Yves here. The mention of the Gates Foundation often evokes strong negative feelings about the influence of wealthy individuals attempting to shape social policies. This reaction, however, is not unfounded. For instance, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), an initiative by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, failed to deliver the promised improvements in agricultural productivity. Instead, it primarily benefited wealthier landowners while neglecting smaller farmers and diverted resources from potentially more effective strategies.
Interestingly, the article does not address the significant reliance on “modern” farming practices, particularly chemical fertilizers, that emerged from previous green revolutions. This dependence leaves both crops and soil vulnerable to the current spikes in fertilizer costs and shortages exacerbated by external conflicts.
It’s important to note that philanthropy can indeed yield positive results, as seen with Andrew Carnegie’s libraries, which enriched many American communities, particularly in smaller towns. Unfortunately, today’s affluent individuals often impose their vision of progress without fully aligning with the needs and desires of those they aim to assist.
By Timothy A. Wise, Senior Advisor at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, former UN Assistant Secretary General for Economic Development. Originally published at InterPress Service
As AGRA reaches its 20-year milestone, a new report highlights its continued failure to achieve its goals of doubling productivity and incomes while halving undernourishment in participating African nations.
AGRA Still Failing Africa’s Farmers
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, commonly referred to as AGRA, was founded in 2006.
This multi-billion-dollar initiative, backed by the Gates and Rockefeller Foundations, has focused on 13 countries over the past two decades.
With substantial evidence of its shortcomings becoming apparent, AGRA revised its ambitious goals in 2022 and rebranded its efforts as AGRA 3.0, shifting its focus toward food systems and policy reforms.
It also removed its explicit association with the much-maligned Green Revolution. A 2020 assessment by Wise indicated only modest and uneven progress toward its initial objectives.
Wise’s latest review showed even slower productivity growth and a worsening hunger crisis under AGRA compared to conditions prior to 2006. Its initiatives to promote improved seeds and fertilizers failed to achieve sustainable intensification—growing more food on existing land.
Dubious Progress
The goal behind increasing food production and sales was to alleviate rural poverty and enhance food security.
However, yield growth has been inconsistent and lagged behind pre-2006 levels, despite billions of dollars allocated for subsidies favoring a select few crops associated with AGRA.
The adoption of high-yielding seeds and agrochemicals has been limited among smallholder farmers, largely reliant on heavy subsidies.
While subsidies have incentivized the cultivation of favored crops on new land, modest yield enhancements often did not offset the higher input costs, leaving many farmers in debt.
Moreover, the production and yields of millet—a nutritious climate-resilient staple—have declined over the past two decades.
Rather than cutting the number of undernourished individuals in half, the rate of undernourishment has surged by 58% in participating countries since 2006. Tragically, the number of hungry individuals in the 13 AGRA nations nearly doubled in just six years!
AGRA Unmonitored
The African Union was persuaded to back AGRA with promises of increasing government investment in food agriculture. In 2006, it launched the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP).
CAADP aimed to substantially boost government spending on agriculture to 10% of national budgets. However, most governments have failed to meet these funding requirements.
Nevertheless, many nations, particularly those involved with AGRA, have allocated significant portions of their limited public resources to agriculture, often channeling these into Green Revolution programs.
Despite establishing similar goals for productivity, income, and hunger reduction, none of the CAADP countries met its targets by 2025, according to comprehensive biennial progress reports.
AGRA’s primary initiatives, which focus on input markets and industrial farming, remain prohibitively expensive for most small-scale farmers, benefiting wealthier producers more.
Wise attributes the disappointing outcomes not solely to AGRA but primarily to the Green Revolution strategies that gained substantial backing from private foundations and currently from the World Bank Group.
In contrast, Senegal, which is not included among AGRA’s 13 focus countries, successfully halved hunger through more diversified policies promoting a greater variety of crops and farming techniques.
What Failure?
AGRA has yet to report genuine progress against its initial ambitions of doubling productivity and incomes for 30 million farming households while halving hunger.
With fewer measurable objectives, recent progress reports now emphasize metrics such as the quantity of commercial seeds produced, private investment generated, and new enterprises launched.
AGRA claims to have “directly reached 11 million farmers and indirectly reached 26 million.” This assertion overshadows their initial goal of reaching 30 million smallholder households.
While claiming to engage 37 million farmers, mostly in an indirect manner, provides little insight into tangible impacts for those farmers. Unsurprisingly, many donors have decreased their financial support for AGRA.
Currently, AGRA is shaping national and continental policy agendas to promote agricultural commercialization. Its renewed emphasis on food systems and policies has shifted its focus away from productivity and small-scale farmers.
Whither AGRA?
Yield growth has been slow and inconsistent, primarily for a select few crops emphasized by AGRA. Frequently, these modest gains do not balance the high costs of inputs, resulting in many farmers facing increased debt.
The expectation that higher food production and sales would alleviate rural poverty and hunger has not materialized. Instead, malnutrition rates have risen across most AGRA countries, coinciding with a decline in dietary diversity linked to decreasing crop variety.
While Asia’s Green Revolution provided more substantial support to farmers, its accomplishments have often been overstated. In contrast, Africa’s Green Revolution has contributed far less, primarily enhancing commercial seed availability.
AGRA continues to deny the failure of its previous policies, while only paying lip service to low-input strategies such as agroecology.
In 2025, AGRA president Agnes Kalibata acknowledged upon her departure, “Part of why [AGRA] rebranded was that the Green Revolution ship has sailed. We can’t continue pursuing what’s not working for others.”
After two decades, it’s crucial for AGRA to take this advice to heart.
