On July 1, China’s new ‘ethnic unity’ law took effect, aiming to establish a “shared” national identity among the country’s 55 recognized ethnic minority groups. Notably, this law includes a provision that holds individuals and organizations outside the country legally accountable for actions perceived to undermine “ethnic unity and progress” or for inciting ethnic separatism. This could encompass a wide array of activities such as speech, advocacy, fundraising, cultural activism, and symbolic acts.
In essence, Beijing is solidifying its initiative to counter separatist and militant groups, many of which are believed to be supported by Western nations and target China’s interests and its expanding infrastructure projects globally. However, it remains uncertain whether this law will adequately address the challenges on the horizon. Here are some key insights from recent reports:
- As reported by Xinhua, Vice Minister of Justice Hu Weilie stated that any enforcement of the law outside China’s borders would adhere strictly to legal norms and be conducted in a rule-based manner, ensuring that normal cross-border interactions, academic exchanges, and trade activities are not compromised. In nations with strong diplomatic and security ties to China, Beijing has already secured agreements for extraditing individuals or taking other measures against perceived hostile actors.
- Hung Pu-chao, deputy head of the Center for Mainland China and Regional Development Research at Tunghai University, noted that the new law could result in entry bans, sanctions, public condemnation, and commercial pressures. Taiwan, with its extensive economic connections to mainland China, is a likely target for these actions.
While China seems to have effectively shielded its domestic landscape from destabilizing efforts and can exert pressure on Taiwan, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and expanding supply chain networks make it increasingly vulnerable to external attacks — from Southeast Asia to Africa.
Analyst Brian Berletic suggests that the new ethnic unity law may reflect Beijing’s concerns regarding Washington intensifying its efforts to utilize armed groups to challenge Chinese interests.
🇺🇸🇨🇳NEW ARTICLE: US Prepares Terrorist Army to Expand its Dirty War on China
(NOTE: Due to ongoing censorship practices, I am providing the entire article below).
The US media has invested in… pic.twitter.com/ZoFLdJ9S2N
— Brian Berletic (@BrianJBerletic) June 24, 2026
It is challenging to definitively state that the United States is behind attacks on Chinese interests and projects. Local resistance against Chinese economic dominance does exist, alongside various actors interested in destabilizing specific projects. However, these incidents often align with the operational patterns of Washington and its allies.
Given the vast scope of China’s BRI, let’s narrow the focus to Central Asia, which has gained media attention recently for several reasons.
Significance of Central Asia
Central Asia is rich in vital raw materials, and interest in the region has surged in recent years due to the global demand for lithium, rare earth elements, cobalt, uranium, and more.
Historically, Russia has significantly influenced the former USSR states, but the rise of China has altered the dynamics over recent years, with Western nations arriving late to the scene.
As Russia becomes increasingly embroiled in its conflict with Ukraine, it appears to be an opportune moment for the U.S. and its allies to strengthen their foothold in Central Asia. Yet, it is China that continues to consolidate its presence in the region, dwarfing all competitors. In fact, China’s investments in Central Asia reached $25 billion in just the first half of 2025. Even The Telegraph acknowledges this:
Back in 2000, Russian trade with Central Asia exceeded Chinese trade with the region by more than five times. Since then, however, Chinese trade has skyrocketed, especially following the initiation of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, culminating in a significant surge over the past three years, coinciding with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Currently, Chinese trade with Central Asia surpasses Russia’s by more than double.
While Moscow faces distractions amidst its ongoing struggles, America’s military presence in Central Asia has diminished since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, allowing Beijing to expand its influence. This has resulted in securing more resource transactions with Central Asian nations, as well as ramping up infrastructure construction to ensure that, regardless of geopolitical tensions, China can maintain its supply lines to Europe and global markets.
Concerns about energy supply disruptions from Washington and speculation around a toll booth for the Strait of Malacca have prompted China to reinforce its land connections to Central Asia:
Reminder that Central Asia really matters to China & even Tajikistan is important in China’s rail network across Asia to Europe.
See below for multiple routes through Tajikistan & Kyrgyzstan that link to Iran, Afghanistan & Pakistan.
China has engaged in intensive diplomacy to maintain peace in… https://t.co/iFtjR4tz9S pic.twitter.com/CwY23eeL0M
— tphuang (@tphuang) May 13, 2026
China and Central Asian states are actively investing in the development of these transportation networks. Here are a few significant projects:
- A major railway terminal is being constructed on the Turkmenistan–Iran border to expedite transport along the China–Iran–Türkiye–EU corridor.
