President Lula’s “mathematically difficult” electoral victory has significantly disrupted the U.S.’s Monroe Doctrine in Latin America.
On Sunday, Brazil witnessed one of the most remarkable political turnarounds in recent history. Incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva triumphed over Flávio Bolsonaro in a closely watched presidential runoff, receiving 64,256,232 votes (51.8% of the total) compared to Bolsonaro’s 59,826,041 votes—a margin exceeding 4.4 million votes.
This outcome appeared almost unfeasible just three weeks earlier, when Bolsonaro secured 47.03% of votes in the first round, while Lula garnered 45.16%. Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party, which includes three of his family members, also expanded its influence by capturing an additional 23 seats in the lower house and nearly doubling its representation in the Senate, primarily at the expense of centrist parties.
In our previous post dated October 9th, we pointed out that following Bolsonaro’s surprising first-round success, political analysts largely concurred that Lula faced a daunting challenge, despite his proven track record in runoff elections since 1998:
The first-round winner has never lost a Brazilian presidential runoff. However, this first round has not been this close before.
As Tim Vickers, a Brazil-based English football commentator, aptly summarized, it was “mathematically difficult, but politically possible.” If anyone could achieve this, it was Lula, whose victory solidifies his legacy as the first Brazilian president democratically re-elected for a fourth term, marking an unprecedented swing of over 5.5% in just three weeks.
In response to his defeat, Flavio Bolsonaro echoed his father’s previous reaction by expressing reluctance to accept the outcome. However, shortly after President Donald Trump indicated he would not support him, Flavio effectively conceded.
Simultaneously, Brazilian authorities mandated Flavio, who is under investigation for alleged involvement in a money-laundering scheme, to surrender his passport. Yet, it seems this measure wasn’t entirely effective; reports indicate that Flavio crossed into Argentina on Tuesday morning using his national ID card.
It’s crucial to note that Lula’s victory wasn’t just against Flavio Bolsonaro; it signified a broader resistance against:
- Former Presidents Trump, Netanyahu, and Milei, who all backed Bolsonaro and leveraged their state mechanisms to facilitate his victory. Both the U.S. and Israel have intervened in various elections across Latin America in recent years.
- O Globo, Brazil’s largest media corporation, which committed substantial resources to promote Bolsonaro after Lula’s decree restricting online gambling weeks before the first round of elections, highlighting O Globo’s significant stake in Brazil’s online gambling sector.
- Big tech corporation Meta, which actively restricted messages on its platforms that supported Lula, while amplifying those supporting Bolsonaro. A study by Eko found that AI tools like ChatGPT were predominantly directing users towards right-wing candidates.
- Wall Street, whose financial institutions, including Mastercard and VISA, are understandably concerned about Lula’s digital payments system, Pix, which he has chosen not to adjust to appease their preferences.
Lula’s victory represents a significant setback for U.S. and Israeli efforts toward total control of Latin America, a topic we will explore further in the ensuing discussion.
How did Lula stage this remarkable comeback?
Three primary factors contributed to his success, although those familiar with Brazilian politics may recognize additional nuances.
1. Online Messaging. In the wake of Lula’s disappointing showing in the first round, a relatively unknown deputy named André Janones established the WhatsApp channel “Lula’s Army,” which skyrocketed from 50,000 to 10 million followers in three weeks. This initiative aimed to dominate the online discourse and inundate opposition messages with counter-narratives.
Janones contended that previous progressive campaigns in Latin America faltered by responding to digital attacks with lengthy speeches, failing to address the rapid-fire nature of online communication. He advocated for combatting disinformation with straightforward, engaging content that resonated with the audience on an emotional level.
“Lula’s Army” emerged as a formidable mobilization force, exemplified in a Payday Report article that highlighted their lavish gatherings, including mass rallies that boosted morale during Lula’s decline, drawing one million attendees at Copacabana Beach. These events spurred volunteers to mobilize and secure votes. For more insight on this dynamic, check out our video from the one-million-person rally on Copacabana Beach.
