Categories Finance

Halliburton Sues Venezuela for Damages Due to US Sanctions

Discussing the Costs Imposed on the Victim…

On December 11, as the Trump administration intensified its military efforts against Venezuela by attempting to impose a full blockade on its oil and gas sector, US oilfield services firm Halliburton discreetly lodged a lawsuit against Venezuela at the World Bank’s international arbitration court, ICSID.

Long-time readers will find familiar ground in the subject of investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS), a topic we’ve examined extensively over the past decade. As Yves highlighted in a recent post regarding Russia’s decision to use ISDS to challenge the EU’s attempts to permanently seize Russian assets, the outcomes of these disputes predominantly favor investors:

Designed to supersede national laws and regulations, these treaties grant investors protected status while undermining national sovereignty. ISDS cases are adjudicated by a limited circle of arbitrators, many of whom helped draft ISDS treaty provisions, with hearings often conducted in secret and typically non-appealable. Growing awareness of their detrimental effects on labor rights and environmental protections was crucial in halting attempts to extend their reach in the US, but no existing ISDS provisions have been retracted.

This case is especially troubling as much of the losses and potential profits Halliburton aims to recover are attributable to the economic sanctions imposed by Washington on Venezuela. Additionally, the case was initiated at the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes — an organization Venezuela has not participated in since 2012.

The development illustrates the challenges that nation-states face when trying to disengage from ISDS commitments embedded in numerous bilateral trade agreements, which pose clear threats to national sovereignty. Latin America has emerged as a significant source of revenue for primarily Western corporations seeking legal redress against sovereign governments, along with the highly compensated arbitration lawyers they engage.

Little information currently exists regarding Halliburton’s ISDS case against Venezuela. Below is an excerpt from a paywalled article published by the Global Arbitration Review, which was translated into Spanish and later shared by the legal firm Bullard Falla Excurra on its LinkedIn page (translated back into English, with emphasis added):

On December 11, 2025, Halliburton submitted a claim against Venezuela to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) under the Barbados-Venezuela Bilateral Investment Treaty. The case will be processed under the Additional Facility Rules, as Venezuela withdrew from the ICSID Convention in 2012. The dispute follows Halliburton’s gradual exit from the Venezuelan market between 2016 and 2020, after reporting losses estimated at approximately US$199 million. These losses were attributed to the devaluation of the Venezuelan bolívar and the deteriorating economic and political circumstances in Venezuela, which impaired its capacity to meet payments to clients, including PDVSA, the state-owned oil corporation. Halliburton also cites changes in the Venezuelan government’s exchange rate and US sanctions as further complicating its operations within the country. Halliburton, which has been active in Venezuela since 1940, was compelled to cease operations in 2020 [due to US sanctions], although it maintained local assets and equipment there.

The arbitration is in its initial stage, and details regarding the specific claims and the amount sought have yet to be revealed. This case is one of seven ongoing ICSID arbitrations against Venezuela.

Halliburton was among several US oil services firms that were forced to halt all operations in Venezuela in April 2020—not due to Venezuelan regulations, but rather as a result of the Trump administration’s escalating sanctions.

Just over a year prior, the US, alongside numerous other nations, had recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s interim president, marking the beginning of efforts to severely disrupt Venezuela’s economy.

As part of that agenda, the US Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) forbade American companies from engaging in any activities related to the drilling, refining, selling, or transport of Venezuelan crude oil, as well as from participating in the design, construction, or installation of oil wells.

Consequently, Halliburton, similar to all other US oilfield service firms, ceased its Venezuelan operations, cleared out what it could, and terminated the employment of its 400 local workers via email. The company warned that any “assets” left behind would be “expropriated” by Venezuelan authorities.

A New Global Low?

Currently, Halliburton is attempting to hold the Venezuelan government accountable for losses or potential future profits that were partly, or largely, prompted by actions taken by the US government. This strategy could establish a troubling precedent globally—where corporations seek reparations for losses incurred due to US sanctions, not from the US itself, but from the sanctioned countries instead.

The sanctions against Venezuela, first imposed in 2005, have already inflicted a devastating impact on the country’s economy, as documented by Jeffrey Sachs and Mark Weisbrot in their 2019 CEPR study, Economic Sanctions as Collective Punishment: The Case of Venezuela:

The sanctions led to decreased caloric intake among the population, increased rates of disease and mortality (affecting both adults and infants), and forced millions of Venezuelans to flee the country amidst escalating economic depression and hyperinflation. They exacerbated Venezuela’s economic turmoil and rendered stability nearly impossible, contributing to additional loss of life. All of these consequences undesirably affected the most vulnerable and impoverished Venezuelans.

More severe and harmful than the broad economic sanctions imposed in August 2017 were the sanctions enacted via executive order on January 28, 2019, and subsequent orders later that year. The recognition of a parallel government further unleashed a new range of financial and trade sanctions, which are even more constrictive than those executive orders.

