In the realm of global politics, the relationship between the U.S. and Russia has undergone numerous changes over the centuries. This article examines the historical context and key events that have shaped their interactions, tracing back to their first encounters and moving through significant milestones that defined their foreign policies. Despite periods of collaboration, distrust remains a persistent theme in their complex relationship.
Yves here. While John Ruehl’s article offers a valuable overview of U.S.-Russia relations through the years, I find its minimal attention to the Communist Revolution’s significant impact on how Americans perceive Russia quite surprising. Historically, the U.S. has often approached foreign affairs with a mercenary outlook, as discussed in Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America.
One notable factor contributing to FDR’s reforms, perceived by some as beneficial to the working class, was the rise of the Communist-sympathetic CIO. FDR recognized that if he did not make concessions to capitalists, they might face even greater losses. Similarly, Stalin’s approval of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact stemmed from Russia’s urgent search for allies to counter an expected German invasion, as they were rebuffed by the international community.
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist residing in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to several foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X @john_ruehl. Produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
The relationship between Washington and Russia appears poised for further decline, with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stating on May 22 that formal diplomatic discussions regarding the Ukraine conflict are effectively on hold. The last meeting between former U.S. President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin occurred in August 2025 in Alaska. Although the meeting was devoid of overt hostility, the restrained press conference afterward reflected the chilly state of relations, with minimal engagement since. Notably, no American president has visited Russia since Barack Obama in 2013.
Russia stands as the only great power with which Washington openly maintains an adversarial rapport. In contrast, Trump’s May 2026 visit to China reflected his inclination toward amicable ties with Beijing, despite underlying tensions.
The deteriorating U.S.-Russia relationship has effectively dismantled the framework for international affairs established in the latter half of the 20th century. Cold War confrontations prompted both nations to engage in de-escalation through various arms control agreements and maritime protocols, which stabilized relations and set global standards. Unfortunately, many treaties established in the post-Cold War era have since crumbled, leaving a power imbalance and diminishing the previously well-defined spheres of influence.
Russia’s challenges in Ukraine and the ambiguity surrounding Washington’s global leadership have exacerbated their mutual difficulties. However, discussions regarding their antagonism often overlook their deeper historical roots. U.S. perceptions rarely extend prior to 1945, while Russian narratives increasingly trace back to U.S. interventions in the Russian Civil War two decades earlier as pivotal moments in their relations.
Both nations, however, must recognize that their periodic mistrust and cooperation have been variably fluctuating for over 250 years and require efforts towards stabilization for their mutual benefit and global well-being.
Early Contact
The first official Russian expedition that reached the Alaskan mainland occurred in 1741, led by Danish navigator Vitus Bering, who sought animals for the lucrative fur trade. After numerous incursions, the first permanent Russian settlement in Alaska was established on Kodiak Island in 1784, leading to an influx of Russian merchants, explorers, and missionaries in the region.
Even before the U.S. War of Independence, American merchants had formed a transatlantic trade relationship with Russia, circumventing Britain’s Navigation Act. Russia’s neutral stance during the war fostered trust that fueled post-war commerce, leading American traders to commence Arctic trade by the 1790s. In 1799, the Russian-American Company (RAC) was established as a state-supported colonial trade monopoly, with its political administration based in Novo-Arkhangelsk (now Sitka, Alaska).
In 1812, Fort Ross was established in northern California, representing the southernmost outpost of the company. Although Spain and later independent Mexico claimed the area, neither had a significant presence to counter Russian expansion, which also raised alarms in Washington. In 1821, Russia officially claimed much of the Pacific West coast extending down to the current U.S.-Canadian border, although American and British objections subsequently limited this to Alaska’s southern border.
Russian expansion efforts were also reflected in Hawaii. The RAC briefly established a foothold at Waimea Bay after a shipwreck in 1815, initiating trade and relations with local native Hawaiian groups. Yet, the Russians had to withdraw in 1817 due to pressures from local populations and Americans.
Despite this, ongoing Russian activity in the Pacific Northwest heightened concerns in Washington. In 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams informed the Russian envoy that the U.S. would challenge Russia’s territorial establishments on the American continent. The Monroe Doctrine, articulated later that year and heavily influenced by Adams, explicitly warned Russia and other European nations against further expansion in the Americas.
Russia continued to pursue its interests, and the signing of the Russo-American Treaty for Oregon in 1824 established boundaries between the two powers on the West Coast. By the late 1830s, the Russian population (which encompassed various ethnic groups within the empire) had peaked at around 823 registered colonists in its territory. Contemporary estimates suggest that the Indigenous population was in excess of 10,000, with another 12,500 recognized through contracts but not formally registered, and approximately 17,000 more living beyond Russian administrative control.
Continental Powers in Contrast and the End of Russian America
In Democracy in America, published in 1835 and 1840, French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville described Russia and the U.S. as emerging continental powers influenced by Europe but expanding into different frontiers and following contrasting political paths.
