Categories Finance

Trump’s Peace Efforts in West Asia vs. Failed Caucasus Initiative

Exploring the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP)

The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) is presented as a significant infrastructure initiative. This project aims to connect rail lines, pipelines, and fiber-optic networks. The United States has secured exclusive development rights to this corridor, which stretches across southern Armenia, adjacent to the Iranian border, for a period of 99 years. However, progress remains stagnant or nonexistent, as a concrete construction timeline has yet to be established for any of the planned infrastructure projects.

TRIPPing

Some view TRIPP as part of the Trump administration’s broader strategy to compete with China in logistics. It could be interpreted as a “credible and peaceful alternative to Chinese initiatives.” However, one must question the genuine interest of the State Department, whether under Trump or Biden, in this endeavor, as well as the US’s current capabilities in infrastructure construction.

Considering the United States’ historical track record, it seems more plausible that Washington might unintentionally ignite regional tensions rather than foster peace.

But how could this escalation occur? Several scenarios could contribute, including:

  • Any key player overestimating their leverage.
  • The destabilization of Armenia, which is grappling with constitutional changes required to finalize peace with Azerbaijan, causing domestic unrest.
  • Disruptions in traffic between Russia and Iran via Armenia, potentially leading to retaliatory actions that escalate tensions.

In essence, US involvement may act as a catalyst for increased conflict.

In our previous discussions following the TRIPP agreement, we posited that it was less an economic initiative and more of a disruptive factor aimed at Russian and Chinese influence, while also serving a broader strategy against Iran. The Caucasus region is just one element of the multifaceted pressure campaign against Tehran, which involves economic sanctions and ongoing hostilities against its allies in the Levant and Persian Gulf.

As developments unfold elsewhere, what are the implications for the Caucasus?

Armenia on the Edge

Recently, protests have erupted outside Russia’s military base in Gyumri, Armenia, which hosts roughly 4,000 troops. These protests could escalate further if the Armenian government were to call for their withdrawal.

This unrest partially stems from Yerevan’s narrative that attributes its losses to Azerbaijan solely to Moscow’s inaction. While this perspective may be oversimplified, it provides a convenient scapegoat and is in line with Western sentiment.

Despite Western NGOs and their financial influence in the country, public opinion regarding Russia remains largely favorable. This sentiment likely prevents Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government—which is suffering declining popularity—from completely severing ties with Moscow.

Nevertheless, Pashinyan’s actions are causing noticeable damage, highlighting the contradictions in both the government’s strategy and the entire TRIPP initiative.

One significant inflammatory measure was the arrest of billionaire Russian-Armenian businessman Samvel Karapetian, labeled a “Putin oligarch” by the US Treasury. He owns the Tashir Group, which controls the Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA). Following his arrest, the government effectively seized control of ENA, leading to immediate repercussions.

Moody’s swiftly downgraded the utility’s credit rating, indicating an immediate loss of investor confidence connected to the government’s politically driven actions.

Pashinyan’s administration is advocating for a distant prospect of EU integration while portraying dissenters as pro-Russian agents. Earlier this year, the Armenian government ratified a bill to initiate the accession process to the EU; should this proceed, Armenia would likely leave the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), its economic lifeline. This would be detrimental for Armenia’s economy, raising fears of escalating regional conflict as well.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk warns that if Armenia exits the EEU, its exports could decline by 70-80 percent, while energy and food prices would spike.

As noted by Fitch Ratings, Armenia’s economy heavily relies on Russia for trade and energy. For instance, Armenia currently pays Russia $165 per thousand cubic meters of gas—well below the European market price—and considers Russia its primary trading partner.

Given the paths taken by Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia in similar scenarios, one must question the wisdom of pursuing such a course of action. Speculation surrounds Pashinyan, raising allegations that British gambling money is being funneled to him and his associates as an incentive to steer Armenia in a politically favorable direction.

Moreover, there are claims that funds from the French Development Agency (AFD) and the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France (CCAF) are being misappropriated for the personal benefit of politicians, including Pashinyan’s alleged purchase of a €3 million villa near Marseille. If true, these actions cast doubt on Pashinyan’s governance, making it even less reassuring for the Armenian people.

Azerbaijan’s Changing Dynamics

Is a similar scenario unfolding in Azerbaijan?

Over the past ten months, Azerbaijan has seen its ties with Russia fraying, but during a recent summit of Commonwealth of Independent States leaders, President Putin met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and apologized for a tragic incident involving Azerbaijan Airlines. This diplomatic overture arrives amid American threats of additional sanctions:

Putin stated that Russia’s investigation suggested air defense missiles exploded near the aircraft as they responded to Ukrainian drone strikes. He also committed to compensating the victims’ families, a move that seems to have placated Aliyev, possibly leading to a rapprochement between Moscow and Baku. This shift is notable, especially given Azerbaijan’s earlier dismissal of TRIPP.

However, several hurdles remain, and even if Aliyev mends fences with Moscow, the situation with Iran continues to loom large.

Azerbaijan’s key allies, Turkey and Israel, currently appear cohesive despite surface tensions. Azerbaijan’s economy heavily relies on oil and gas, which could suffer dramatically if the nation is drawn into regional conflict.

Will Aliyev jeopardize economic stability for a more significant role (with Mossad reportedly using Azerbaijan as a base) in potential future conflicts with Iran? Two factors suggest that he might.

First, the West is exerting immense pressure on pivotal states like Azerbaijan. Second, the historical landscape of Azerbaijan’s oil and gas industry reveals significant influence from BP, which has backed the nation since its independence from the USSR.

