The Islamic Republic of Iran established a distinctive legal framework that prioritizes state law, as defined by the Iranian government, over traditional canonical Islamic law, known as Sharia. This system was set in motion by Khomeini to address a specific challenge within Shiism, which had historically faced divisions, and to enhance the authority of the state.
Authority in Shiism is predominantly hereditary, traced back to Ali, who was both a cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. This lineage emerged as a key theological principle, possibly as a response to the Umayyads’ consolidation of hereditary power. For Shias, this family line of Imams is sacred and central to their belief system.
Shiism encompasses several branches, with the Fivers (Zaydis), Seveners (Ismailis), and Twelvers being the primary groups. The Twelvers, constituting the largest segment, form the ideological foundation of the Iranian Republic, while various smaller denominations exist. Disputes over who would succeed as the next Imam triggered these historical splits.
Shias hold that following the Prophet’s death, God selected members of his household to lead the community, starting with Ali and subsequently his grandsons, Hasan and Husayn. The first significant division arose after the passing of the fourth Imam, Ali ibn al-Husayn. The Zaydis contend that his son, Zayd ibn Ali, who died resisting the Umayyads, was the fifth Imam, marking the end of the line.
Conversely, Ismailis and Twelvers believe that the lineage continued with Zayd’s brother, Muhammad al-Baqir. The next split arose over the successor to the sixth Imam, Jafar ibn Muhammad. Ismailis assert that his son, Ismail ibn Jafar, was the seventh and final Imam, with their historical view evolving over time. In contrast, Twelvers uphold that the seventh Imam was Musa ibn Jafar, maintaining that the line extends to the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, who entered occultation in 874 and is expected to return to establish justice on Earth.
The dispute over spiritual and worldly authority played a significant role in fragmenting the Shia community. While the main splits culminated in the twelfth Imam’s occultation, debates about governance during his absence continued to dominate Shia political discourse. During the “Lesser Occultation,” lasting approximately 70 years, it was believed that the Imam communicated with four deputies. However, following the death of the fourth deputy without a designated successor, the “Greater Occultation” began, a state that persists today.
Until Khomeini’s emergence, Shiism lacked a cohesive political identity. Authority was divided between scholars, known as Ayatollahs, who represented religious legitimacy, and monarchs like the Safavids and Qajars, who, although deemed divinely illegitimate, were necessary for maintaining order. This division fostered a quietism underpinned by the belief that true justice awaited the return of the hidden Imam, the Mahdi.
This historical backdrop is vital to grasping the transformative changes introduced by Ruhollah Khomeini. He introduced the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih, which asserts that the leadership of the Ummah—applicable only to Shiites—during the Imam’s occultation falls to a just and knowledgeable jurist, or faqih. This principle is embedded in Article 5 of the Iranian Constitution.
Khomeini’s approach effectively unified temporal and spiritual authority in the figure of the Supreme Leader. A parallel can be drawn with Western history, where a similar dichotomy existed. In the 5th century, Pope Gelasius I articulated the “Two Swords” doctrine, highlighting the separate realms of the Church and the state: the Church governed the soul, while the King ruled the body and the land. This structure frequently led to violent confrontations, such as the Investiture Controversy, a struggle for power between Popes and Holy Roman Emperors regarding ecclesiastical appointments.
The question of auctoritas and the legitimacy of governance emerged as prominent themes in political conflict and theory. Carl Schmitt asserted that the modern state’s significant concepts were secularized theological ideas, positing that the absolute monarch replaced the omnipotent God. As the West transitioned to the nation-state system, sovereignty shifted from God and the Church to the executive branch, thereby endowing the state with the authority to legislate and enforce its laws autonomously.
Khomeini aimed to invert this secularization process. After the Iranian Revolution, amidst a wave of Arab nationalism, he reallocated sovereignty claimed by modern nation-states back to the jurist, thereby eliminating the previous duality.
Nonetheless, Khomeini introduced another critical doctrinal shift, asserting that law serves as a means of achieving justice and that justice supersedes law. Traditionally, both Sunni and Shia perspectives viewed human law as subordinate to Sharia; any human government was accountable to it. Khomeini, however, positioned the Islamic government above the Sharia, proclaiming there to be no law superior to the state’s legislation.
This perspective aligns with Wael Hallaq’s argument in The Impossible State: he contends that an “Islamic nation-state” is essentially unattainable since ultimate authority is fundamentally inverted. In Khomeini’s framework, sovereignty and state law take precedence over Sharia. While Sharia provides inspiration, it must be interpreted by the Supreme Leader to inform state governance during the last Imam’s occultation, rather than serving as the law of the land.
Khomeini effectively established the conditions for a Shia nation-state by transferring sovereignty—the capacity to legislate—from the religious realm to the state itself. This shift transformed governance from being “under Sharia” to “above Sharia.” To ensure this did not predicate a purely secular state, Khomeini positioned the just faqih, or Supreme Leader, as the state’s custodian.
However, during times of conflict, a pressing question arises: Is the Supreme Leader genuinely wielding governing power, or is it the state apparatus represented by its various factions? This conjecture prompts inquiries into whether the secular aspect of the Iranian Republic is more influential than the Islamic component. Schmitt would argue that sovereignty resides with whoever can dictate the state of exception.
Similar arguments could be made regarding numerous nation-states that claim to be Islamic, albeit framed differently.
