Yves here. In this article, we explore the ongoing deadlock between the U.S. and Iran regarding control of the Strait of Hormuz within the larger framework of maritime law and the role the U.S. plays in ensuring global maritime security. Experts often criticize Iran’s claim to authority over the Strait, arguing it falls outside acceptable practices laid out in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. According to the UN:
What does international law say?
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the legal framework for maritime activities.
Key principles
- Vessels have the right to “transit passage” through international straits.
- Coastal States must not obstruct navigation.
In simpler terms, the strait is required to remain accessible to international shipping.
However, a significant caveat exists: Iran is not a party to UNCLOS, although the principle of transit passage is generally recognized as part of customary international law.
Remarkably, Iran is not the only non-signatory; the United States has also not ratified UNCLOS.
Furthermore, maritime law expert Sal Mercogliano, despite expressing discontent over the Strait’s closures, has noted that maritime law is often poorly defined and presupposes peaceful conditions. While Mercogliano didn’t explicitly state this, his thoughts suggest that actions such as stopping or boarding vessels could be deemed acceptable during conflicts for national security reasons. Nevertheless, he believes that Iran’s toll on international shipping is unjustified, as levies for transit via the Panama and Suez Canals are related to service provisions.
A recent article in Tasnim News, titled Iran: Hormuz Security Steps in Line with Int’l Law amid Aggression, articulates Iran’s perspective:
According to Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, Iran, as a coastal state of the Strait of Hormuz, has taken measures in accordance with international law to ensure its security and defend its national interests against U.S. and Israeli provocations.
During a meeting with Chung Byung-ha, special envoy from South Korea’s foreign minister, Araqchi discussed the U.S. and Israeli assaults on Iranian interests. He reiterated the importance of a unified international response condemning these aggressions.
Araqchi argued that the military actions taken by the U.S. and Israel have contributed significantly to instability in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, necessitating Iran’s measures to ensure its security.
He concluded by asserting that those responsible for escalating the situation will bear the consequences.
By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist based in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He contributes to various publications on foreign affairs, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. Follow him on X @john_ruehl. Produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
Amid rising tensions, including the seizure of vessels, the Strait of Hormuz has become a critical point of negotiation between the U.S. and Iran.
On April 19, the U.S. escalated its tactics with direct intervention against Iranian-linked shipping, boarding and seizing an Iran-bound container ship as part of its blockade strategy. Just days later, on April 22, Iranian forces responded by capturing two ships, leading to skepticism about Trump’s previous claim that the strait was “open for business.”
In the meantime, coordinated U.S.-Israeli military operations, supported by Gulf allies, have not successfully undermined Iran’s military capabilities or destabilized its government. However, the ongoing crisis has greatly diminished shipping traffic through one of the world’s most vital oil transit routes, where approximately 25 percent of global seaborne oil and around 20 percent of its liquefied natural gas are transported.
For maritime crews still willing to navigate the strait, soaring insurance costs have impeded trade. Although the U.S. has initiated a $40 billion insurance fund to bolster shipping, mixed signals from both the U.S. and Iran, including contradictions in their public communications, have contributed to a climate of uncertainty, hindering a resurgence in shipping.
Responses in current events bear resemblances to maritime tensions experienced during the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s when U.S. Navy escorts ensured tanker safety and allowed foreign vessels to fly U.S. flags. This approach led both Iraq and Iran to curtail their assaults on shipping. This experience solidified Washington’s role as the global steward of maritime commerce, a function that is once more being challenged.
While the U.S. aims to keep the strait accessible, there appears to be a growing inclination to bear some level of disruption, consistent with the “America First” strategy prevalent during the Trump administration. As U.S. reliance on oil imports from the Middle East has diminished due to diversification and increased domestic production, the blockade has also benefitted American producers and exporters.
However, enforcing control over the strait is complex, given the threats posed by Iran’s sophisticated arsenal of low-cost drones and missiles. Using military force to secure the strait entails significant risks, making a standoff approach seem more appealing. It may be more advantageous to maintain naval forces at a distance while applying economic pressure to facilitate shipping. Though Operation Epic Fury showcased U.S. military capabilities, it illustrated the current limitations as warfare increasingly evolves with mass drone and missile technology.
The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz highlights the ambiguity and uneven enforcement of maritime law, a situation that U.S. dominance has historically masked. Neither Iran nor the U.S. has ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and few international organizations or states can offer neutral mediation. Both nations rely on competing interpretations of legal rights and obligations regarding the strait, which further complicates negotiations.
Mounting Strains
The U.S. strategy in the Strait of Hormuz appears to focus on anticipating and managing disruptions rather than merely reacting to crises, influenced by various challenges to its maritime order in recent years. Since 2023, Houthi rebel drone and missile strikes against shipping in the Red Sea have kept tanker traffic below pre-crisis levels, even after a U.S.-led military intervention and a ceasefire in 2025. This agreement now looks tenuous due to Houthi threats to resume attacks, prompted by Iran’s call for them to prepare for renewed campaigns against shipping in the Red Sea in response to escalated U.S. military actions.
In parallel with the Houthi campaign in the Red Sea, there has been a notable resurgence of Somali piracy, driven partially by foreign fishing and toxic waste dumping in Somali territorial waters. This crime escalated sharply in the late 2000s and early 2010s, leading to an international effort, mostly led by the U.S., NATO, and the EU, which managed to suppress it. The resurgence of such piracy indicates a weakening global cooperative framework for maritime security and the limits of U.S. enforcement capabilities.
