The history of slavery in Scotland during the era of Adam Smith is multifaceted, highlighting different forms of oppression. One prominent group consisted of chattel slaves of African descent, who were treated as mere property, devoid of rights and subjected to inhumane conditions. The second category included Scottish coal miners (colliers) and salt workers (salters), who, although they retained some legal rights, were effectively trapped in servitude due to political and economic loopholes.
Smith held a rather bleak view regarding the possibility of eradicating slavery. He did not believe that mere sympathy could persuade slave owners to free their slaves, but he had hope that economic rationality could drive abolitionists to seek change. While he expressed skepticism about the efficacy of politics and religion in ending slavery, he spent considerable effort discussing these issues with the next generation of Scottish leaders in his lectures. He lamented that economic incentives alone might not be enough to compel masters to liberate their slaves: “It is indeed almost impossible that it should ever be totally or generally abolished,” even under a republican system (LJ(B) 102).
So, what could abolitionists realistically expect? The answer seems to lie in the gradual evolution of societal norms. As noted by John W. Danford, “On Smith’s understanding, historical progress is a narrative not just of expanding wealth but also of a slow transformation in the moral framework of societies” (Danford 1980, p. 686).
An Inevitable Evil?
Smith expressed a certain pessimism about the abolition movement. He deemed slavery to be both ubiquitous and seemingly unavoidable: “Slavery occurs in all societies at their inception, stemming from a tyrannical inclination that can almost be considered natural to mankind… It is indeed almost impossible that it should ever be totally or generally abolished” (LJ(B) 134, 102). He viewed the wealth of nations as a factor that might even encourage slavery; wealthier societies tend to maintain a larger number of slaves than poorer ones, as the desire for control is inherent. In this context, he stated, “the greater freedom of the free, the more intolerable is the slavery of the slaves” (LJ(B) iii.111).
Smith did not have high expectations for political or religious intervention either. He believed that monarchs would not take steps to liberate slaves, as many remained in servitude, and asserted that “the temper of the Christian religion is not necessarily opposed to slavery” (LJ(B) iii.128). Many Christian nations, including Scotland, allowed slavery to persist. Even parliamentary systems could not be relied upon to alleviate slavery, since “those who frame laws are often themselves slave owners who would never create regulations to mitigate their own practices” (LJ(b) iii.102).
In response, Smith proposed an economic case against slavery, arguing that arguments based on monarchy, freedom, or religion were unlikely to persuade masters. He believed that if he could exhibit how abolishing slavery would benefit slave owners economically, it might sway their opinions in the long run.
However, it is essential to note that being strategic does not equate to being moral. Modern readers may wonder whether Smith was inherently opposed to slavery; he certainly was, particularly when it came to chattel slavery. His most poignant critiques center around the suffering of African slaves rather than that of the Scottish colliers and salters:
“Fortune never exerted more cruelly her empire over mankind than when she subjected those hero nations to the refuse of the jails of Europe, to wretches who possess neither the virtues of the countries they come from nor those they go to, and whose levity, brutality, and baseness so justly expose them to the contempt of the vanquished” (TMS, V.2.9).
Smith reflected on the miserable existence endured by slaves, noting that their autonomy and belongings were entirely at the mercy of another, rendering their liberty effectively non-existent (LJ(B) iii.94). He stated, “It is evident that the state of slavery must be very unhappy for the slave himself. I hardly need to prove this” (LJ(b) iii.112). Yet, while these observations are valid, they are not persuasive arguments against slavery on a moral level. Instead, Smith sought a more explanatory framework in his The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS).
A Sentimental Path to Abolition?
TMS represents Smith’s early foray into moral psychology rather than a codified ethical doctrine. While he makes moral assertions, they are intricately linked to how moral judgments are formulated. In TMS, his mentions of slavery’s immorality are framed within a broader consideration of the interconnectedness of humanity and the varying perspectives individuals hold. The crucial idea here is sympathy, a capacity that Smith argues all humans have, allowing us to empathize with one another and evaluate the propriety of their moral sentiments.
Smith articulates moral sentiments as “moral observations” (Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, i.144). This involves making judgments about others’ judgments and actions. For instance, if one witnesses someone stubbing their toe and responding with an emotionally charged outburst, they assess whether that reaction is justifiable. If found appropriate, they will sympathize with the individual and endorse their actions; if not, their lack of sympathy may suggest the need for moderation.
