Introduction
In the complex landscape of international relations, the involvement of powerful nations can often elevate tensions rather than ease them. This article explores the nuances of the Nile River dispute involving Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan, and critiques the interventions of past U.S. administrations, particularly under President Trump.
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Conor here: The circumstances surrounding the Nobel Peace Prize hopefuls seem to be repeating. In the Rwanda-Democratic Republic of Congo, the situation is teetering on the brink of collapse, yet perhaps there will still be opportunities for the U.S. private sector to secure access to its minerals. Meanwhile, the fragile “peace” in the Caucasus raises questions about whether U.S. intentions are merely a disguised means to fuel larger conflicts.
However, it is overly simplistic to place all the blame on Trump for these issues. The author of the following piece argues that were it not for “Trump’s disdain for U.S. State Department professionals,” circumstances would be significantly improved. However, a look back at the havoc wrought by the last U.S. president awarded a peace prize and his highly regarded State Department indicates otherwise.
While it is true that Trump has shown contempt for State Department specialists, some groundwork for recent “peace” negotiations was indeed laid by the previous administration’s diplomatic efforts. Although Team Trump may have employed a more hurried approach, the underlying issues persisted, even as the style of engagement shifted.
By Fred H. Lawson, Professor of Government Emeritus, Northeastern University. Originally published at The Conversation.
On September 23, 2025, President Donald Trump criticized the United Nations during an address at the General Assembly in New York, lamenting its inability to resolve critical global conflicts. “All they seem to do,” he stated, “is write a really strongly worded letter and then never follow that letter up. It’s empty words, and empty words don’t solve war.”
Contrarily, Trump claimed that he has brought an end to several serious international conflicts, one of which was the ongoing dispute over Nile River waters, exacerbated by Ethiopia’s plans to construct a dam on the Blue Nile—raising concerns over Egypt and Sudan’s water supply.
As an expert in international relations, I find it challenging to ascertain that Trump’s interventions moved this dispute toward resolution. In fact, they may have worsened the situation.
The Source of the Dispute
The Nile River’s waters are crucial for agriculture and public health in Egypt and Sudan. A 1959 agreement governs the distribution of this water, favoring Egypt and Sudan with the majority of the Nile’s output. A set of international laws also prohibits upstream countries, like Ethiopia, from manipulating the river’s flow in ways detrimental to those downstream.
Map: The Conversation, CC-BY-ND.
Source: River route from Natural Earth. Created with Datawrapper
In 2011, Ethiopia declared its right to harness its water resources, asserting that the dam would provide affordable electricity to impoverished Ethiopians and neighboring countries.
Both Egypt and Sudan vehemently opposed this initiative, fearing severe repercussions for their populations and appealing for intervention from international entities.
Ambiguous Wording
Trump entered the Nile dispute upon Egypt’s request for U.S. mediation in late October 2019, as Ethiopia accelerated construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. After discussions with Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, Trump agreed to engage directly.
He and then-Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin invited foreign ministers from Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia to Washington for negotiations.
During the opening session, Trump tweeted that the talks were progressing positively. Yet these discussions ultimately yielded no substantial results. Instead, all parties, alongside World Bank representatives, agreed to confer again over the following months to address technical issues.
Subsequent meetings witnessed Egypt and Ethiopia clashing over definitions related to the dam’s potential impact. Mnuchin and his team mostly observed, though they reportedly sided with Ethiopia on isolating the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam discussions from broader Nile Basin water management issues.
Critically, U.S. representatives permitted vague language to infiltrate the joint statement at the December 2019 meeting’s conclusion.
The statement stipulated that “Ethiopia will undertake the implementation of these technical rules and may adjust them,” which Egypt interpreted as requiring collective regulations, while Ethiopia viewed it as affirming its autonomy in decision-making.
Talks Blow Up
The final round of discussions in January 2020 laid out a draft agreement permitting Ethiopia to commence filling the dam’s reservoir, but reducing its obligations during drought conditions.
However, Ethiopia hesitated to endorse this draft, arguing that vital issues remained unresolved. Egypt and Sudan chose not to revisit matters they believed were resolved, yet agreed to edits suggested by U.S. Treasury officials.
In February 2020, the U.S. Treasury introduced a revised draft. Trump, hopeful for a swift resolution, telephoned al-Sissi to express optimism regarding a final agreement.
But Ethiopia, feeling cornered by U.S. and Egyptian pressure and fearing domestic backlash, failed to send a representative to accept the revised proposal. U.S. Treasury officials subsequently announced a comprehensive settlement had been reached and urged Ethiopia to sign.
Egypt’s foreign ministry asserted that “President Trump affirmed the U.S. administration’s continued efforts” for a fair resolution. However, Ethiopia’s foreign minister labeled Washington’s sudden declaration as “undiplomatic.”
Ethiopia then delayed for two additional months before proposing its own provisional agreement, which Egypt and Sudan promptly rejected.
In retaliation, Washington hinted at withholding financial support from Ethiopia unless the country signed the Treasury Department’s agreement. Meanwhile, construction of the dam progressed, and in July, Ethiopia began filling its reservoir, cutting off the Blue Nile flow.
In September 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo suspended $130 million in aid to Ethiopia—a move that, however, yielded no advancements in negotiations.
Frustrated by the deadlock, Trump suggested during a telephone conversation with Sudanese and Israeli diplomats in October 2020 that Egypt “will end up blowing up the dam,” provoking condemnation from Ethiopian officials. The prime minister’s office issued a statement denouncing such threats as detrimental and violating international laws while Ethiopia fortified the dam area with anti-aircraft defenses.
Negotiations ultimately stalled, remaining inactive for three years.
Assessing the Impact of US Mediation
Analysts universally agree that Trump’s initial involvement exacerbated the already dire situation in the Nile dispute. His admiration for authoritarian regimes led him to favor Egypt’s position, jeopardizing U.S. credibility.
Moreover, Trump’s skepticism toward the State Department resulted in the sidelining of professional diplomats, entrusting complex negotiations to Mnuchin, known more for financial acumen than diplomacy. His impatience and blunt communication alienated both Egypt and Ethiopia, thereby aggravating the situation.
Apart from these tensions, Ethiopia insists it “has no obligation to seek permission from any entity to fill the Renaissance Dam.” In September 2025, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced the dam’s completion and highlighted two additional dams nearing development along the Blue Nile.
Meanwhile, Egypt has established a significant naval base on the Red Sea and calls for military solutions in the Nile dispute are escalating. In July 2025, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty hinted at potential military actions to resolve the dispute.
Despite the escalating tensions and the inability of Trump’s prior administration to find a resolution, he still asserts that his mediation efforts were successful. In July 2025, Trump told NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte that a swift resolution to the Nile dispute was imminent. President al-Sissi expressed hope that it would lead to a “just agreement.”
However, there’s little evidence to suggest that the current Trump administration is more equipped to resolve the Nile River dispute than its predecessor. Following Trump’s second inauguration, experienced State Department officials resigned or were dismissed, leaving vital diplomatic roles filled by businesspeople with personal connections to the president, rather than seasoned diplomats capable of navigating complex negotiations between sovereign nations.
This shift seems unlikely to sway Trump from his belief that he has already achieved a solution to the Nile River conflict—and that he can do so again.
Conclusion
The complexities of the Nile River dispute highlight the pitfalls of intervention without a nuanced understanding of the geopolitical landscape. As tensions persist and diplomatic efforts flounder, the need for skilled negotiation and careful diplomacy remains as critical as ever. The hope for peace in the region will require more than just promises and assertive declarations; it necessitates genuine commitment from all parties involved to foster long-lasting solutions.