The Straits of Hormuz are not the only maritime routes facing challenges. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, efforts associated with the war have significantly reduced traffic through the Black Sea and undermined internationally negotiated agreements, generally rendering it a “no-man’s land.” Concurrently, restrictions on Russian access to the Black Sea due to Western sanctions have further complicated matters.
The structure that has historically upheld U.S. naval dominance is steadily fraying amid tensions within the transatlantic alliance. The Trump administration’s renewed interest in Greenland has exacerbated tensions with Denmark and other EU nations, revealing fissures in Western unity and complicating collaborative maritime efforts, even prior to the current turmoil in the Strait of Hormuz.
Moreover, the Trump administration’s focus on expanding American influence in the Americas ties into counteracting China’s expansive trade ambitions, which are most prominently showcased in disputes regarding the Panama Canal.
The Panama Canal, constructed between 1903 and 1914, saw the U.S. gradually transfer control to Panama in the 1970s, culminating in full transfer in 1999. However, the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989 partly to secure the canal and remove Manuel Noriega from power. Following the transfer, Hong Kong-based CK Hutchinson was already in a position to operate significant container terminals on both sides of the canal.
By securing interests in port infrastructure, Chinese firms have been able to enhance global operations, extend supply chain influence, while also offering improved market access and lower shipping costs for Chinese companies, as reported by the Jamestown Foundation.
Now, Panama is feeling renewed pressure from the U.S. to minimize China’s influence. In early 2026, Panama’s Supreme Court ruled that elements of the agreement with CK Hutchinson were unconstitutional, leading to state reviews and plans to reissue operational rights. A consortium led by BlackRock aims to acquire this crucial logistics hub, raising alarms in Beijing.
“The canal serves as a vital link in global trade, accounting for over 5-6 percent of maritime commerce. … The agreement involving BlackRock thus represents a strategic shift in Panama’s posture, limiting Chinese economic maneuverability and prompting a reconsideration of the control mechanisms governing regional supply chains,” noted an article in the Transatlantic Dialogue Center.
This scenario highlights a costly, though partial, victory for the Trump administration, indicative of efforts to counter China’s growing port influence. Many officials have remarked on China’s involvement in ports abroad, citing the capacity for increased control over essential maritime routes, as exemplified by the situation in Peru’s Chancay port and suggestions regarding Greece’s Piraeus port made by U.S. Ambassador to Greece, Kimberly Guilfoyle. The Biden administration has continued to support strategies to limit China’s expanding influence, including a $553 million deal with Sri Lanka aimed at opposing Chinese trade initiatives there.
Though this arrangement ultimately collapsed in 2024, it illustrates the challenges the U.S. faces in retaining even minimal foreign port interests. From 2000 to 2025, China invested $24 billion across 168 ports in 90 nations, expanding its logistics and maritime influence at an unmatched scale compared to the U.S. The historical role played by the U.S. Navy in securing international shipping lanes for its own economic benefit has inadvertently bolstered China’s trade growth.
Uncertain Transition
Nevertheless, as highlighted by the U.S. Naval Institute, “China’s dependence on overseas supply chains makes it politically and economically vulnerable. This vulnerability could be targeted in times of conflict, with U.S. Marines potentially playing a substantial role.” Despite efforts to diversify trade routes, most Chinese trade remains maritime, meaning changes at transit points like the Strait of Hormuz and Panama Canal have substantial security ramifications, particularly given that China’s rapidly expanding navy lacks the global presence necessary to securely maintain its maritime routes.
China’s vulnerability is shared among many nations, including close U.S. allies in Europe and beyond. On April 1, the Financial Times reported that Trump threatened to suspend arms deliveries to Ukraine unless European nations sent troops to secure the Strait of Hormuz. This was echoed by a commitment from Britain and France to help restore trade, although the vague nature of their commitment illustrates the limited capacity of major powers to guarantee the smooth operation of international commerce.
The U.S.’s more transactional stance regarding maritime security escalates global risks, potentially leading to a lack of clarity in international legal norms. Contesting control over critical chokepoints may ignite arms races and elevate trade costs further.
Disruptions to global trade caused by non-state actors like Houthi militants and Somali pirates demonstrate how relatively low-cost technologies can effectively challenge state military forces and create zones of prohibitive access. These challenges have fueled demand for the burgeoning private maritime security sector, which itself contends with significant regulatory and oversight challenges.
A swift resolution to the situation in the Strait of Hormuz could mitigate severe disruptions to the current maritime order. Yet, that order has been disintegrating for years, with the U.S. seemingly deliberating between maintaining its global maritime “safety premium” or adopting a more concession-based approach. Losing control over major chokepoints would diminish the dollar’s stature in global trade while undermining U.S. geopolitical influence; it would compel China to allocate additional resources and illustrate Washington’s strategic priorities amid escalating great power rivalries and rapidly evolving military technologies.
Without a clear alternative system in place, selective U.S. enforcement risks giving rise to parallel Chinese initiatives and fragmented regional alliances. While U.S. dominance at sea has never been absolute, it has provided stability that has benefitted many nations, including its primary rival. Allowing this framework to dissolve without a credible substitute poses significant threats to international order and collaborative endeavors.