BP has maintained a central role in shaping a state conducive to its own commercial needs since supporting Heydar Aliyev’s ascent to power after a coup in 1993. This relationship demands attention, especially given the significant withdrawals and shifts in ties that have occurred recently.

As demonstrated by the Pandora Papers leaks, Aliyev’s family has engaged in extensive offshore dealings, raising suspicions about the nature of his governance.

Relations between Azerbaijan and its two significant neighbors, Russia and Iran, are increasingly fraught. Recent actions, such as Azerbaijan’s decision to demolish Soviet monuments in Nagorno Karabakh, exemplify this trend, creating historical tensions with Moscow. Additionally, Azerbaijani oil and gas infrastructure has suffered damages in Ukraine:

Reports also suggest Azerbaijan may be supplying arms to Ukraine via Africa, with MiG-29 fighter jets appearing within Ukraine’s arsenal. While these actions may have minimal immediate impact, their continuation post the Putin-Aliyev meeting remains to be seen.

Until recently, Azerbaijan successfully balanced relationships across the geopolitical spectrum. Yet now, cracks are appearing in its previously smooth navigation through these treacherous waters.

Moreover, Azerbaijan is playing an influential role in crucial projects, such as the International North-South Transport Corridor and the Middle Corridor—from India to Russia and China to Europe—enhancing its importance in Eurasian integration initiatives.

Aliyev’s current posture resembles that of an activated geopolitical asset. Following the downing of Azerbaijan Airlines flight J2-8243, often blamed on Russia and NATO, Baku and Moscow seem to be caught in an unfortunate chain of escalating tensions.

In the larger context, it appears that the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, while publicly adversarial, may be strategically cooperating to expel Russian influence in favor of US and EU engagement.

Russia played a pivotal role in the peace negotiations following the 2020 conflict, deploying peacekeepers and agreeing to facilitate transportation communications. However, that accord now appears fragile.

Claims have arisen in Armenia that Russia’s lack of support during the 2020 conflict hastened their defeat. Such sentiments surged after Azerbaijan’s recent advances in Nagorno-Karabakh.

This narrative overlooks a crucial detail: it was Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who unilaterally recognized Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh, thereby permitting Azerbaijan to take control of the territory without significant resistance from Yerevan.

Azerbaijan capitalized on this situation, with Pashinyan’s government seemingly blaming Russia for the aftermath while simultaneously benefiting from a closer realignment with the West.

In this dynamic, both Armenia and Azerbaijan might achieve their aims, albeit at considerable risk for regional stability.

Yet as the situation evolves, it appears that Azerbaijan’s commitment to the framework established in 2020—calling for Russian involvement in previously contentious corridors—may be dissipating, especially following the incident involving the downed aircraft. As the Baku-Moscow relationship continues to decline, Armenia is conceding further ground to Azerbaijan, culminating in the creation of TRIPP.

However, it seems unlikely that this route will achieve the peace and prosperity its title suggests.

Given Azerbaijan’s evident involvement in a potential conflict with Iran—as it serves as a not-so-hidden base for Israel—the situation appears increasingly precarious:

Iranian officials allege that Israeli drones were launched from Azerbaijan during conflicts, a claim denied by Baku.

The Chinese Perspective on TRIPP

An analysis from ThinkChina outlines TRIPP’s potential implications for China:

The new corridor seamlessly connects with the Middle Corridor, facilitating freight movement from China through Kazakhstan to the Caspian Sea, then into Azerbaijan, through the South Caucasus to Turkey, and eventually to Europe. This route is becoming a preferred overland alternative to the northern route through Russia and longer maritime paths.

Its remarkable growth is showcased by the substantial increase in container flows since 2022, with total tonnage reaching into the millions. Projections from the World Bank and the OECD suggest that freight volumes could at least triple by 2030, contingent upon improved efficiency and coordination.

If the corridor operates under purely commercial terms, Chinese logistics firms stand to gain significantly. However, if it becomes militarized or if the US manipulates its influence for geopolitical ends, China will face tough choices regarding operational costs and regional partnerships.

A cursory understanding of US foreign policy indicates a likely trajectory for TRIPP that favors dominant geopolitical interests.

Amidst varying routes for the Middle Corridor emerging from China, recent efforts to destabilize the Georgian government have unfolded, illustrating the ongoing geopolitical volatility:

Turmoil in Georgia

While some nations in the region have aligned with US interests, Georgia continues to resist external pressure, even as EU and US representatives strive to sway the political landscape.

Local elections in Georgia prompted European officials and ambassadors, led by EU foreign affairs commissioner Kaja Kallas, to attempt discrediting electoral outcomes and incite protests. According to Georgian security services, there was an alleged plan to topple the government.

Georgian law enforcement discovered substantial amounts of weapons and explosives intended for use during protests in Tbilisi, tracing them back to Ukrainian origins. These were supposedly intended to facilitate a coup against the sitting government.

Should these allegations be true, it suggests that the geopolitical players may be overstepping ethical boundaries in Georgia, following a pattern seen elsewhere.

With past incidents reflecting attempts to disrupt the democratic process in Georgia, the government is ostensibly prioritizing sovereignty amidst pressures for alignment with Western ideals.

Conversely, China has established trade agreements and visa-free travel with Georgia, exemplifying a significant economic partnership. This reliance on Beijing only exacerbates the self-fulfilling prophecies of Western policymakers, who face a diminishing influence in the region.

In conclusion, the intricate dynamics within the Caucasus and beyond reveal the precarious balance of power, as nations navigate the complicated interplay of alliances and aspirations. As TRIPP unfolds, its ultimate impact on regional peace and stability remains uncertain, overshadowed by the complexities of global politics and local aspirations.

Leave a Reply

您的邮箱地址不会被公开。 必填项已用 * 标注

You May Also Like