It… organized massive celebrations that rejuvenated the movement when Lula was lagging, including enormous 1-million-person rallies on Copacabana Beach. Those rallies inspired people to seek out those votes.
Importantly, Lula ramped up the intensity of his messaging in the weeks leading up to the runoff rather than tempering it to appeal to centrist voters, which is a common approach among left-leaning candidates. He also emphasized the existential risks a Flavio Bolsonaro presidency would impose on fundamental aspects of Brazilian society—such as welfare payments, public healthcare, education, and the Amazon rainforest.
The impact was evident, with turnout on Sunday reaching 80.8%, nearly 2% higher than the previous round. While Bolsonaro increased his vote count by three million from the first to the second round, Lula gained an astonishing ten million votes.
2. Flavio’s Disadvantages as a Candidate. Throughout the period between the two election rounds, Flavio’s vulnerabilities came to the forefront. These included dubious business dealings, lack of professional experience outside his father’s influence, and connections to paramilitaries. As Vickers noted, these flaws were glaringly evident throughout the campaign.
3. Flavio’s “Nine Fingers” Remark. Presidential elections often pivot on singular moments of miscalculation, and this was certainly the case here.
During the last presidential debate, just two days prior to the runoff, Bolsonaro ridiculed Lula’s “nine fingers,” claiming that Lula distributed resources to the public while taking everything for himself with his nine fingers. This was a catastrophic error on Bolsonaro’s part, given that Lula lost a finger in an industrial accident when he was just 17.
After Lula rightfully expressed his outrage, Bolsonaro was left with little choice but to apologize. As the Mexican journalist Témoris Grecko observed, it was Bolsonaro’s conceit that ultimately sealed his fate:
He, who has never worked and who owes everything to his father, mocked someone who has worked since his teenage years and lost a finger due to it. The “nine-fingered” remark was a joke that Bolsonarism laughed at… until it cost him votes. It allowed Lula to clearly position himself as the representative of the working class.
4. The Trump-Netanyahu-Milei Connection. After casting his vote, Lula draped his podium with the Brazilian flag, stating: “We’re going to build a country where this flag is honored. The other side campaigned under this flag, yet intended to govern beneath the American flag. We campaigned under this flag, and whether we win or lose, we will always remain loyal to it.”
The shadow of U.S. and Israeli intervention loomed large over Brazilian elections in recent years, likely raising alarm among many voters about potential meddling in their affairs.
Moreover, the connections to Milei cannot be overlooked. Remember, Argentine President Javier Milei disparaged Lula as a “thief” and a “prisoner” during a campaign event supporting Flávio Bolsonaro before the first round. Bolsonaro has often expressed aspirations to replicate Milei’s “chainsaw” economic model in Brazil.
However, both Milei and Bolsonaro now confront significant challenges, as Milei’s economic model is revealing serious flaws despite the $82 billion in bailout funds received from multilateral lenders and the U.S. treasury over the last two years. Even financial institutions and the Anglo-American media are starting to ring alarm bells.
As Spanish commentator Cesar Vidal humorously noted, with such backing, how could Bolsonaro possibly lose?
A Challenging Journey Ahead
Interestingly, as of Monday afternoon, Milei was the lone Latin American leader reluctant to acknowledge Lula’s re-election. This isn’t particularly surprising, given that he hinged the future of Argentina’s relationship with its primary trading partner on a Bolsonaro victory. With Lula’s fourth term secured, Argentina now faces an even more precarious economic outlook.
Moreover, Lula will grapple with passing legislation in a Congress dominated by right-wing factions, including Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party. According to AP, “If right-wing and centrist lawmakers unite, they will hold a simple majority in the 513-seat lower house and could even form a supermajority to amend Brazil’s constitution.”
As noted by Fiorella Isabel, this is a key reason many in the liberal community support Lula—he’s seen as politically stable and reassuring to social democrats in Europe and the West, yet he’s also likely to be constrained at every turn by Brazil’s right-leaning legislature:
People shouldn’t project their ideals onto Lula. While he began with more radical intentions, he was never a revolutionary. In Latin America, the alternative is often a descent into paramilitary fascism. If you don’t recognize this and try to analyze it through a U.S-centric lens, your understanding is misguided. It’s not akin to a Trump vs. Biden scenario here—Lula’s victory does not erase past missteps regarding Haiti or Venezuela, but it stalls the aggressive takeover of Latin America that the current regime seeks, marked by extreme Zionist influence and a Milei-style dismantling.