- Iran and Turkmenistan are collaborating on establishing standardized tracks to facilitate freight movement and improve border crossings.
- Two development routes connecting China, Iran, Türkiye, and the EU are underway: one traversing Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan; another solely passing through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
On the other hand, the U.S. and Europe are increasingly integrating Central Asia into their critical mineral strategies, which are gaining significant momentum. From The Times of Central Asia:
The pace of U.S. commercial engagement in Central Asia has accelerated in recent weeks, with business delegations, officials from export finance, and sector-specific agreements being established across the region. In June, a U.S. business delegation explored investment opportunities in Turkmenistan, while Assistant Secretary of Commerce David L. Fogel promoted practical collaboration on critical minerals at the Astana Mining and Metallurgy Congress.
Additionally, the Tashkent International Investment Forum in June attracted key figures such as John Jovanovic, president of the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and Ben Black, CEO of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation. Agreements worth $10 billion were signed between Kazakhstan and U.S. companies in the field of artificial intelligence, while Uzbekistan also committed to reduce tariffs on U.S. goods. Kyrgyzstan’s Civil Aviation Agency engaged in discussions with U.S. Ambassador Leslie Viguerie regarding aviation cooperation.
Together, these developments indicate a shift in strategy for the U.S. in the region, now increasingly articulated through commercial missions, project finance, technology partnerships, and trade mechanisms rather than through broad diplomatic statements. This transition is evident in numerous capitals.
The seriousness of these relationships can be seen in the financial dealings involving influential figures such as the Trump and Lutnick families, who are involved in negotiations for American access to one of the world’s largest untapped tungsten reserves, critical for the U.S.’s defense infrastructure. From the New York Times:
In the lead-up to the deal, the Trump administration approved preliminary applications for up to $1.6 billion in federal financing for the American firm now known as Kaz Resources, which plans to start the project in rural Kazakhstan.
Both the Trump and Lutnick families saw opportunity in this deal, as their sons quickly became involved alongside partners with whom their fathers had been negotiating, continuing a trend of rent-seeking behavior in American politics.
Within weeks of the dealings at St. Regis, investors linked to Dominari Securities, based out of Trump Tower in New York and partially owned by Donald Trump Jr. and Eric Trump, acquired a 20 percent stake in a company connected to the Kazakhstan project. Similarly, an investment company controlled by the Lutnick family aided one of the primary investors associated with the Kaz Resources project in raising $210 million in new funding, which typically generates substantial fees for their firm.
Central Asia offers ripe opportunities for investment and development, particularly in the context of post-Soviet neoliberal struggles for governance. It’s noteworthy that such American interests haven’t significantly infiltrated the region until now.
Nonetheless, the corrupt regimes in Central Asia could contribute to public discontent, making the area susceptible to unrest and, potentially, more severe reactions.
The Threat of Radical Islam
Mariya Omelicheva, a Professor of Strategy at National War College, identified the internal factors contributing to the emergence of radical Islam and terrorism in Central Asia in an essay from over a decade ago:
Although connections to radical Islam and Central Asian terrorism have been linked to external influences, the proliferation of Islamist organizations has primarily resulted from internal regional dynamics. The autocratic policies of Central Asian governments have exacerbated fundamentalism. In the global context of a “war on terrorism,” Central Asian regimes have cracked down on security and suppressed a range of religious and political freedoms. This has bred resentment among Muslims, inadvertently spawning social forces that embrace violence and terrorism.
Deals like the one involving the Trump and Lutnick families can exacerbate this discontent. As noted by Nurlan Aliyev from the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst:
Corruption, government mismanagement, and public dissatisfaction pave the way for radical nationalism, while infighting among political elites further fuels discontent. Moreover, political radicalization is rising, especially among the youth. Survey data from the Central Asian Analytical Network indicates that perceptions of injustice are the primary drivers of youth radicalization, with 56% of respondents not considering Kyrgyzstan a fair state.
China’s significant presence in the region makes it an attractive focal point for local resentment. Past protests have gravitated toward Chinese labor policies, land leases to Chinese firms, expenditures on Chinese development grants, and even marriages between local women and Chinese men.
Attempts to leverage the Uyghur issue from western China have further inflamed tensions, alongside climate change-induced pressures regarding water scarcity in Central Asia.
Interestingly, Islamist groups in the region do not seem to target U.S. interests, despite Washington’s conduct in various Muslim-majority countries. A recent article in Foreign Affairs by Carter Malkasian reflected on how the U.S. terror threat from Afghanistan has been vastly overstated over the past two decades:
While the Islamic State retains a few thousand fighters in Afghanistan that have executed notable attacks on the Taliban regime in Kabul, no terrorist action has been reported from Afghanistan against the United States in five years.
