The U.S. Department of Justice is exploring the revival of a century-old maritime law to seize Iranian oil tankers, sparking significant discussions about the implications of this legal strategy and its historical context.
As reported by Bloomberg, the Department of Justice is considering the establishment of prize court proceedings in Houston, Texas, which is well-equipped for handling seized oil tankers due to its extensive midstream infrastructure. U.S. Attorney for the Southern District Aaron Reitz has confirmed his office’s involvement in this initiative. The U.S. administration aims to utilize a Prize Law from the 1800s to appropriate cargo from Iranian vessels.
Prize Law is a 19th-century maritime statute that allows for the creation of special tribunals to quickly assess the legality of the seizure and forfeiture of enemy merchant vessels. The process is straightforward: a captured ship is brought into port, a specialized tribunal is convened, and ownership of the vessel and its cargo is typically transferred to the state.
However, there are specific conditions that must be met. The vessel in question must belong to a belligerent enemy state and be engaged in one of six activities: carrying contraband goods towards enemy territory; transporting enemy military personnel; operating under enemy control or charter; using fraudulent documentation; violating regulations near naval operations; or attempting to breach a blockade. Captured vessels almost always fall under one of these categories.
This legal approach aligns with the situation regarding Iran, which is classified as an enemy state in conflict with the U.S. Iranian vessels would likely be accused of attempting to breach blockades, operating under enemy charters, or violating maritime regulations. Thus, utilizing this ancient legislation to handle captured vessels appears logical. Traditionally, the U.S. would rely on civil forfeiture laws for similar purposes. The differing justifications for these two approaches offer compelling insights into the dynamics of U.S. imperial strategy.
A significant complication arises, however, as Prize Law has not been invoked since World War II. In May 1945, U.S. forces captured a German ocean liner, which had been repurposed for troop transport, marking the last documented use of Prize Law. In the ensuing decades, the U.S. transitioned from employing specialized prize proceedings to adopting broader statutory civil forfeiture frameworks.
This shift coincided with the U.S. emergence as a dominant military force. Prior to World War II, the U.S. maintained a relatively small peacetime military and a neutral stance on conflicts outside the hemisphere. By 1945, however, the end of the war heralded a new era. Following the decline of European colonial powers and the ruination of their national industries, the U.S. rose to superpower status.
This marked the beginning of the U.S.-led Western order. The 1940 Destroyers for Bases agreement with the U.K. enabled a global U.S. military presence. In 1944, the Bretton Woods agreement cemented the dollar’s status as the world’s reserve currency. The establishment of the United Nations in 1945, headquartered in New York, further solidified U.S. leadership. Additionally, the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade anchored American influence in global trade organizations.
For much of the world, particularly following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the U.S. became the enforcer of international law, a law primarily fashioned to serve American interests. While the U.S. adhered to this law in principle, whenever it sought to seize vessels or cargo from other nations, it predominantly employed civil forfeiture law instead of Prize Law.
Military interventions in places like Korea, Vietnam, Kuwait, Panama, Bosnia, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan were accomplished without formal declarations of war. These actions were often justified under pretexts like self-defense, invitations from foreign governments, humanitarian missions, or peacekeeping. However, in none of these cases was Prize Law invoked.
Because of its role as a global hegemon and enforcer of international law, the U.S. refrained from formally declaring war against other nations, as doing so would undermine the very system it was upholding. Whereas other nations flouted international law, the U.S. positioned itself as its enforcer and ‘liberator.’
Various factors contributed to this reluctance to declare war, including the desire to circumvent domestic legislative constraints and to retain executive power. In the U.S. framework, any aggression against it was classified as an illegality rather than an act of war, leading to the appropriation of vessels and cargo through civil forfeiture processes.
This evolution exemplifies a significant change in how the U.S. exerted its control over the seas. Since the late 19th century, the U.S. has largely adhered to Alfred Thayer Mahan’s “Sea Power” theory, which posits that national greatness and prosperity are closely linked to naval supremacy. Mahan argued for a robust battle fleet, control over strategic sea lanes, and overseas bases.
Mahan’s theories spurred a pivotal cultural shift in the U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt harnessed these ideas to expand U.S. naval power and establish the “Great White Fleet.” This theoretical framework provided the rationale for American efforts to dominate overseas markets, build a global navy, and claim strategic territories, marking America’s rise as a world power.
Post-World War II, the U.S. opted for civil procedures to impose its will since it faced little challenge to its maritime control. Rather than acting as a traditional wartime belligerent, the U.S. Navy functioned as the global maritime police, overseeing essential sea routes under the banner of American hegemony.
Now, as it stands in 2026, facing challenges in maintaining control of the Strait of Hormuz, the administration is looking to reintroduce Prize Law. Invoking this law to seize Iranian vessels would implicitly acknowledge a state of war, even without a formal declaration. The legal justification would depend on the tangible existence of a “state of war,” rather than merely a congressional declaration.
Should the Trump administration revive Prize Law, it would not only signify a state of war with Iran but also indicate a departure from its role as the world’s police. This sentiment has been echoed in the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy; it would also be a concrete acknowledgment of a significant shift in U.S. foreign policy.
This analysis is not intended as a legal examination. Rather, it aims to highlight the convergence of facts that suggest a deeper historical trend.
If 1945 symbolizes the zenith of American naval power, then 2026 may represent a turning point in its decline. The abandonment of Prize Law once marked America’s rise as a leading global power and its role as the guarantor of maritime security. The current challenges in the Iran conflict, underscored by the inability to control the Strait of Hormuz, signal a pivotal moment in U.S. naval dominance, with the potential resurgence of Prize Law serving as a telling emblem of this transition.
