iran’s existing leverage in the region. Oman’s strategic neutrality during conflicts, particularly given the absence of U.S. airbases on its territory, allowed it to avoid Iranian targeting. Consequently, unless hostilities reignite, Iran’s ability to impede maritime traffic in Omani waters appears limited.

The concept of a new regime for the Strait of Hormuz has been met with resistance. As reported on Al Jazeera’s live feed:

Arab Gulf states reject ‘new geopolitical facts’ born from aggression: UAE presidential adviser

The UAE’s presidential adviser, Anwar Gargash, stated that “new geopolitical facts” cannot be imposed upon the Arab Gulf states following any form of aggression.

The Omani route remains a viable corridor for maritime traffic:

Additionally:

There are claims circulating on Twitter—though unverified—that very large crude carriers cannot utilize the Omani side due to shallow waters. A workaround involves transferring fuel onto smaller vessels, which can then relay it to larger ships either at sea or in a proximate port.

According to Iran International, Oman has declined to impose transit fees:

Oman has declared that future arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz will forgo transit fees, supporting a memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran. The Omani foreign minister expressed this view during a joint ministerial meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States in Bahrain, as reported by the Oman News Agency. He emphasized that Oman holds a unique responsibility, as a bordering state, to facilitate international maritime navigation according to international law and UNCLOS.

Oman is also advocating for the restoration of safe navigation through the strait and expressed hope that the U.S.-Iran MoU would fulfill its intended objectives for achieving peace.

Conversely, Iran has vociferously opposed the use of the Omani route. As reported by Al Jazeera in Iran warns against Hormuz crossings without authorisation:

The Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has issued strong warnings against any unauthorized crossings of the Strait of Hormuz, asserting that vessels not adhering to regulations “will be dealt with” and condemning the new route through the waterway.

The future of the strait, a crucial route for energy transport, which was essentially shut by Iran during the prolonged conflict between the United States and Iran, remains a contentious topic in negotiations.

“The only authorized route for passage is that declared by the Islamic Republic of Iran,” the IRGC stated on Thursday. They characterized any unapproved crossing as “unacceptable and extremely dangerous.”

Additionally, they criticized the announcement of a new route through the waterway by “certain authorities,” without providing further details.

Importantly, there have been disparities in stance between the IRGC and Iran’s political leadership previously. On at least one occasion, the IRGC declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, with officials subsequently contesting this narrative during negotiations. Current declarations of closure, meanwhile, have not been supported by any IRGC action, such as directing vessels to intercept non-compliant ships.

During a recent meeting involving the U.S. and GCC states, the President of Bahrain endorsed a unified stance, following Secretary of State Rubio’s assertion that the Strait of Hormuz will remain open:

If Bahrain’s declaration signifies a consensus among GCC members, it implies that Iran’s aspirations for cooperation in controlling navigation and imposing transit fees are unlikely to materialize—unless the situation escalates into warfare, which may compel a change in perspective. As it stands, Oman appears unlikely to ally with Iran in asserting dominance over the Strait of Hormuz in the face of widespread opposition from the GCC.

To emphasize the ongoing stalemate, Trump has reiterated his firm stance that Iran’s imposition of fees for transit through the Strait of Hormuz will be met with resistance:

Additionally, a significant contentious issue has arisen regarding U.S. refusal to allow Iran to impose fees on maritime traffic through the strait, as detailed by Bloomberg in Hormuz Fees Branded ‘Unacceptable’ by Trump in Warning to Iran:

  • President Donald Trump has declared that tolls on vessels traversing the Strait of Hormuz will be a red line in negotiations with Iran.
  • Trump made it clear that he would find it unacceptable if a final agreement included any service or shipping fees in the strait.
  • While Iran has indicated plans to manage the strait, it asserts that vessels would need permission to cross the waterway and must carry a mandatory insurance policy.

When asked whether he would reject a final agreement if it contained any service or shipping fees in the strait, Trump affirmed that he would.

“It would be unacceptable to me,” the president stated at a White House press conference. “We have numerous strengths, and if you did that for them, you’d have to do it for other people. It would be a game changer.”

Despite the seeming resoluteness in these declarations, it is telling that the term “unacceptable” may signal underlying vulnerability. The likelihood of the U.S. granting the Persian Gulf Authority formal permission to levy transit fees appears negligible. It is conceivable that any final agreement need only remain silent on this matter.

