The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has become a focal point in discussions among influential YouTube commentators, particularly those skeptical of US hegemony and supportive of anti-globalist views. This discourse aligns with early predictions made by commentator Mark Sleboda, who has accurately forecasted the conflict’s trajectory. Many now agree that Russia will likely seek control over all of Ukraine. This necessity arises from the consistent and fervent commitment by NATO officials and key EU leaders to arm Ukraine, even in the face of potential defeat. Consequently, the only viable long-term solution for Russia appears to be the eradication of any Ukraine aligned with the US, NATO, and the EU. Achieving this would likely involve securing all of Ukraine’s territory, possibly through referenda in regions favoring Russia or by installing a sympathetic government in Ukraine.
While some may argue that a full occupation of Ukraine would be costly for Russia, it could represent the least undesirable outcome from their perspective. However, Sleboda has cautioned that such an outcome might not be seen unfavorably in the West, insinuating a kind of revenge: “We’ll make you choke on it.”
When considering the strategy of subjugating all of Ukraine, there are various approaches. John Mearsheimer has suggested that Russia’s ultimate goal may be to create a dysfunctional, fragmented Ukraine. This would likely involve Russia taking historically pro-Russian regions like Odessa, effectively rendering the remaining Ukraine landlocked.
John Helmer has provided significant insights into potential endgame scenarios, largely due to his connections within the Russian General Staff. He suggests that there is frustration within the military ranks regarding President Putin’s cautious tactics and the slow pace of military advancements. This reticence has been particularly pronounced in the ongoing electricity warfare, an area where Russia has gained leverage as Ukraine’s air defenses have weakened.
Helmer has noted that one aspect of Russia’s strategy could involve pushing determined Ukrainian nationalists out of the country. A deliberate, gradual military advance would serve this purpose, as it could lead to a significant population shift westward. Many Ukrainians may prefer to remain, viewing their homeland’s resistance favorably. Recent estimates indicate that Ukraine’s population has diminished to around 20 million from a pre-war figure of approximately 43 million, although this number may still be declining.
Eliminating extreme nationalist elements could theoretically diminish threats from terrorism and create a more manageable population that is more amicable toward integration with Russia. This would likely encourage more regions to join Russia than current voting patterns might suggest.
Moreover, Helmer asserts that an intensified electricity war could result in a humanitarian crisis, prompting many to flee westward. While this might benefit Russia by overloading neighboring countries, it could also present a public relations challenge, as Putin may be reluctant to appear to inflict suffering on civilians. A possible solution could involve Russia implementing controlled blackouts lasting between 12 to 72 hours, offering residents a glimpse of the hardships ahead while allowing for a more organized evacuation.
Despite these strategies, discussions regarding measures to minimize terrorism in both the newly integrated areas of Ukraine and pre-war Russia seem insufficiently addressed. Reports indicate that the British intelligence agency MI6, in particular, thrives on such covert operations. Concerns have been raised about the effectiveness of American intelligence operations in Russia, with Scott Ritter alleging that the CIA unit responsible for meddling in Russia operates outside of regulatory bounds.
Another critical observation in the discourse surrounding Ukraine’s future is that foreign influences do not necessarily require a robust pro-Ukrainian ideology among local populations to instigate violence. John Kirakou, a former CIA operative, has mentioned that many captured members of Al-Qaeda were not motivated by ideology but rather by poverty, illustrating that monetary incentives can drive participation in terrorism. Russia must consider such risks carefully, especially as Western-aligned forces have previously swayed impoverished individuals into their ranks.
Thus, Mearsheimer’s assertion that Russia seeks to transform Ukraine into a failed state acknowledges the potential for increased terrorism, unless “failed state” implies severe depopulation. If Russia were to de-electrify areas in Western Ukraine, it could risk rendering these regions equivalent to the sparsely populated Unorganized Territory of Maine, which, despite its low population density, contains fertile agricultural land—making neglect unwise.
Consequently, Russia faces the critical decision of either vacating sections of Ukraine unlikely to support a pro-Russian post-war environment or ensuring these areas are prosperous enough to dissuade terrorist recruitment.
There may be ongoing debates within Russian strategic circles regarding this issue, but recent commentary suggests that the General Staff may not adequately consider these risks. Helmer’s assessments hint that preparations for an accelerated migration from east to west in Ukraine could lead to a breakdown of military defenses and the eventual ousting of key Ukrainian leaders.
Ultimately, as the conflict unfolds, the vision for post-war Ukraine appears to be crystallizing within political, military, and analytical circles. The paths ahead are still uncertain, and it remains to be seen how developments, such as the potential exile of Ukrainian leadership, will influence the outcome.
Addressing the long-term risks of terrorism should be a vital concern for Russia’s future strategy. My interpretation of the current outlook suggests that this issue may not be receiving the necessary attention, unless the intention is to sustain ongoing low-level conflicts in a fragmented Ukraine.
For those engaged with Russian media and forums, additional insights and observations are highly encouraged, as they can significantly enhance understanding of the situation at hand.
_____
1 Interestingly, the notion of capturing Odessa is not as widely embraced in Russia as one might think, primarily due to its reputation for corruption and crime, even by Ukrainian standards.
