The swift advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) at the commercial level has significantly reduced the expenses involved in executing complex, large-scale information operations. These include foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaigns. Central to this development is generative AI, capable of producing multimedia content based on user inputs—referred to as ‘synthetic’ content. Threat actors across the globe are increasingly utilizing this technology to mislead and influence their targets on a large scale.
The scale and ambition of Russian FIMI campaigns have made them a prominent aspect of international relations. Regular attempts by Russia to influence elections and deepen societal divides in NATO member states, including France and the United States, as well as in countries like Côte d’Ivoire and Japan, are now commonplace. Based on the 2026 4th European External Action Service (EEAS) report on FIMI, it was found that 29% of all FIMI campaigns documented in 2025 originated from Russia. Moreover, the report indicated that 27% of all incidents involved AI-enhanced content, such as synthetic media.[1]
Implementation
The growing use of generative AI by Russian entities is driven by the concept of ‘information confrontation’ (информационное противоборство), which perceives international politics as a battleground primarily defined by information warfare.[2] Russian officials and scholars are reflecting on how to leverage this tool effectively to gain an upper hand in this confrontation.
The Russian Intelligence Studies journal “Невидимое измерение” (An Invisible Dimension) has extensively reported on the application of AI within defense and security domains. A contribution by Sergey Denisentsev in 2024 outlines several generative AI functions of particular interest to intelligence agencies, including: automated data collection, data mining, biometric data analysis, support for hacking efforts, deepfake production, social engineering via disinformation and blackmail, spam generation, and bot network establishment.[3]
Since the introduction of ChatGPT’s first commercial model in 2022, there has been a persistent occurrence of AI-enhanced FIMI campaigns orchestrated by Russian state-backed and state-aligned actors.
In light of the launch of ChatGPT’s initial model in 2022, there has been a continuous execution of AI-enhanced FIMI campaigns by Russian-affiliated groups. The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) noted that the 2024 U.S. presidential election was targeted by these Russian state-linked entities employing generative AI.[4] The MTAC’s analysis revealed several insights regarding the utilization of AI by Russian threat actors: AI-generated audio proved more persuasive than video; AI-enhanced (rather than fully AI-generated) video was more frequently deployed; and content shared during critical events and within closed groups had the most significant effect.
Despite the relevance of these Russian efforts, MTAC concluded that the assumption that AI-generated deepfakes could induce “mass deception” ultimately “did not materialize.” The EEAS report indicated that even though synthetic content was extensively employed, its impact remained low, primarily due to the attackers’ high-volume, low-quality strategy for FIMI campaigns.
This nuanced observation is echoed by others in the field. A 2025 report from the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) indicated that Russian hacker groups expressed confidence in their ability to effectively harness generative AI for FIMI production. However, it was also noted that operational prowess, technical skills, and strategic foresight are deemed essential by some Russian state-aligned hacker groups, especially to ensure that AI-enhanced FIMI campaigns are more beneficial than harmful.[5]
From Global Leader to Isolation
The concerns reflected in the RUSI report illustrate a deep-seated anxiety within Russia’s ruling elite regarding the imbalance in the AI sector, particularly between domestic capabilities and those of Western firms. Following disappointing results and the repercussions of Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, the trajectory of state AI policy has shifted from aspirations of leadership to one of isolation. This shift carries significant implications for AI-enhanced Russian FIMI strategies.
The evolution of state AI policy has transitioned from seeking leadership to embracing isolation.
In a landmark 2019 speech, Russian leader Vladimir Putin highlighted the future of AI as a pivotal aspect of state policy.[6] He characterized AI as a “resource of colossal power” and described the ambition to elevate Russia as a global leader in this domain: “We must, and I am confident that we can, become one of the global leaders in AI. This is a matter of our future, of Russia’s standing in the world.”[7] That same year, the Russian national AI strategy was unveiled, outlining goals with a target date of 2030.[8]
As of 2026, the results are mixed. Sanctions, particularly those aimed at electronics, alongside broader isolation of Russia’s tech landscape, have obstructed the Kremlin’s AI ambitions.[9] Another complicating factor is the structure of Russia’s technology sector, heavily dominated by large state-run or affiliated companies, with limited opportunities for a vibrant start-up culture to stimulate innovation. The militarization and economic stagnation following 2022 have compounded these challenges. Nevertheless, state resources and the competitive standing of Russian universities have kept aspirations viable. According to the aggregator DisserCat, 279 doctoral dissertations related to AI have been registered at Russian universities since 2023.[11]
The Kremlin has increasingly characterized the AI sector in terms of ‘sovereignty’ and national security.
