Yves here. The U.S. is embarking on a new interpretation of an age-old containment strategy in Eurasia, a move some may deem destined for failure. However, considering the vast production capacity of China and the military strength and natural resources of Russia, the awaited consequences may take longer to unfold than anti-globalists anticipate.
First, it’s important to note that the U.S. is substantially more inclined to resort to violence to uphold its claim to global dominance than either China or Russia. In the long run, this could prove self-defeating—evident from the militarization and sanctions policies already impacting living standards and exacerbating social and political divides in Europe. However, such tactics might serve as a costly delaying measure (a higher chance of success would exist if U.S. and European leaders had better managerial capabilities).
This article primarily examines the major players in Eurasia, especially as Russia increasingly positions itself as a “civilizational state.” While this may resonate with U.S. opponents looking to reclaim their Great Power status, my experiences living in Southeast Asia highlight a clear distinction between new and old power dynamics.
Typically, smaller nations excel at maneuvering between larger powers. Even during my short time in Thailand, I have observed initiatives aimed at balancing relations with both China and the U.S./OECD. For instance, participation from Southeast Asian countries in the recent Minsk International Conference on Eurasian Security was notably limited, signaling hesitance about fully aligning with the China-Russia-led BRICS and new world order. Notable absentees included Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand (see Karl Sanchez for details).
Their non-participation indicates reservations about this new alignment.
Doubts concerning aspirations versus the emerging realities of the multipolar order were discussed in a previous report titled “BRICS: New Defenders of Free Trade, the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank”. A key excerpt reveals:
Vanessa Beeley (32:18): If we elevate BRICS countries, particularly Russia and China, as viable alternatives to the long-standing paradigm that the world has grown weary of, how can we ignore that they are essentially perpetuating the same issues?…
Fiorella Isabel (38:40): This is merely a formulaic cheerleading for a team; it degenerates into repetitive narratives where loyalty to a particular ideology clouds objective analysis. Questioning this framework seems to lead to cognitive dissonance.
Consequently, it’s rational for smaller nations to navigate a middle path rather than committing themselves firmly to one side.
Andrew Korybko, a political analyst based in Moscow, specializes in the global transition to multipolarity during the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, under the Russian Foreign Ministry. This content was originally featured on his website.
US-backed NATO, Pakistan, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent” comprising Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, are set to face Russia, India, and China as we move further into this century.
The U.S. is sending mixed signals regarding the Sino–Russo Entente. This alliance was bolstered by the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline agreement. While Trump recently claimed he is “not concerned” with this development, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth suggested that he aimed to “re-establish deterrence” against these nations. As outlined here, “Trump 2.0’s Eurasian Balancing Act Has Failed” primarily because of this situation, now involving India’s subtle endorsement amidst its rapprochement with China.
Instead of maintaining divisions, particularly regarding the complexities of China-India relations that challenge Russia’s balancing effort, the three leading powers in Eurasia are collaborating more closely to revitalize the dormant Russia-India-China (RIC) framework. This initiative holds significance not only as a standalone platform but also as the heart of BRICS and the SCO, which are gradually reshaping global governance as discussed here.
While direct military force is inadequate to counter these evolving multipolar trends, the Pentagon may aim to stall progress by instigating arms races. Military buildups by NATO, Pakistan, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent” (Japan-Taiwan-Philippines) could serve this purpose against Russia, India, and China, supplemented by bolstered U.S. military presences (or formal returns in Pakistan’s case).
Moreover, the introduction of the “Golden Dome” with intermediate-range missile deployments and increased militarization of outer space may further strain relations with Russia and China. However, these strategies could inadvertently enhance military cooperation between the two nations. While Russia and China might not be allies in a traditional sense, their overlapping military-security interests raise the likelihood of mutual support during conflicts.
China has so far refrained from providing military-technical assistance to Russia due to its intricate economic ties with the West. However, escalating tensions arising from Trump’s tariff war, accusations against President Xi Jinping of “conspiring” against the U.S., and Pentagon strategies concerning the “Asian/Containment Crescent” might necessitate a strategy reevaluation. In a parallel vein, Russia might find it beneficial to share advanced military-technical knowledge with China to counter U.S. actions, potentially extending support to their common ally in North Korea.
Although the majority of Pakistan’s military resources come from China, it’s conceivable that the U.S. could penetrate this market if Chinese exports dwindle due to the Sino-Indian rapprochement, maybe necessitating U.S. exports to Pakistan as a replacement for decreased sales to India. If exports to India escalate while U.S. imports to Pakistan increase in a revival of Cold War-era dynamics, Russia might re-establish itself as India’s primary arms supplier.
These strategic interactions create a security dilemma between the Eurasian Rimland (NATO, Pakistan, and the “Asian/Containment Crescent”) and the Eurasian Heartland (RIC), orchestrated by the U.S. to “re-establish deterrence” against the Sino-Russo Entente. This tactic aims to pressure one or both of these powers, or their shared partner, into conceding to U.S. demands, thus enabling a more effective divide-and-conquer strategy across the supercontinent. Such hegemonic maneuvers are set to define the geopolitics of Eurasia in the 21st century.