Nevertheless, attacks targeting Chinese interests have continued. Recently, work resumed on a 109-kilometer stretch of the Dushanbe-Kulma highway along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border after assaults in late 2025 killed five Chinese workers and injured several others. Tajik authorities attributed the attack to Islamic militants.
While comprehensive data on assaults against Chinese infrastructure remains hard to obtain, such incidents have arisen across the Sahel, sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the five Central Asian nations.
According to reports from February, “China Now Finds Itself in al-Qaeda’s Crosshairs”, reflecting the sentiments expressed by Sheikh Saad bin Atef al Awlaqi, the emir of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who termed the Chinese government a “pagan, infidel” adversary due to its actions against Uyghur Muslims, justifying potential retaliatory attacks.
The Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K) has also claimed responsibility for significant attacks, including a devastating incident in 2024 at the Crocus City Hall venue near Moscow that resulted in 151 fatalities and many injuries. IS-K appears to have had support from Kiev in this context.
Bearing this in mind, perspectives from both Moscow and Beijing suggest that it may not be coincidental for militant groups to concentrate their efforts on targets associated with China and Russia. A previous article from Indian Punchline pointed out:
Moscow has estimated that Taliban rule has notably stabilized the situation in Afghanistan, leading it to support the Kabul administration in effectively countering the extremist elements notably linked to IS, which is chronicled as a legacy of the U.S. occupation. Through its influence over Central Asian states, Russia seeks to prevent Western-backed anti-Taliban resistance groups from finding safe havens.
This strategy aims to ensure that Western intelligence agencies cannot exploit Islamist factions to destabilize Central Asia or the Caucasus once again.
Chinese officials also accused Türkiye of harboring training camps for anti-China militants, many of whom have become battle-hardened in conflicts like the Syrian civil war.
Recent events may have raised alarms for Beijing and Moscow. At the 12th Summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) last year, Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan agreed to enhance cooperation in various domains, including trade and logistics — a move that could marginalize Russia and bolster ties with the European Union, along with military collaboration through joint exercises.
Following that gathering, Azerbaijan hosted a NATO delegation as it moves towards aligning with the alliance’s standards while strengthening cooperation with Turkey. In April, Kazakhstan and Türkiye solidified their military ties through agreements facilitating the transit of military cargo and personnel via each other’s airspace. The Caspian Post remarked on this growing collaboration:
Kazakhstan has emerged as one of Türkiye’s most significant regional allies, with previous agreements addressing military intelligence cooperation, defense industry collaborations, drone production, and joint military drills. Türkiye, in turn, sees this as an opportunity to enhance its security and logistical role in the Turkic world, intensifying its defense diplomacy in Central Asia through various initiatives.
Moreover, Gulf states have increasingly turned their attention to Central Asia, with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar collectively investing approximately $16.2 billion from 2020 to 2024. This influx of funding, focused on infrastructure and energy projects, combined with Turkish influence, suggests potential undertakings motivated by external actors, including considerations linked to what Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi refers to as “CIA Islam.” It’s possible that some of this investment aims to disrupt the Iran-China railway project.
As we consider the implications of China’s ethnic unity law in Central Asia, any involvement propping up local authorities could prove counterproductive and create a breeding ground for hostility directed at Chinese interests.
In a similar vein, increased Chinese investment in Central Asia may inadvertently trigger militant assaults. According to Global Risk Insights:
Critical to China’s security interests is the presence of Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP) fighters in the region. This largely Uyghur jihadi movement seeks independence for Xinjiang and is regarded as a substantial threat by Chinese authorities. The TIP’s attack on the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek in August 2016 exemplified the potential risks to Chinese personnel and interests in Central Asia.
Given the aspirations of Uyghurs for greater political autonomy, China’s westward expansion might provoke actions against the Silk Road Economic Belt’s routes and associated infrastructure. Between 2010 and 2014, terrorist incidents in Xinjiang claimed the lives of 468 individuals, and attacks such as the one on the Kunming railway station in March 2014 or the Urumqi railway station bombing in April 2014 illustrate how rail facilities can attract militant actions. The geographical significance of a route linking Xinjiang to Central Asia could become a target for extremist groups as the construction of new rail lines might open former isolated regions to attack possibilities.
Ultimately, China’s objective with the ethnic unity law and its broader strategy could significantly shape the geopolitical landscape of Central Asia. As various nations vie for influence in this critical region, the impact of development initiatives on security and stability remains to be seen.
