The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has become increasingly volatile, with recent events highlighting shifting dynamics among regional powers. Qatar experienced attacks within a short span of three months, first by Iran and later by Israel. Surprisingly, there was no military response from the United States, a nation that has long been viewed as Qatar’s protector. This development marks a significant indication of a changing world order, one that Israel seems to recognize more clearly than the Gulf states.
Israel’s actions against Qatar have revealed how precarious the security framework of the Gulf states is, especially as U.S. influence wanes. As John Mearsheimer points out, while Israel may not seek to expand its territory within the Gulf, it certainly aspires for regional dominance. By fostering relations through the Abraham Accords, particularly with the UAE, Israel aims to assert its superiority over its neighbors.
At the heart of Israel’s ambitions is the pursuit of hegemony in the Middle East, which includes establishing a “Greater Israel” and expelling Palestinians from its borders. This endeavor presents significant challenges for Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Many analysts speculate that Israel might strike Iran again, possibly before the end of the year. Moreover, Turkey’s government is also closely monitoring these developments taking heed.
Israel’s ambition to position itself as the dominant power in the region is evident and is currently supported by the United States. The U.S. appears eager to withdraw from the Middle East to “end the endless wars,” preferring to leave matters in the hands of a cooperative ally—Israel. Consequently, Washington refrains from restraining Israeli aggression, offering only symbolic condemnations in response to its military actions against other countries.
Israel’s recent assertiveness in pursuing its hegemonic goals signals its understanding of a critical reality that eludes Gulf states: the U.S. is a declining, overstretched power forced to make difficult choices regarding resource allocation. Various indicators—ranging from the withdrawal from Afghanistan to challenges in Ukraine, trade tensions with China, and the erosion of international norms—point towards the waning of the hegemonic era.
However, this hegemonic period has not fully collapsed yet, providing Israel with a prime opportunity, which Netanyahu is keenly aware of. The U.S. maintains a significant foothold in the Middle East, and Israel has convinced Washington that advancing its strategic objectives aligns with American interests—a notion propped up by the Israeli lobby.
To further its expansionist agenda, Israel relies on U.S. support for political cover—fully aware that such actions may lead to severe human rights violations—while demonstrating a reluctance to uphold international laws. There is considerable evidence suggesting that the Hamas attacks on October 7 may have been orchestrated or at least tacitly endorsed by Israel’s political and military leadership.
It could be argued that Israel has been anticipating this moment since its establishment in 1948, or more precisely since the Oslo Accords signed in 1993. The U.N. partition in 1947 was clearly aimed at achieving a specific end—not a two-state solution. The Oslo Accords seem to have merely allowed Israel time to fortify its position to eventually disregard them entirely. Netanyahu’s Likud party, founded in 1973, was explicitly focused on realizing a “Greater Israel.”
Significantly, Israel appears to be capitalizing on circumstances conducive to its expansion. In 2003, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon approved a disengagement plan from Gaza, and the E1 settlement in the West Bank—which Netanyahu has claimed would obliterate the possibility of a Palestinian state—has seen delays since 1994. Now, aggressive moves in Gaza and the E1 settlement are advancing rapidly.
Following the onset of Israel’s attacks on Gaza, it has also accelerated efforts to solidify its presence in the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria. Despite a general state of peace, Egyptian leaders are increasingly apprehensive, recognizing Sinai’s inclusion in Israel’s broader plans, noting that Israel has previously annexed the territory. Furthermore, Israel’s policy of destabilization in the region aims to thwart the rise of any power that could pose a regional threat, prompting attacks on Iran and soon possibly Turkey.
This aggressive posture contrasts starkly with Israel’s approach during Trump’s first administration and the initial phase of the Abraham Accords. At that time, Israel sought to present a facade of stability and normalize relations with Arab states. In stark contrast, Israel now openly discusses plans to annex Gaza and the West Bank, unabashedly pursuing its hegemonic vision of a Greater Israel.
Israeli leaders have recognized that the opportunity window for advancing their expansionist strategies is critical right now—or potentially a fleeting moment. Despite cordial relations with Russia and China, neither poses the supportive political cover that the U.S. provides. Thus, the current climate may represent the last chance for Israel to act with minimal scrutiny while the international order is in disarray.