In similar vein, if one learns of an individual who owns slaves without taking steps for liberation, they may question the appropriateness of that inaction. If they can relate to the owner’s stance, they may find it acceptable, but if they disapprove, they may expect action toward emancipation.
Smith maintained that as individuals grow morally, they can introspect and envision an impartial observer who serves as their conscience. This impartial spectator is shaped by personal experience, culture, and the experiences of others. While it can align with community values, it can also challenge prevailing norms. Scottish philosophers recognized the existence of slavery and understood societal approval of it, yet their internal moral compass led them to condemn it in their writings.
He noted that it is simpler to empathize with those who are geographically and culturally closer to us. The more relatable another’s circumstances are, the easier it becomes to empathize with them. This notion underscores the paradox of moral judgment; historical contexts of slavery reveal that some masters were kind to their slaves, yet as societies grew wealthier, the disconnect between the lived experiences of slaves and masters widened. Consequently, the masters grew increasingly incapable of recognizing the inhumanity of slavery.
Smith argued that when we empathize with those who suffer injustice, we internalize their resentment toward its source, which in the case of slavery is the master. This creates a dilemma: for slave owners to liberate their slaves, they must first empathize with them and understand their suffering. This leads to self-resentment, as freeing slaves would entail confronting their own culpability in their suffering—something most are unwilling to do. Ironically, if they were to pursue emancipation, they would regain self-approval.
“He is a bold surgeon, they say, whose hand does not tremble when he performs an operation upon his own person; and he is often equally bold who does not hesitate to pull off the mysterious veil of self-delusion, which covers from his view the deformities of his own conduct. Rather than see our own behaviour under so disagreeable an aspect, we too often, foolishly and weakly, endeavour to exasperate anew those unjust passions which had formerly misled us; we endeavour by artifice to awaken our old hatreds, and irritate afresh our almost forgotten resentments…” (TMS, III.4.4).
Regrettably, such resistance often serves as a means of psychological self-protection, akin to economic irrationality, despite its indefensibility in the long run. This insight clarifies why slave cultures fostered a worldview justifying slavery, employing biblical citations, economic structures favoring domination, and literature that reinforced the status quo. Tools of persuasion that can effectively dismantle slavery—like Uncle Tom’s Cabin—also have the potential to evoke empathy. As articulated in my work, Adam Smith’s Pluralism, the aspects that unite us can paradoxically divide us (Weinstein 2013). These complexities contribute to Smith’s assertion that slavery appears to be an unavoidable reality.
Ironically, despite Smith’s belief in the ease of empathizing with those closer to us, he showed more compassion towards African chattel slaves than he did for Scottish collier workers. His struggle to recognize the suffering of his compatriots potentially mirrors contemporary issues. Modern discussions on servitude often involve garment workers and migrant laborers, who, although not classified as slaves, experience conditions reminiscent of the colliers’ plight. The extent to which these groups inherit the legacy of colliers and salters is still a debated point, yet it is one that Smith would undeniably understand [JW7].
Of Colliers and Salters
Modern readers might be unaware of the slavery endured by colliers and salters. Smith notably downplayed Scotland’s involvement in the slave trade while remaining silent about potential interactions with individuals who profited from the subjugation of others. This omission was not unique to Smith; many Scottish intellectuals vocally opposed slavery yet failed to acknowledge their connections to its existence. As historian Duncan Rice points out, “Scotland was a society whose intellectual and religious leaders had turned against slavery, without developing the slightest conception that anything should be done about it” (Rice 1983).
Many Scots were either directly involved in or had connections to the slave trade in the West Indies. They would travel to buy or invest in slaves or occupy jobs with employers who did. Consequently, Scotland greatly benefited from the tobacco and sugar industries. The urgency of abolition may not have felt as pressing to Smith compared to abolitionists in colonial America, where the proportion of the enslaved population reached nearly 25 percent, in contrast to the handful of African slaves present in Scotland during Smith’s lifetime.
In contrast to the limited number of chattel slaves, Scotland had many colliers and salters. While some scholars categorizing them as serfs differ, they were not directly comparable. The Act of 1606 placed already employed coal miners and salters in a state of perpetual bondage, prohibiting their transfer to new employment without a testimonial from their employer. This effectively bound workers to their jobs and included their children, who could be similarly constrained for minimal recompense. Although colliers and salters were not legally property like Black slaves, the consequences of their situation bore striking similarities.
