Introduction
Sudan’s conflict is deeply rooted in its complex socio-political landscape, characterized by historical grievances and resource struggles. The ongoing strife has escalated recently, particularly with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) capturing strategic locations, intensifying violence and power struggles in the region.
The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the warring factions in Sudan, have seized control of El Fasher, the largest city in Darfur, located in the western part of the country. This takeover not only signifies the RSF’s dominance in a gold-rich area but also underscores the crucial role that gold plays in Sudan’s ongoing conflict. The other key element in this struggle is Port Sudan, situated along the Red Sea coast, where the interests of various foreign powers intersect with local dynamics.
As the RSF took control of El Fasher, enduring nearly 18 months of siege, shocking footage of civilian massacres surfaced. The RSF justifies these actions as a crackdown on those it labels as collaborators with its rival, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). However, the killings exhibit a distinct ethnic and racial dimension, as the Tasis coalition, which supported the SAF in El Fasher, comprises mainly non-“Arabized” Sudanese.
Originally formed from the Janjaweed militias by Sudan’s ousted president Omar al-Bashir, the RSF was intended to bolster al-Bashir’s power against the military. This balancing act was crucial for preserving his regime, especially in light of the fate endured by many of his predecessors, including the prime minister he deposed in 1989. The Janjaweed, alongside the SAF, participated in the Darfur genocide between 2003 and 2005, operating under al-Bashir’s directives.
The genocide claimed around 200,000 lives during the Darfur War, driven not only by territorial conflicts but also by a targeted campaign against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes—populations regarded as “African” by the government. These groups were blamed for separatist sentiments, leading to a systematic campaign of racially motivated violence. Throughout the Darfur War, both the SAF and RSF executed killings in alignment with this discriminatory policy.
The contemporary events in Darfur can be viewed as a continuation of the earlier war, evolving from a fight for autonomy into a fierce contest over gold. Originally sparked by a secessionist movement echoing South Sudan’s aspirations for independence in 2011, the dynamics shifted dramatically with the discovery of significant gold deposits in North Darfur around the same time. Following the loss of 75% of its oil reserves and 95% of its foreign exchange from southern oil fields, gold became a vital asset for Sudan.
Before 2010, gold played a minimal role in Sudan’s economy, which heavily depended on oil exports, primarily to China, alongside agriculture. Oil revenue was crucial for sustaining Sudan’s governmental operations and al-Bashir’s presidency. With the decline in oil income and rising gold prices, gold mining transformed into a viable revenue source. In 2012, al-Bashir established the Sudan Gold Refinery, which accounted for 60% of the country’s exports that same year.
Prior to this gold rush, North Darfur was largely insignificant to the capital, Khartoum. The emergence of artisanal miners spurred the government to take control as gold became strategically important. Al-Bashir’s government sought to establish dominance over gold production by deploying Janjaweed militias, which evolved into the RSF and was later legitimized under the leadership of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti). By 2017, the entirety of gold production was dominated by the RSF, with profits funneled into Dagalo’s family business, Al-Gunade.
While al-Bashir used the RSF to secure gold in Darfur, he assigned control of other mining operations to the SAF, particularly in the Red Sea, Northern, River Nile, and South Kordofan states. The SAF managed the more developed mines, contrasting with the RSF’s reliance on artisanal mining. In 2022, Sudan produced 87 tonnes of gold, with a majority exported to the United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Although al-Bashir initially tolerated informal gold mining, he struggled to control the revenue. His attempts to exert tighter regulation over local production sparked grievances that motivated the December Revolution. In 2018, he doubled the tax on gold, inciting protests from miners and exacerbating tensions with Hemedti. Such pressures ultimately led to Hemedti’s alliance with General al-Burhan against al-Bashir, paving the way for the transitional government formed in April 2019.
In 2020, the transitional government under Abdalla Hamdok nationalized the Jebel Amer mines through a high-stakes agreement that compensated Al-Gunade with $200 million, alongside providing a 33% stake in the state-owned company Sudamin for the Dagalo family. This government also created the Empowerment Removal Committee aimed at reversing the military’s hold on the economy—an initiative that contributed to the coup that displaced Hamdok in 2021.
Hemedti initially supported Hamdok’s removal but later disagreed with al-Burhan regarding the timing of integrating forces into a unified military, which was critical for controlling gold production. There are also claims suggesting U.S. intervention motivated the tension between al-Burhan and Hemedti. Al-Burhan initiated negotiations with Russia to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast but faced U.S. pushback, emphasizing potential “consequences.”