We find that the sanctions have inflicted, and increasingly inflict, very serious harm to human life and health, including an estimated over 40,000 deaths from 2017 to 2018; they fit the definition of collective punishment of the civilian population as outlined in both the Geneva and Hague international conventions, to which the US is a signatory. They are also illegal under international law and treaties that the US has signed, and may violate US law as well.

Sachs and Weisbrot’s research was published in 2019. Following that, the economic pressure only tightened under Trump, briefly released by the Biden administration as it tried to mitigate the surge in global energy prices ignited by the conflict in Ukraine and the West’s ongoing sanctions against Russian energy.

Trump then reinstated the restrictions, and additional measures in May:

Venezuela has, however, found ways to adapt amidst the economic constraints, as noted by Michelle Ellner in her analysis for Venezuela Analysis:

Oil has been rerouted through alternative markets; communities have developed strategies for survival; the populace has shown creativity and resilience in enduring shortages and hardships.

Remarkably, thanks in part to the Biden administration’s easing of sanctions in 2023, Venezuela is now hailed as the fastest-growing economy in South America, even though it starts from a very low base and faces a triple-digit inflation rate:

This resilience is precisely what the Trump administration seeks to undermine, as Ellner remarks:

Instead of launching a military invasion that could provoke widespread backlash and social scrutiny, Trump is opting for a more insidious approach: total economic strangulation. By tightening sanctions on Venezuelan oil exports, which are vital for revenue, the administration aims to drive the nation towards complete humanitarian collapse.

Recent maritime activities by the U.S. in the Caribbean Sea, including the harassment and interception of oil tankers linked to Venezuela, signify a shift from financial coercion to illegal maritime aggression. These operations increasingly jeopardize Venezuela’s capability to transport its own resources across international waters. Oil tankers are being delayed, seized, threatened with secondary sanctions, or coerced into alternate routes—aiming for nothing less than strangulation.

This is a violation of international law.

Similarly illegal are the drone strikes reportedly conducted by the CIA against targets within Venezuela, allegedly with the assistance of Special Operations forces:

Curious Timing

Furthermore, it is revealing that Halliburton, the company formerly led by Dick Cheney that profited significantly from the US’s second war in Iraq, is now suing Venezuela for losses incurred due to US sanctions—over five years after it was expelled from Venezuela by Washington’s policies.

The delayed timing of this lawsuit is noteworthy. As the writers of the La Tabla blog observed, it seems Halliburton is positioning itself as a preferred creditor should there be a regime change in Venezuela or an external takeover of its oil sector—an area where Halliburton has extensive experience:

The narrative of former [Halliburton] CEO Dick Cheney epitomizes the intertwining of corporate interests, state power, and warfare. As Vice President, Cheney was instrumental in the 2003 invasion of Iraq—justified by the false pretext of weapons of mass destruction—from which Halliburton secured numerous lucrative no-bid “reconstruction” contracts. The company and its executives have also faced formal allegations of corruption in cases such as one in Nigeria during the Cheney era.

This ICSID claim appears less as a legitimate legal grievance and more as a calculated maneuver in the geopolitical arena. Halliburton is attempting to capitalize on losses largely stemming from its own government’s foreign policy, while obscuring a history of labor rights violations and war profiteering. This case stands as a cynical reminder of how, within the geopolitics of oil, corporations shift their risks onto sovereign states, rewriting history to absolve themselves of accountability while paving the way for prospective profits.

It is reasonable to assume that if the Maduro administration is overthrown and a US-instated Maria Corina Machado regime takes its place, Halliburton’s demands will be met, including the financial reparations it believes owed—assuming the Machado regime can maintain power long enough.

The recent appearance of former CIA Director Mike Pompeo on FOX News appears to reinforce this perspective. In an interview just before Christmas, Pompeo identified Halliburton as one of the entities that should assist in revitalizing Venezuela’s oil industry once a “capitalist model” is imposed on the country:

In summary, US foreign policy under the so-called “Peace” President Trump has come full circle. The Gray Zone’s Wyatt Reed highlights a number of parallels with the second Gulf War, during which Halliburton, under Cheney’s leadership, not only profited immensely but also attempted to offset over $1.4 billion in “questioned” and “unsupported” expenses onto the US government:

Halliburton was awarded a $7 billion no-bid contract to perform similar tasks in Iraq—a deal likely facilitated by Cheney, who ran the company until he took up the Vice Presidency.

As… the lives of over a million Iraqis and thousands of American soldiers were lost in a war of preference launched on false premises, Halliburton was busy defrauding American taxpayers.

Within two years, Pentagon auditors uncovered that the company had attempted to pass over $1.4 billion in “questioned” and “unsupported” charges onto the US government. While the loudest neocons may have departed from the Trump administration, the cycle of substantial profits for select interests and perpetual resource wars for the majority remains unchanged.

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