However, if Trump genuinely stands firm on this position, will Iran ultimately reject a final agreement? With widespread disapproval towards Iranian control over the Strait existing, it would be imprudent for Iran to stake its reputation on this issue. As Robert Pape has pointed out, the Strait of Hormuz could serve as a conduit for Iran to elevate itself to a significant global power. Nevertheless, the U.S. may fail to fulfill the MoU in sufficient capacities, leading to the Strait of Hormuz becoming a focal point of compliance concerns rather than merely a debatable issue within the negotiations.

Intriguingly, Israel could potentially enable Iran to reestablish dominance over the Strait of Hormuz through military means if the situation escalates to the point where Iran engages with Israeli targets supporting operations in Lebanon, triggering retaliation, either via airstrikes or targeted assassinations. However, Israel still faces the challenge of maintaining a consistent hold on this dominance.

I harbor skepticism regarding the potential outcomes of Iran-Gulf state discussions, as they seem to focus more on restricting U.S. military operations within their territories, rather than the likelihood of Iran refraining from aggressive actions against them:

The latest ceasefire agreement in Israel-Lebanon witnessed only a brief pause, lasting about 48 hours. An Israeli operation resulted in the deaths of two individuals serving as bulldozer operators in an area urgently requiring reconstruction. Furthermore, Israel remains adamant that it will not withdraw its forces from southern Lebanon. Analysts closely monitoring the situation, such as Trita Parsi, emphasize that Iran regards adherence to the initial clause of the MoU, which includes Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, as paramount. Thus far, Iran has remained silent regarding these violations, indicating that mere stern statements will not suffice moving forward. We will revisit the situation in Lebanon soon.

Israel continues to solidify its defiance of the MoU by asserting its ongoing military presence in Lebanon, as highlighted in a Harretz headline: ‘Soldiers In, Residents Out’ Netanyahu: Israel Won’t Withdraw From Lebanon ‘As Long as I Am Prime Minister’

Not only does Israel reinforce its commitment to remaining in Lebanon, but Israeli Defense Minister Katz has remarked that the U.S. has not requested Israel’s withdrawal:

In a lightly edited transcript, the narrative unfolds:

Hindustan Times narrator: Israel’s Defense Minister Katz also defied Trump’s broader regional strategy, affirming that the IDF would remain active in Lebanon.

Katz [translation in video clip]: The IDF is prepared in the yellow line, and we are not retreating. We have stated that we will not withdraw at this time. This is a political achievement. There has been no request from the U.S. for Israel to pull back from Lebanon.

Interviewer: There is no such request?

Katz: Correct, there is no demand, and in any case, we will not withdraw.

Interviewer: Even if there is a demand? Even if the U.S. requests Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon?

Katz: But there is no demand. We have made this clear in discussions between the Prime Minister, President, and Secretary of War.

We are there to safeguard the residents of the north.

In a Reason2Resist report, Trump deflected multiple inquiries regarding what actions he would take in light of Israel’s firm stance on remaining in Lebanon (starting at the 10:20 mark):

Additionally, Lascaris offers an insightful discussion surrounding the legal issues raised by Iran’s proposed regulations for Strait of Hormuz traffic and potential fee imposition.1

Trump appears emboldened, particularly with oil prices declining as inventory on ships exiting the Gulf increases and the prospect of normalization surfaces. As the U.S. persists in disregarding the MoU—especially by withholding its leverage over Israel to compel a withdrawal from Lebanon—Iran will likely have to resort to measures that threaten the flow of oil and goods. Merely issuing declarations that the Strait of Hormuz is closed without substantive actions may not be sufficient.

Moreover, any measures taken by the Trump Administration against Israel are likely to be tentative, considering the influence of the Israeli lobby—a force that continues to shape U.S. policy despite challenges emerging from within the Democratic Party—as well as Trump’s longstanding personal ties to Zionist interests, reflected in the composition of his inner circle. Expect the U.S. to devise half-measures in Lebanon that will likely be rebuffed by Iran. Thus, the battle over Lebanon could continue for some time, assuming Iran insists that the U.S. upholds its MoU commitment. However, Iran’s ability to prevail seems constrained unless it exhibits a readiness to clamp down on maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz.

True to its past behavior, Israel appears to be engaging in what Chas Freeman has characterized as a ceasefire with its unique features. From Elijah J. Magnier on Twitter:

For the second consecutive day, Israel has violated the ceasefire, allegedly with the tacit approval of the U.S., highlighting both the fragility of the agreement and Washington’s complicity.

