Understanding the Recent Clashes between Afghanistan and Pakistan
The complexities of the Middle East are deeply interconnected, making it essential to analyze events in their broader context. Recent hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan serve as a prime example of this intricate web of relations.
When George Galloway was asked to shed light on the conflicts that arose between these two nations starting on October 11, he remarked, “I can’t remember the last time there was a conflict in the world that I don’t understand, but I’m afraid this is one of them.” The seemingly sudden outbreak of violence appears perplexing and quite arbitrary. Yet, Galloway provided a hint: “When war breaks out, you can be sure that the person instigating it has either just visited Washington or Washington has just engaged with them.”
Galloway’s observation is significant in light of the fact that on September 25, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, often regarded as the country’s informal ruler, were in Washington. Furthermore, at the Gaza Peace Summit on October 13, Sharif extensively praised Donald Trump, stating, “You are the man this world needed the most at this point in time.” Trump reciprocated the admiration, calling Sharif and Asim Munir his “favorite field marshal.”
This timing raises questions, notably why conflict erupted elsewhere while Trump seemed to celebrate successes in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Not long before this, on October 10, Kabul experienced an explosion, followed by another in the eastern province of Paktika, alongside reports of assaults in Khost and Jalalabad, with the Kabul incident resulting in five fatalities and numerous injuries, including women and children.
Initially, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid downplayed the severity of the attacks and refrained from attributing blame. However, by Friday, the Afghan Ministry of Defense held Pakistan accountable for the blasts in Kabul and Paktika. The Pakistani government did not confirm or deny these allegations but instead accused Afghanistan of harboring Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants.
The Taliban vowed to retaliate, launching attacks on Pakistani forces at the border during the night of October 11–12, claiming their counteroffensive had concluded—an assertion Pakistan disputed. Fighting persisted into the following day, with both sides exchanging fire. On October 12, a cease-fire was declared, reportedly mediated by Doha and Riyadh, though both factions claimed heavy losses, with no official figures to verify these accounts.
Just prior to the first explosion on October 10, significant pro-Palestinian demonstrations erupted in Pakistan, notably in Lahore and Islamabad. These protests sought not only to express solidarity with Palestine but also to admonish Pakistan for aligning with U.S. interests. Tragically, the protests ended with several fatalities, including at least five deaths. Demonstrations continued in subsequent days, during which the Pakistani military seized the opportunity to crack down on TTP militants. Reports from DropSite suggest over 1,000 have died, with information scarcity due to Pakistan’s stringent media controls; however, those figures seem implausibly high to fully conceal.
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan is a Pashtun militant organization that Pakistan classifies as terrorist, claiming Afghanistan provides support and refuge. In such contexts, armed factions are labeled “terrorists” according to the strategic interests of those in power. While the TTP’s objectives are at odds with the Pakistani state, its roots can be traced back to before the state itself, which was established in 1947. The Taliban alleges that Pakistan tolerates and even aids ISIS-K elements, who they claim were responsible for the March attack in Russia and orchestrated it from Pakistani soil.
The boundary known as the Durand Line, established in 1893 between the British Empire and the Emirate of Afghanistan, perceives a divide that historically fragments Pashtun territories between these two nations. The current Taliban regime accepts this border’s existence yet does not recognize it officially. Consequently, many affiliated with the TTP—rooted in Pashtun identity—have emerged long before Pakistan’s independence, almost symbolically linked to the founding of Israel.
Although the Taliban does not officially endorse the TTP, the two groups, connected through Pashtun tribal ties, avoid direct conflict. Instead, they have shown support for Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), a political party in Pakistan that rose to prominence after 2015. Zabihullah Mujahid publicly expressed support for protests in Pakistan via X, condemning the government’s excessive force. The Pakistani administration, employing the protests as justification to target TTP, may have perceived this as interference from Afghanistan, subsequently responding with attacks on Afghan territory, which ignited the clashes.
