Yves here. The Trump Administration’s glaring ineptitude has raised serious doubts about the credibility of the U.S. National Defense Strategy document. It appears that any misleading claims may stem more from self-deception among U.S. voters than from a deliberate effort to mislead allies or competitors. In a recent discussion with Daniel Davis, Jeremy Scahill describes Iranian officials’ astonishment at the evident Dunning-Kruger effect displayed by the Trump administration.
The document is riddled with inconsistencies. For example, it suggests a focus within the Americas, hinting that any action against China would be limited to its influence in areas like Panama, rather than on a global scale. Contrarily, it was during Trump’s initial term that economic warfare was declared against China through tariffs, alongside efforts to diminish Huawei’s market presence both domestically and internationally. Now, there is an illogical push to compete with China in artificial intelligence, backed by Silicon Valley entrepreneurs as the nation’s champions.
Furthermore, the strategy paper adopts a perplexing, boastful tone. Competent organizations prioritize clearly defined goals and actionable steps in their planning documents, rather than empty bravado.
One might argue that the U.S. is not entirely forthright about its intentions. However, this is not as clear-cut as it may seem. Brian Berletic consistently posits that Trump’s approach represents a continuity of U.S. policy, frequently citing key strategic documents that have shaped U.S. foreign policy.
By Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former economics professor and former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Development, recipient of the Wassily Leontief Prize for Advancing the Frontiers of Economic Thought, alongside Kuhaneetha Bai Kalaicelvan, and Nurina Malek, an economics graduate from the University of Wisconsin-Madison currently engaged in policy research at the Khazanah Research Institute. Originally published at Jomo’s website
The January 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) marks a substantial departure from its predecessors, including those during Trump’s first administration. Is it purposefully misleading, or are other factors truly driving U.S. policies, including military actions?
National Defense Strategy
The 34-page NDS opens with the declaration: “For too long, the U.S. Government has neglected – even rejected – prioritizing Americans and their tangible interests.”
Much like the recent National Security Strategy (NSS), released by Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Marco Rubio in December 2025, the NDS claims to prioritize ‘America First.’
Both documents assert commitments to shun the old ways of doing business, claiming to alter decades of strategy for the sake of national interests. Unlike earlier military frameworks, the new NDS is rife with ambiguous language and avoids discussing overseas interventions.
However, in just the first year of Trump 2.0, the U.S. engaged in military actions across ten countries while threatening four others, all within the Americas. Notably overlooked in both documents, the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran resumed on February 28!
Europe
The NDS asserts that the U.S. is reducing its direct military involvement in Europe but still aims to maintain its influence.
It promises to remain integral to NATO “while we adjust U.S. force posture and activities in the European theater” to align with U.S. priorities.
While acknowledging that “Russia will remain a persistent but manageable threat to NATO’s eastern members for the foreseeable future,” the NDS insists that NATO allies must “take primary responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense.”
The NDS sends mixed messages regarding Europe’s robust support for Ukrainian President Zelensky, envisioning a diminished troop presence on NATO’s borders with Ukraine.
Many European allies express concerns that the Trump administration has created a ‘security vacuum,’ leaving Europe to face Russia with uncertain U.S. support.
They also criticize Secretary Pete Hegseth’s insistence on “credible options to guarantee U.S. military and commercial access to key terrains.” The NDS demands more than just access to Greenland and the Panama Canal.
Shortly after Trump claimed to have a “framework for a future deal” on Arctic security with NATO leader Mark Rutte, asserting it guaranteed the U.S. “total access” to Greenland, a NATO ally, Danish officials insisted that formal negotiations had not yet begun. Trump even threatened tariffs on European nations opposing his Greenland plan.
Western Hemisphere
The NDS reinforces the NSS’s and Trump’s ‘Monroe Doctrine’ focus on the Western Hemisphere, envisioning the Americas as an extension of U.S. territory.
In January, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney remarked at Davos that recent U.S. actions are disturbing established international norms.
The NDS was issued shortly after tensions arose between the White House and its Western allies. U.S. cooperation with the Americas, including Canada, is now conditional on “ensuring they recognize and fulfill their responsibilities to defend our shared interests.”
The document warns that the U.S. will “actively and fearlessly defend America’s interests throughout the Western Hemisphere. Where interests are not aligned, we are prepared to take focused, decisive actions that clearly advance U.S. interests.”
Trump previously declared that the U.S. should reclaim Panama and its Canal, accusing the government of relinquishing control to China. However, later statements became more ambiguous regarding ‘retaking’ the country and canal.
Concerns also arise regarding Trump’s intentions with the alleged kidnapping of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, ostensibly for trial on drug charges in the U.S.
Asia-Pacific
The previous NDS, released in 2022 under President Joe Biden, identified China as the primary U.S. threat. Biden also adopted Trump 1.0’s Indo-Pacific alliance aimed at encircling China.
Conversely, the new NDS positions China as an established power in the Indo-Pacific that must merely be deterred from dominating U.S. interests.
The stated goal is “not to dominate China; nor to humiliate them. This does not necessitate regime change or a battle for existence. President Trump seeks stable peace, equitable trade, and respectful relations with China.”
The NDS even proposes “an expanded range of military-to-military communications” with Chinese counterparts, indicating a shift after the administration backed down from threatened tariff escalations following China’s successful retaliation.
Biden’s 2022 NDS promised support for Taiwan’s asymmetric self-defense, but the new NDS provides no such assurances to the self-governing island that China threatens to take by force if necessary.
The NDS calls for “a significant shift in approach, focus, and tone,” emphasizing that U.S. allies must assume greater responsibility for countering adversaries like China, Russia, and North Korea.
It insists that “South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support.”
Cutting Costs of Empire
Similar to Trump, the new NDS urges allies to significantly increase their contributions for U.S. ‘protection.’
This echoes Trump’s frequent critiques of allies who have benefited from the support of previous administrations while being ungrateful for U.S. defense provisions.
However, the specifics of this subordination remain vague, and may even appear extortionate or corrupt. Gulf monarchies may regret their substantial contributions to the president, seemingly without significant returns thus far.
Trump’s approach to allies, the Netanyahu-led aggression against Iran, and ongoing U.S. efforts to ‘contain’ China suggest that both documents provide limited insight into understanding, let alone anticipating, U.S. foreign policies.