The United Nations took nearly three years and over 600,000 deaths to conclude that Israel is indeed committing genocide. Various international organizations—including the U.N., the ICC, the EU, BRICS, and the OIC—despite their declarations, have failed to take meaningful action to stop the devastation in Gaza and hold Israel accountable for its aggressive expansionist policies. This represents a significant failure of the international community—a recurrent issue that underscores the collapse of an already fragile order.
This troubling dynamic reflects a broader reality of U.S. declining hegemony, which Gulf states appear not to fully comprehend—or if they do, they lack the urgency to respond as Israel does. The recent Arab-Islamic emergency meeting in Doha, convened in response to Israel’s attack on the emirate, illustrates this point: filled with indignation but ultimately lacking tangible outcomes.
The meeting urged the “international community,” invoked the Arab League charter, and referenced Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits acts of aggression that threaten territorial or political integrity. They called for accountability for Israeli aggression against Qatar and its relentless expansionist agenda. Yet, there were no clear, executable policies stemming from these discussions.
Critics argue that the meeting served more as a public relations maneuver to quell rising public dissent rather than a serious attempt to address the crisis. Some maintain that both the U.S. and Qatar were aware of the reality that Hamas was the primary target rather than Qatar itself, leading to a sense of detachment from the perceived threat posed by Israel. This might explain their rhetorical yet ineffective calls for Arab and Islamic unity amidst a lack of decisive action.
While I personally question the narrative that Qatar was complicit, it’s plausible that it felt compelled to accept its situation as a fait accompli, particularly as it doesn’t seem to derive any benefits from this reality. This further entrenches its status as a vassal state.
In essence, the Gulf states exist as quasi-dependents of the U.S. They owe their contemporary existence to the American-led international order established after World War II and the protection it provided, which is why they invoke it during times of distress. This arrangement established a contractual relationship: security and recognition in exchange for oil and gas resources. However, they lack real sovereignty over their policies. As Julian Macfarlane argues, their predicament mirrors that of Indian princely states under British imperial rule—local leaders maintained a semblance of control but ultimately served imperial interests that often diverged from their own.
Such a scenario likely reflects the dynamics surrounding Israel’s aggression against Qatar. It is hard to believe that U.S. officials were unaware of the attack’s timing. Axios has reported that Netanyahu communicated with Trump prior to the attack. John Helmer speculates that the attack may have employed drones rather than missiles, potentially launched from a site within Qatar, possibly linked to the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base. While this remains speculative, the notion that the U.S. was uninformed is untenable—similar to when Trump claimed no involvement in Israel’s attack on Iran.
Confronted with conflicting U.S. interests, what options do Gulf states really have? Limited, as Mearsheimer points out, they essentially possess minimal leverage. They have cultivated an image of political and economic stability, aiming to draw in wealth from international financiers, both Western and non-Western, all generally reliant on the U.S.-led order.
With that order now faltering, the Gulf states face the risk of experiencing a fate akin to that of Antwerp in the 16th century. Once under Spanish rule, Antwerp thrived as the world’s financial center, overseeing a lion’s share of trade with Asia and receiving thousands of vessels weekly. However, when the Spanish Empire, crippled by debt, failed to pay its mercenary soldiers in 1576, those troops looted Antwerp, decimating the merchant hub and prompting traders and financiers to relocate elsewhere within a mere three days.
In closing, presenting a narrative solely centered on Israel’s triumph would be incomplete; it’s worth noting that the ongoing genocide may ultimately jeopardize the country’s future. It’s hard to envision how a society could sustain itself amidst such a profound moral crisis, and Netanyahu has himself warned of impending isolation. The pressing question remains: how long can Israeli society maintain cohesion before facing internal strife? While predicting the exact timeline is challenging, the signs of discord are undeniably evident.
PS: As I completed this article, reports emerged regarding a security agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which MoA has analyzed as a potential response to the recent upheaval in Doha. This does not undermine the argument presented here, as Saudi Arabia has previously experienced its own “Qatar moment” back in 2019. Despite its Gulf status, its significance and size place it in a unique category relative to its neighbors, aligning it closer to Türkiye and Iran.