In April 2022, RSF units moved closer to Khartoum, leading to escalating clashes. A month later, the RSF seized the Sudan Gold Refinery in Khartoum, containing 1.6 tonnes of gold and unrefined materials worth approximately $150.5 million. The RSF not only reclaimed the Jebel Amer mines but also expanded its influence into gold-rich territories in South Kordofan and South Darfur. Despite a decline in Jebel Amer’s output, RSF-held production is projected to reach about 10 tonnes in 2024 (valued at around $860 million), with much of this gold still exported to the UAE, regarded by many as the RSF’s main supporter, a claim the UAE disputes.
The UAE is also a significant recipient of SAF’s gold. Since the onset of the conflict, it is estimated that approximately 60% of gold from the Northern, River Nile, and Red Sea states is moved informally to Egypt, with much ending up in the UAE. The SAF reportedly uses gold revenue to finance its arms procurement.
In an effort to reinvigorate industrial mining in the northeast and attract international support, al-Burhan’s faction has sought investment from Russian and Chinese companies. A Russian delegation in May 2024 secured a significant exploration concession and established bank arrangements to facilitate rouble transactions, promoting Sudanese purchases of Russian weaponry.
Initially, Russia supported the RSF through the previously active Wagner Group, trading gold for Libyan oil and weapons. It remains ambiguous if this support was sanctioned by the Kremlin, as Russia pivoted to openly backing SAF amidst diminished leverage in Syria, while simultaneously looking to establish a naval base in the Red Sea. In 2024, Russia accounted for half of SAF’s oil imports. By 2025, SAF consented to permit the establishment of a Russian naval base.
Iran has also sought a naval base along Sudan’s Red Sea coast, aiming to bolster its control over this critical shipping route, especially in relation to Yemen’s strategic position. Given that the RSF has sent fighters to assist the Saudis against the Houthis, Iran’s alignment with the SAF is motivated by these dynamics.
China’s vested interest lies in Port Sudan, where it invested $140 million in harbor development. While remaining neutral officially, reports suggest discussions are ongoing with SAF regarding investments in new oil refineries and the reconstruction of Sudan’s largest slaughterhouse, as well as negotiations to provide advanced aircraft.
Port Sudan serves as a vital trading gateway. The SAF’s relocation of its headquarters from Khartoum to Port Sudan underscores this strategic significance. The port connects Sudan with global markets and highlights Saudi Arabia’s historical investments in the country, particularly in agriculture, as it subtly aligns itself with SAF while mediating in the conflict.
Other nations, such as Türkiye and Egypt, also side with the SAF to promote a robust central government that can unify the nation. This dynamic complicates the conflict, as none of the parties can claim legitimacy. Each played a part in ousting al-Bashir, promising a transitional period towards civilian governance, before eventually reversing course over resource control rather than ideological struggles.
Ultimately, the situation in Sudan reflects systemic failures within the nation-state framework established during colonialism. A legitimate state is typically underpinned by a somewhat homogenous populace that embodies collective will, allowing it to claim authority. However, Sudan’s post-independence reality belies this notion, with over 20 coups occurring since 1953.
In the absence of a unified national identity, a centralized government can only maintain authority through force or control over resources. When these capacities wane, competing claims for legitimacy arise, fueling resource-based conflicts. Power vacuums, whether organic or induced, become opportunities for others to exert influence and control.
The SAF positions itself as the successor to al-Bashir’s government, using titles like “Foreign Minister of Sudan” or “central government.” However, what state do they claim authority over? The very regime they helped dismantle. Much of the media unwittingly reproduces this framing, portraying SAF as a legitimate government. Meanwhile, the RSF has established its parallel governance structure, claiming to embody the aspirations of the civilian populace that was undermined during al-Burhan’s ousting of Hamdok.
In essence, neither faction’s legitimacy is rooted in democratic principles but rather in military strength and resource control. Both factions have perpetrated atrocities in pursuit of power and wealth, suggesting a continual cycle of violence as long as resources remain contested. There lies a significant risk of further fragmentation within Sudan under these conditions.
Conclusion
As the conflict in Sudan unfolds, it becomes evident that the struggles are driven not just by immediate power contests but also by longstanding issues of identity, resource control, and foreign interests. The future of Sudan hinges on how these complex factors interact over the coming years, underscoring the urgent need for a comprehensive approach to peace and governance.
