Introduction: The growing influence of China in Central Asia is a development redistributing power dynamics in the region. While some in the West harbor concerns over this shift, recent developments suggest a deeper integration of Chinese investment and presence in these nations, which may complicate Western strategies aimed at isolating both China and Russia. This article delves into China’s expanding reach and the implications for Central Asian governments.
Conor here: U.S. influence outlet RFE/RL attempts to present a favorable perspective on China’s increasing presence in Central Asia—a crucial region for numerous plans to isolate and disrupt both China and Russia.
If Beijing’s recent military parade conveyed a message, then its consistent economic growth in the Eurasian heartland sends another. It appears that some individuals in Washington may be starting to recognize the extent of their misconceptions, which could explain recent, more pragmatic moves toward Beijing. One can only hope.
By Reid Standish, RFE/RL’s China Global Affairs correspondent based in Prague and author of the China In Eurasia briefing. He specializes in Chinese foreign policy in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and has extensively reported on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its alleged internment camps in Xinjiang. Prior to joining RFE/RL, Reid served as an editor at Foreign Policy magazine and was its Moscow correspondent. His work has also appeared in The Atlantic and The Washington Post. Originally published at RFE/RL.
As Chinese leader Xi Jinping walked down a red carpet at Beijing’s Tiananmen Square in early September, accompanied by Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korea’s Kim Jong Un during a heavily choreographed military parade, another significant narrative regarding China’s extending influence unfolded nearby.
While Xi conveyed messages of determination aimed at the West during the September 3 parade and earlier at a summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Chinese officials and businesses secured billions in new infrastructure and technology agreements with Central Asian governments. They also introduced new measures to facilitate Chinese business operations in the region.
“China is now fully integrated into the region. Its overwhelming presence in Central Asia is undeniable,” stated Frank Maracchione, an expert on China’s engagement with Central Asia at the University of Kent, to RFE/RL.
This reality is most pronounced in Central Asia’s largest economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. During the SCO summit and its accompanying events surrounding the grand military parade in Beijing, Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev secured over 70 commercial agreements valued at $15 billion. These agreements encompassed investments in oil and gas, petrochemicals, transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital technologies.
Additionally, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev returned from China with significant investments in construction, nuclear energy, higher education, and the automotive sector. He also received formal support from the SCO for a long-awaited multibillion-dollar railway project connecting Uzbekistan to China via Kyrgyzstan, which has been advocated by Tashkent.
“It’s no longer solely about Beijing’s relationships with Central Asian governments or just major infrastructure initiatives,” Maracchione noted. “Many people in the region now work for Chinese companies, purchase Chinese goods, and are learning the Chinese language. China has become a part of their daily lives.”
Nuclear Energy, Pipelines, And More
China’s growing influence is also evident in data from Uzbekistan’s national statistics agency, which indicates that the number of Chinese businesses operating in the country surpassed that of Russian firms in 2024 and continues to increase. In 2025, over 1,000 new Chinese companies launched operations in Uzbekistan compared to the previous year.
China has become a crucial source of investment for Central Asia. Kazakhstan, one of the region’s most vibrant economies, regards China as a development model as it seeks to diversify beyond oil and gas, which have dominated its economy since independence in 1991.
Astana and other governments are seeking Chinese expertise and investment in renewable energy—a sector where China has established itself as a global leader. Recent agreements signed in Beijing included provisions for acquiring wind turbines, manufacturing electric vehicles, and establishing steel plants in collaboration with Chinese partners.
Kazakhstan also secured an additional $1.5 billion in investments for oil and gas projects during the week of high-level discussions in China.
This includes a $1 billion partnership with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to construct a gas chemical facility in the Aktobe region, along with another collaboration with the China Development Bank worth approximately $500 million for financing pipelines for ethane and propane in the Atyrau Region.
Nuclear energy cooperation has emerged as a pivotal focus, with Mirziyoyev having met with Shen Yanfeng, chairman of China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), on September 2. Their discussions centered around enhancing cooperative efforts and coincided with announcements by Uzbek Mining and Geology Minister Bobir Islamov regarding 13 new mining-related agreements valued at $5 billion, including uranium projects.
Earlier in June, Uzbekistan signed a deal with Russia’s state-run nuclear energy company Rosatom to conduct a feasibility study for building four reactors in the country. However, due to international sanctions jeopardizing Rosatom’s future, Tashkent may be considering China as a viable alternative.
A similar scenario unfolded in Kazakhstan this year when CNNC received the contract to construct the nation’s second nuclear power plant. In July, Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar announced that the Chinese firm would also build Kazakhstan’s third nuclear facility.
A New Version Of The Same Multivector Game
According to Temur Umarov, a fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin, the recent surge of activity involving China underscores the consistent engagement that Beijing has maintained with Central Asia, solidifying its role as an increasingly significant economic and now political player.
While governments are keen to attract investment and embrace new Chinese firms, they remain cautious about becoming overly reliant on China.
“All Central Asian nations have stabilized their strategies and aren’t making significant adjustments in their relationships with China,” he advised RFE/RL. “[They’re] continuing with their traditional multivector foreign policy.”
This strategy involves actively diversifying partnerships and has led Central Asian governments to welcome a greater presence from Europe while also aiming to maintain strong connections with the United States.
In April, Uzbekistan hosted a landmark summit with Central Asian leaders and the EU to discuss energy, mineral, and transit agreements.
Bilateral trade between Central Asia and China, its largest individual trade partner, has seen steady growth, reaching a record high of $94.8 billion in 2024. However, the EU, with its 27 member states, remains Central Asia’s largest foreign investor.
Following his return from China, Mirziyoyev spoke with U.S. President Donald Trump on September 5 and extended an invitation for the president to visit Uzbekistan “at a convenient time,” as per a statement from the Uzbek president’s office.
Mirziyoyev made an official visit to the White House in 2018 during Trump’s first term, during which the U.S. president characterized him as a “highly respected man.”
Conclusion: The increasing investment and integration of Chinese influence in Central Asia presents both opportunities and challenges for the region’s governments. While they seek to benefit from this relationship, they must also navigate the complexities of managing dependence on a single power, striving for a balanced approach towards multiple international partners.