While the U.S. emphasized freedom for settlers, Russian society was rooted in servitude. American westward expansion often operated through individual initiatives within a looser democratic framework, while Russia advanced under a centralized autocracy. Nevertheless, both nations seemed destined to “sway the destinies of half the globe,” as Tocqueville stated.
As the decades went by, interactions in the Pacific intensified, culminating in Russia’s decision to relinquish its American territories based on practical considerations. The 7,500 miles from Alaska to the centralized leadership in St. Petersburg made administration challenging. On March 30, 1867, U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward and Russian envoy Baron Edouard de Stoeckl signed the Treaty of Cession, during which Tsar Alexander II ceded Alaska, his country’s last territory in North America, to the United States for just $7.2 million, as noted in an article in The Conversation.
Facing bankruptcy after wars in Europe, Russia viewed its American holdings as peripheral and threatened by the British, leading to their decision to transfer these regions to the U.S. Subsequently, Russia sold Fort Ross in 1841 and Alaska in 1867, concluding its more than a century of presence in North America as it shifted focus to Central Asia for expansion.
Even prior to the sale of American territories, Moscow and Washington had entered a more cooperative era. During the Civil War, Russia strongly supported the Union, dispatching its Baltic and Pacific fleets to winter in New York and San Francisco in 1863. Tsar Alexander II and U.S. President Abraham Lincoln linked the latter’s emancipation proclamation to the Tsar’s emancipation of Russia’s serfs from two years prior. In the aftermath of the Civil War, sections of the American and Russian elite explored the potential for a longer-term alignment.
However, these efforts never solidified. Russia’s aggression in Manchuria in 1900 clashed with the U.S. Open Door Policy in China, and the discontinuation of the Russian-U.S. trade agreement in 1911 illustrated the precarious state of their relationship.
Russian Revolution and U.S. Intervention in the Civil War
The two nations briefly aligned during World War I. However, after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Russia exited the war. While the November 1918 armistice effectively ended fighting with Germany, U.S. forces remained deployed for wartime operations. As Smithsonian Magazine explains, “Russia had begun World War I as an ally of England and France. But the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, led by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, installed a communist government that pulled Russia out of conflict and into peace with Germany.”
While the war in Europe wound down, U.S. troops remained in Russia, engaged in operations initiated during the broader conflict, which continued as the country descended into civil war.
The U.S. first sent around 5,000 troops to Arkhangelsk in northern Russia in September 1918 under British command, part of a larger allied intervention to prevent potential German advances and secure Western weapon stockpiles. Soon, however, the operation morphed into a Western effort to combat the Bolsheviks.
In Siberia, U.S. forces under General William S. Graves arrived in 1918, also as part of an international deployment. Their mandate was to protect Western munitions and control the Trans-Siberian railway for the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Legion. There was some vague support in Washington for encouraging Russian self-governance, although this was less ambitious than the efforts of the British, French, and Japanese against the Bolsheviks.
Graves kept his distance from White Russian units, uneasy due to reports of atrocities and unwilling to become fully engaged in the civil war. As the Bolsheviks made gains in early 1919 and American casualties rose, the Wilson administration found justification for withdrawal, leading American forces to leave Northern Russia in August 1919 and depart Siberia by the following April.
Although U.S. intervention concluded, relations with the Soviet state persisted. The Siberian expedition was partly aimed at curbing Japanese expansion, a matter of concern for both Moscow and Washington. Despite a surge in Japanese military activities post American withdrawal, their forces departed in 1922 following negotiations with the fledgling Soviet government under U.S. pressure.
The complexity of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was marked by a reluctance on Washington’s part to support outright either side in the civil war. Some influential U.S. figures and politicians from the Progressive movement even viewed the Bolsheviks as more democratic than the Tsarist regime.
This was not to say that fear was absent from either side; the first Red Scare intensified U.S. concerns about the cultural and political implications of communism, whilst the U.S. loomed large in Soviet discourse. Although formal recognition of the Soviet state did not occur until 1933, this decision facilitated a brief alliance during World War II.
Modern Relations
Much of the subsequent history of U.S.-Russia relations is well-known. The Cold War, which began after World War II, saw both nations embroiled in a prolonged ideological and military competition lasting nearly 50 years, culminating in the Soviet collapse and the establishment of a U.S.-led order.
Nonetheless, the brief stability following the Cold War quickly unraveled. Even amid some earnest cooperative efforts, proxy conflicts in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Georgia in 2008, Ukraine, and Syria in the 2010s have marked a steady decline in relations. Increasing tensions in the Caucasus, Libya, Central Asia, and the Arctic further represents the gradual breakdown signaling a relationship reminiscent of the Cold War’s lowest points.
However, history reveals moments of cooperation and balance in Russian-American relations that required restraint and concessions. The two countries remain neighbors, and relations have rebounded from even worse depths than those experienced today. To stabilize this enduring rivalry that has yet to establish a solid foundation, both countries must reconsider their roles on the global stage and in their regions, moving away from provocations that lead to heightened international tensions. Without establishing a more stable framework, the rivalry will only continue to evolve into further destructive forms.