After enduring months of conflict, many Lebanese citizens remain trapped under rubble in different regions of southern Lebanon. For the Lebanese resistance, the current priority is not immediate retaliation for Israeli ceasefire violations but rather the recovery of fallen fighters and restructuring their ranks in preparation for future engagements. They believe that the appropriate time for a response will materialize in due course.

And:

Al Jazeera reported shortly after 2:00 AM EDT that an Israeli soldier died in Lebanon. However, subsequent reports suggest that this incident was accidental, which may mitigate potential escalation by Israel.

On other fronts, the U.S. is intensifying pressure against Iran. An insightful observation regarding the current state of affairs is as follows:

The ongoing negotiations between the U.S. and Iran continue to draw attention, especially with regards to the entry of UN inspectors into Iran’s enrichment facilities. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recently stated that inspections will proceed despite Tehran’s reluctance to permit such access until a final agreement is established.

The IAEA Director General, Rafael Mariano Grossi, confirmed on Wednesday that inspections at Iran’s enrichment sites will continue, regardless of Iranian indications to the contrary. “This is going to happen,” he asserted.

However, an Iranian diplomat clarified that any visits from IAEA inspectors would only occur post-final agreement.

This situation brings to the forefront questions regarding the IAEA’s authority and capabilities. Notably:

As this narrative unfolds, we will not delve deeply into the contentious $300 billion reconstruction fund consideration detailed in the MoU. The Gulf states, which the U.S. has positioned as potential financial contributors to this initiative, are growing increasingly dissatisfied with U.S. policy. Asking them to finance Iran’s reconstruction while managing their own pressing needs seems unreasonable, especially given their absence during discussions. As noted by CNN in Trump’s Gulf allies fear his Iran agreement is a ‘disastrous turning point’:

Gulf states, who opposed the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement under the Obama administration and supported Trump’s decision to withdraw in 2018, are likely to feel even more uneasy with the emerging U.S.-Iran pact. Many of their concerns remain unresolved, leading to what Alhasan describes as a “major loss of confidence in the U.S.” A Gulf diplomat stated that the conflict has highlighted Iran’s “well-developed plan to target” Gulf states…

The proposed agreement also requires Gulf participation because it encompasses a $300 billion reconstruction fund for Iran. Despite Trump’s commitment to securing Gulf funding, indications of their support remain scarce. While Saudi Arabia claims to have “no details” regarding this proposal, Qatar has expressed interest without formal endorsement.

Rubio mentioned he would not be soliciting monetary assistance for the reconstruction fund during his trip, describing it as “far down the road.”

Such statements sharply contrast the MoU’s language:

The United States, along with regional partners, undertakes to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan that allocates at least USD $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for implementing this plan is to be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days.

Rubio’s comments suggest an acknowledgment that the U.S. intends to renege on this part of the agreement or at least delay any final decision.

Rory Johnson offers an informative discussion with Mario Nawfal concerning the present status of Strait of Hormuz transit, though he seems unaware that the tacit oil flow bargain influenced Trump’s sudden shift toward accommodating Iranian demands. As Johnson notes, despite a substantial current flow of oil out of the Gulf, it primarily consists of vessels that were previously trapped. Sustainable energy and marine supply levels will remain constrained until there are reciprocal transits, as he describes—two-way loading in the Gulf.

Sal Mercogliano outlines how shipping levels, despite an uptick in the Strait, remain tentative, with many vessels opting to operate without transponders. His observations suggest some surprise regarding the cessation of the U.S. blockade, which could indicate a reduction in U.S. naval presence, though a new report from Hindustan Times confirms that CENTCOM’s primary assets remain in the area. Mercogliano seemed taken aback by the lack of U.S. naval activity in the Gulf, potentially missing that such behavior could be viewed as aggressive under the MoU.

____

1 Lascaris, a legal expert, contended that Iran could present a plausible legal foundation for its claims. My prior characterization of Iran’s asserted legal standard, identified as “innocent passage,” was incorrect. Iran could contend that any vessels linked to nations supporting the conflict are subject to its control and potential fees.

Conclusion: The intricate dynamics of the Strait of Hormuz underscore the ongoing tug-of-war between Iran and the GCC states, compounded by international pressures. As maritime operations continue to face scrutiny and intervention threats, the implications are far-reaching, affecting not only regional security but also global trade routes. The outcome of these negotiations will ultimately shape the geopolitical landscape in a critical part of the world.

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