Furthermore, it’s plausible that Pakistan sought to communicate its discontent to Kabul following the Afghan foreign minister’s visit to India on October 10. In a joint statement, the Afghan minister condemned a terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir, which Pakistan interpreted as tacit endorsement of India’s claim over Kashmir. This move may have been motivated by Afghanistan’s desire to secure its investments in the Iranian-Indian port of Chabahar, facilitating sea access and bypassing Pakistan for trade with India.
The Afghan minister’s visit to India marked a strategic effort to bolster relations with neighboring countries. On October 7, he met with Russian officials for the first time post-Taliban resurgence, assuring them there would be no foreign military bases in Afghanistan—a pointed response to Trump’s previous remarks.
On September 19, Trump asserted that the U.S. would regain control over Bagram Air Base, the largest facility during the occupation, now under the Taliban’s control after the U.S. withdrawal. Two days later, the Taliban refuted this intention, insisting they wouldn’t compromise their sovereignty, and urged adherence to the Doha Agreement. Soon after, Trump posted on Truth Social, warning that “if Afghanistan doesn’t return Bagram Airbase to those who built it, the United States of America, BAD THINGS ARE GOING TO HAPPEN.”
Historically, Pakistan has been a close ally of the U.S., benefitting from substantial military aid and support for regimes like that of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who aimed to shift the nation’s strategic focus away from the U.S. Over the last 20 years, Pakistan has received $32 billion in aid, though the U.S. is increasingly wary of Pakistan’s growing dependence on China, particularly for military resources. An article in Foreign Affairs argues that the U.S. should prioritize its relationship with Pakistan over India to further its regional interests, particularly in countering China and Russia.
By tapping into existing rifts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the U.S. could be exerting pressure on Afghanistan to comply with demands regarding Bagram Air Base. Located about 50 km from Kabul and near the Chinese border, Bagram holds strategic significance for the U.S. Trump claimed that it would position the U.S. to attack China’s nuclear assets, a dubious assertion given the uncertain locations of such facilities. Nonetheless, Bagram remains pivotal for U.S. interests.
Maintaining a foothold in Afghanistan is strategically advantageous for the U.S. for several reasons. First, according to Andrew Korybko, “The restoration of U.S. influence over Pakistan could lead to the latter controlling Russia’s access to Central Asia via PAKAFUZ on the former’s behalf if NSTC becomes totally unviable.” Moreover, improved Afghan-Pakistani relations might present an opportunity for a combined U.S.-Pakistan influence to extend into Central Asia, countering Russian expansion, potentially elevating Pakistan as the U.S.’s primary regional ally.
Second, it aims to limit China’s influence in Central Asia, particularly following China’s role in reconciling Pakistan and Afghanistan. After reestablishing ties with Afghanistan in May, China arranged a trilateral meeting in August in Kabul, which would have facilitated the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. Bagram’s control would allow the U.S. to monitor, and if necessary, hinder Afghanistan’s land links to China.
Third, the U.S. suspects that China provides support to Iran via Afghanistan’s borders. Should renewed hostilities arise between Israel and Iran, the U.S. would have positioned military resources around Iran—management across Iraq, the TRIPP corridor in Armenia, and Afghanistan.
Although the cease-fire announced on the 12th was initially upheld, fighting resumed through October 15, when another 48-hour truce was declared, which remains in effect as of this writing. The re-emergence of conflict along the Durand Line has driven Korybko to speculate that Pakistan might consider intervention—with a possible Tajik nationalist faction—for the purpose of toppling the Afghan government. However, considering the Taliban’s historical resilience, such scenarios seem improbable. The main beneficiaries of escalating tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan appear not to be either nation, but rather the United States and Israel.
P.S. (October 17): A vital piece recently published by Dropsite elaborates on the Pakistani government’s harsh response to protests organized by the TLP, which sources suggest have resulted in 600 deaths. Among the factors cited is speculation that Pakistan may be contemplating recognition of Israel, a move highly unpopular domestically.