At present, rather than pursuing AI solutions that could compete with those like ChatGPT, Mistral AI, or Anthropic’s Claude, the Kremlin has reframed its AI agenda around themes of ‘sovereignty’ and national security. The state’s objective has shifted towards producing local generative AI solutions and insulating these models from ‘Western’ influences. Russian analysts have been contemplating this issue for years. For instance, a 2021 article contrasted the AI ‘data filtering’ models of China and North Korea to propose pathways for Russia’s own development.[12] In line with a distrustful perspective on foreign information, as of April 2026, the Kremlin has been drafting legislation that mandates Russian AI models be trained solely on data sourced domestically.[13]
The Kremlin is not the only entity interested in the ideological integrity of Russian AI models. The RUSI study noted that hacker groups have expressed dissatisfaction with generative AI tools like Yandex Alisa and Sber’s GigaChat. Their complaints highlighted a lack of ideological consistency in these models, with some instances where they failed to recognize the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as “Russian.” As a Ukrainian journalist pointed out, Russian AI is “aware of the truth but programmed to obscure it.”[14]
Outlook
Historically, state and state-affiliated actors in Russia have adeptly capitalized on significant technological advancements for political leverage. Reports suggest that Russian state-linked entities were aware of the Cambridge Analytica initiatives as early as 2015, well before these were acknowledged by U.S. authorities or the public after the FIMI campaign in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.[15] Similar to other impactful AI-driven FIMI campaigns, Cambridge Analytica enabled targeted messaging.
Russia can strategically benefit from advanced technologies, even if they are not produced domestically.
The example of Cambridge Analytica underscores that Russia can derive a strategic edge from leveraging advanced technologies, even if they originate from outside the country. The incorporation of foreign generative AI tools could eventually lead to the indigenization of these technologies and enable the creation of more sophisticated attack methodologies using international AI frameworks. Although the pursuit of ‘sovereign AI’ may seem contradictory, it could provide advantages for Russian FIMI operations. A more ideologically coherent Russian AI toolkit could facilitate the development of synthetic content that not only aligns with Kremlin propaganda but also adapts to user requests.
While the low-cost nature of these endeavors offers opportunities, the emphasis on quantity over quality may limit effectiveness. Ultimately, Russian state policies concerning AI are driven by both perceived threats and opportunities, with current isolation reflecting a strategy increasingly focused on consolidation, regime preservation, and ongoing aggression in Ukraine.[16] Despite these limitations, persistent resource management and high-volume operations can create environments conducive to experimentation, leading to new and impactful methodologies for attack.
[1] “4th EEAS Annual Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats,” European External Action Service, March 2026, 10.
[2] Karen-Anna Eggen, “A Strategy for the Weak: The Role of Information Confrontation in Russia’s Grand Strategy,” Defence Studies, 2025, 1–25.
[3] Sergey Denisentsev, “Перспективы применения искусственного интеллекта в разведывательной работе [Prospects for the application of artificial intelligence in intelligence work],” Nevidmoye Izmerenie 1, no. 2, 2023.
[4] “Nation-states engage in US-focused influence operations ahead of US presidential election,” MTAC Report, 17 April 2024.
[5] Antonio Giustozzi, “Can AI help Russia Decisively Improve its Information War Against the West?,” Royal United Services Institute, 27 June 2025.
[6] Lapshin, V. F., “Artificial intelligence technology as a potential threat to public security protected by criminal law,” Russian Journal of Deviant Behavior 2(4) (2022): 374–385.
[7] President of Russia, “Conference on artificial intelligence,” Kremlin.ru, 9 November 2019.
[8] President of Russia, “О развитии искусственной интеллекта,” Kremlin.ru, 10 October 2019.
[9] “В «Роснефти» заявили о невозможности создать по требованию Путина «суверенный» ИИ [Rosneft says it is impossible to create a ‘sovereign’ AI as Putin demanded],” The Moscow Times, 17 April 2026.
[10] Heidi Hanhijärvi, “Artificial Intelligence and Foreign Information Manipulation: Chinese and Russian approaches,” The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, Hybrid CoE Paper 29, March 2026.
[11] Figure as of April 2026. Dissercat website.
[12] I. Dzyaloshinsky, “Communication Services in the Age of Digital Civilization: Convergence with Artificial Intelligence,” Communication. Media. Design, vol 6 no. 3 (2021).
[13] Dariia Mykhailenko, “Inside Russia’s “Sovereign AI” Plan—And Why It May Not Work,” United 24 Media, 17 April 2026.
[14] Ihor Samokhodskyi, “I tested Russia’s AI. It knows the truth, but it’s been trained to lie,” The Kyiv Independent, 5 February 2026.
[15] Carole Cadwalladr and Emma Graham-Harrison, “Cambridge Analytica: links to Moscow oil firm and St Petersburg university,” The Guardian, 17 March 2018.
[16] Ivan U. Klyszcz, “Prepare for Russia’s Coming Retrenchment,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, 20 November 2022.