Smith grappled with this complexity, referring to colliers as “the only vestiges of slavery which remain amongst us,” which tends to obscure recognition of the African slaves still present in Scotland. Instead of advocating for their emancipation, he nitpicked distinctions between their conditions and those of traditional slaves, showing leniency towards their masters. He argued that while colliers could be “sold,” this happened only in specific conditions. He defended their treatment, asserting that masters could not kill or seize property without reason, and that workers must receive payment for their toil: “They can be sold, it is true, but then it is only in a certain manner. When the work is sold all the colliers or salters who belong to it are sold along with it… So that they are no way restricted more than other men, except that they are bound to exercise a certain business and in a certain place” (LJ(b) iii.128). Smith’s reasoning appears ironic when considered in the context of his broader work, as the notion that colliers’ situations were more favorable than those of previous slaves contradicts many later assertions. His principal concern in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (referred to as Wealth of Nations or WN) was the establishment of “perfect liberty” for workers, which directly opposes the restrictions faced by colliers and salters.
Smith’s silence on the injustices confronted by colliers and salters in his published works is notable; he primarily addressed economic factors rather than moral ones. In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, he outlined the economic burdens imposed by bound laborers and slaves as opposed to free workers. He argued that free laborers would be more beneficial, as potential employees were deterred from positions in coal work, knowing that working for a year and a day in the coal pit would turn them into slaves rather than free men (LJ(b) iii.128). Free laborers managed to evade the entrapments that had ensnared their predecessors.
Smith’s observations echo this economic inefficiency in Wealth of Nations, where he argues that slave labor is the most expensive form of labor and only extractable through coercion, devoid of personal investment (WN III.ii.9). He outlined that free workers could acquire property, thereby having a vested interest in maximizing output, while slaves merely sought their basic maintenance, resulting in minimized productivity (WN III.ii.12). The more competitive the job market, the lower wages would become; this idea is further illustrated where he notes that slavery exists because plantation owners “can afford the expense of slave cultivation” (WN III.ii.10).
He further concluded that the wear and tear a slave incurs is the master’s responsibility, whereas that of a free worker falls on themselves (WN I.viii.41). Slave labor also requires more effort for the same quantitative output compared to free labor (WN IV.ix). The rationale for preferring slaves lies in the inherent human desire to exert power, a predilection that persists wherever laws permit it (WN III.ii.10). Ultimately, Smith emphasizes that “avarice and injustice are always short-sighted,” as those who wield power often fail to consider how their actions obstruct growth and ultimately harm their long-term interests (WN III.ii.16).
From Smith’s perspective, the primary flaw of slavery is that the absence of personal stake renders slaves apathetic and unmotivated toward productive labor. His overarching viewpoint is that humans are motivated to enhance their conditions, and while he did not endorse the notion of racial inferiority, as indicated by Hume, he affirmed that every individual has the inherent capacity to innovate. A slave, focused only on personal comfort, does not contribute meaningfully to their owner’s advancement.
In summary, Smith contended that slavery was less productive than free labor and that forced servitude diminished workers’ motivation to elevate their circumstances. He noted that slaves aim for short-term ease rather than economic growth, transferring the potential costs to their masters.
However, the desire for increased profits was insufficient to persuade “the masters of coal works” to liberate their bound laborers. Smith thus portrayed slavery as a misguided economic choice while highlighting how the innate urge for control could blind individuals to their broader interests. In denying liberty to their workers, masters are consumed by an irrational impulse, the “love of domination and authority over others,” leading to the exploitation of those forced to perform labor (LJ(b) iii.128).
The Slow Road to Abolition
As Smith might have anticipated, it was the slow and messy march of history that finally dismantled slavery rather than any single, definitive argument against it. In Scotland, the trajectory toward abolishing chattel slavery accelerated following the publication of Wealth of Nations in 1776. The ownership of personal slaves was outlawed in Scotland in 1778, the trade became illegal in British colonies in 1807, and chattel slavery was abolished in 1822.
As for the colliers and salters, legislation declaring them as free laborers emerged in 1775 when Smith was completing Wealth of Nations, but full emancipation didn’t arrive until 1799. The remnants of their bondage persisted in Northern England until 1872, seven years after the conclusion of the American Civil War, which had offered a far more violent resolution to the affliction of black slavery. While some argue for the purported benefits of slavery or dismiss the suffering it engendered, such views are generally regarded as fringe beliefs. Adam Smith would not endorse such sentiments.