Brazil, as Latin America’s largest economy, was at the center of a plan to hand over control to Bolsonaro for consolidated U.S. power. For now, that scenario is off the table. While Lula’s past failings remain, the complete takeover plan has been delayed.
Many Western leftists fail to comprehend that in regions like Brazil, where basic resources such as power, water, and roads are lacking, the lofty ideals of those in the U.S. can seem out of touch. We can’t even elect moderate candidates like Lula and then lecture Brazilians on political affairs or harshly judge Venezuela.
We are all witnessing events unfold in Latin America. But perhaps living in such conditions for a week—sans luxuries—would offer a clearer perspective on how ideology holds up under circumstances marked by international interventions, sanctions, poverty, and the struggle for basic sustenance.
Consequently, while Lula may find it challenging to advance many of his policies in Congress, particularly those that are more populist in nature such as his presidential decree on online gambling and a proposed debt relief plan, the ramifications of a Flavio Bolsonaro presidency would have been infinitely graver—not just for Brazil, but for Latin America and potentially the entire world, given Bolsonaro’s agenda to dismantle environmental protections for the Amazon rainforest.
As we discussed in a previous post, a Bolsonaro-led Brazil would have solidified the U.S. and Israel’s neo-colonial aspirations for Latin America. Due to Brazil’s size, economic strength, and global influence, it served as the missing piece in the U.S.’s latest ambitions for regional dominance.
Facilitating Brazil’s inclusion in the U.S. sphere would have afforded Washington a prominent ally to advance its security agenda, diminish China’s influence in the region, and potentially undermine Brazil’s role in BRICS.
It would also have expanded U.S. access to crucial resources, possibly at reduced costs. Bolsonaro had already expressed a willingness to join Trump’s envisioned Shield of the Americas. Furthermore, a public communication from Marco Rubio to Bolsonaro hinted that the latter had offered to make his transition team available to Washington upon winning.
Brazil’s Wealth of Rare Earths
To illustrate potential outcomes of a partnership between a Bolsonaro government and the U.S., a judge in Colombia recently mandated President Abelardo de la Espriella to disclose details regarding a memorandum of understanding with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, dated September. According to unverified documentation:
- The Colombian government is obligated to inform the U.S. before auctioning or selling any rare earth or other strategic minerals, effectively allowing the U.S. to dictate who exploits Colombian resources.
- The government must provide a geological map to the U.S., opening avenues for U.S. military and corporate access to all of Colombia’s critical reserves.
- Commitments were made to accelerate and streamline mining permit processes for U.S. multinational enterprises. This includes a pledge to legalize fracking.
In Brazil, Bolsonaro had undertaken commitments to pursue strategic collaborations around rare earth minerals with the U.S. even before elections occurred. A year ago, one of the 21 conditions set by the Trump administration for tariff relief was granting U.S. companies preferential access to Brazil’s critical resources.
This is crucial for the U.S., considering that Brazil holds the second-largest known reserves of rare earth minerals globally, second only to China. These materials are vital in producing technological equipment such as missiles and electric vehicles. Furthermore, Brazil contributes approximately 90% of the world’s niobium, a key component in aerospace and military technologies.
This grants Brazil a unique strategic advantage not shared by many nations in the region. In September, Lula’s administration acted swiftly to enhance regulation over its strategic resources, aiming to attract investment while maintaining control over how Brazil’s mineral wealth is managed.
However, Lula’s pragmatism—especially regarding U.S.-Brazil relations—is notable. This is somewhat reflected in the recent approval for USA Rare Earth, a corporation with U.S. government interests, to acquire the Serra Verde mine in Brazil for $2.8 billion—a mine cited as one of the few outside Asia producing essential rare earths.
Reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains necessitates that the U.S. secures access to Brazilian resources, irrespective of who occupies the presidency at the Palácio do Planalto. As reported by sources mentioned in Mining.com, “U.S. government agencies and private investors have continued to explore opportunities in Brazil regardless of the new critical minerals policy and the uncertainties surrounding the presidential election.”
Yet, as of now, the Trump administration has not recognized Lula’s victory. On Monday, Trump remarked that it appeared to be “another rigged election,” an ironic comment given his administration’s pattern of meddling in elections across various Latin American countries.
Former Trump advisor Steve Bannon even requested Trump and Rubio to sever relations with Brazil entirely, encompassing trade, which remains a plausible scenario if Rubio takes the lead.
This dynamic likely contributes to the sharp drop in Brazil’s stock market, which plummeted 13.8% on the day of the elections, alongside an over 8% decline of its currency against the dollar. International investors had anticipated a Bolsonaro victory, which would have catalyzed extensive extraction activities—similar to what has already happened in Argentina. Consequently, they would have positioned themselves to benefit from that anticipated transition—now rendered improbable.
Simultaneously, financial powerhouses in London and Wall Street possess the capacity to retaliate against Brazil’s markets to align Lula with their demands. A recent editorial in the Financial Times delivered a clear message: curtail expenditure, appoint a financially conservative finance minister, and cater to market pressures, or face repercussions…
It remains uncertain how long this downward trend will persist or how severe it may become. Geopolitical expert Alfredo Jalife suggested it might be an opportune moment to acquire Brazilian assets, given that China, as a major creditor nation, is unlikely to allow its fellow BRICS founding member to experience a financial crisis.
This perspective is, of course, not investment advice.
Another nation yet to recognize Lula’s achievement is Israel. On Monday, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar recalled Lula’s earlier accusations against Tel Aviv regarding actions in Gaza. In contrast, Flávio Bolsonaro is viewed as “a friend of Israel,” Saar stated in an online discussion with Yair Lapid, the leader of the primary national opposition.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had also banked on a Bolsonaro success. Following the initial round, the prime minister’s office emphasized intentions to “restore the deep friendship between the two nations” as part of burgeoning relations between Israel and various South American countries.
The Israeli media’s general post-election reaction has been one of profound disappointment.
“Israel observed the elections closely, not only due to Brazil’s significance in Latin America but also because of the starkly differing approaches presented by both candidates regarding Jerusalem,” noted the influential economic outlet Globes.
For Israel, the piece continued, “a Bolsonaro victory could have mended a number of years of strained relations, whereas Lula’s success has set the stage for potential friction.” An opinion piece in the pro-Netanyahu Times of Israel reinforced this sentiment, asserting that Lula’s victory marks a definitive rupture between Brazil and Israel:
Lula crossed a red line with Israel: in addition to being deemed a persona non grata by the Jewish state, he insulted the memories of six million Jews, equating Israel with the Nazis, peddling a narrative of imagined genocide propagated by the global left, and framing terrorism against Israel within the context of resistance narratives. Lula embodies a contemporary form of antisemitism, akin to the sentiments proliferating across Europe and the university campuses in the U.S.
When faced with a choice between severing ties with Israel or yielding to a colonial, supremacist political agenda, most Brazilians would likely lean towards the former—unless they belong to the increasingly numerous evangelical Zionist demographic.
Additional apprehensions linger regarding Lula’s capacity to enact change given the stronghold of the Bolsonaros’ Liberal Party and other right-wing elements in Congress, as well as considerations about his potential successor in the 2030 elections—concerns echoing similar sentiments about Claudia Sheinbaum in Mexico’s upcoming elections.
Yet, those issues can await discussion on another day. For now, we can collectively exhale a sigh of relief. The U.S. and Israel’s endeavor to seize control over Latin America has encountered a significant obstacle in Brazil—an entity perhaps too large to be easily subdued. Currently, Latin America’s two dominant powers retain some semblance of sovereignty, despite the persistent efforts of Washington and Tel Aviv. This is indeed encouraging news for all.
