Tech Empires: The Quest for Dominance

Yves here. John Ruehl’s generally insightful article on the competition between the US and China to secure their technology influences has a notable historical inaccuracy. Ruehl claims that the former Soviet Union adopted a “militarized approach” to expand its influence. In contrast, the USSR built alliances in Africa and potentially other regions through economic aid that came without military conditions, a key reason many African nations chose to reject US and EU sanctions at the onset of the Ukraine conflict, benefiting from the residual goodwill towards the USSR that persists in modern Russia.

Ruehl briefly touches on a relevant topic that emerged in our recent discussions about the challenges facing the US in revitalizing domestic manufacturing: that delegating technologically significant operations to allies also spreads expertise.

By John P. Ruehl, an Australian-American journalist based in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. Ruehl contributes to numerous foreign affairs publications, and his book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022. This piece is produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

The U.S.-UK technology agreement announced in September 2025 aims to boost Britain’s AI sector, though critics argue this could compromise the country’s tech sovereignty. This development exemplifies a consistent pattern of U.S. government and private entities expanding a technology-driven form of dominance, leveraging communication, data, and AI systems to foster dependence on American networks and weaponization against adversaries.

China, on the other hand, has developed a parallel influence through its tech exports, manufacturing capabilities, and integrated supply chains, competing with the U.S. model without the financial burden of a vast military presence. Unlike historical empires, the approaches of Washington and Beijing are increasingly intertwined: Spain, previously a trusted ally of U.S. tech firms and data security, encountered U.S. pressure after signing a deal with Chinese firm Huawei in July to store judicial wiretap data.

Despite the growing influence of both tech-oriented networks, there is an increasing diffusion of capabilities. Advances in manufacturing, resource mapping, and digital development make it feasible for smaller nations to establish industries that have traditionally been dominated by larger powers. As reported in an article from the digital law and policy journal Just Security, “Small countries like Taiwan and the Netherlands have created specialized offerings in niche segments of the global AI supply chain.” This could lead to a more balanced and competitive global landscape even though the U.S. and China still command significant influence.

The U.S. has sustained a formidable foreign presence for over a century. When Elihu Root took office as Secretary of War in 1899, he had already spent years cultivating the country’s elites as a lawyer. Once in power, he reformed the military for long-term overseas operations. Subsequent American expansions into Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines were framed as a paternal mission to bring civilization to those perceived as less fortunate rather than as colonial takeover. Nevertheless, military strength remained pivotal in promoting U.S. governmental and private interests.

Post-World War II, the disintegration of European empires positioned the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a rivalry over overlapping spheres of influence. Contrary to Moscow’s militarized tactics, “Washington’s control mechanisms better aligned with local populations’ desires,” giving rise to what academics termed an “empire by invitation,” according to Norwegian historian Geir Lundestad. Although military and covert operations were employed to protect U.S. interests, many nations willingly partnered with the U.S. to obtain financial aid and technical support.

Following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, the U.S. entered a new expansion phase. Technologies such as GPS, achieving global coverage by 1993, enhanced American dominance, serving as a “silent utility” that became indispensable. The rapid proliferation of the internet under U.S. oversight further solidified American standards and dominance in global communications, while the ascent of tech giants like Microsoft, Intel, and Google entrenched U.S. hardware and software at the core of global technology systems.

Despite military demobilization following the Cold War, Washington reaffirmed its combat and technological superiority through limited conflicts in the Persian Gulf and precision attacks in the Balkans. Dominating global arms exports, it fortified its leverage by integrating additional nations into U.S. defense systems and supply chains.

However, the shortcomings in Afghanistan and Iraq soon revealed the limitations of military invasions and occupations, which no longer ensured control over resources or populations. By March 2025, the U.S. had 1.3 million personnel stationed abroad, representing a dated focus on physical presence. With nearly 90 percent of corporate assets in developed economies being intangible—such as software, patents, and intellectual property—the same reasoning applies to power projection. Digital networks and enhanced remote capabilities have supplanted much of what permanent military bases previously represented.

Trump’s October 2025 suggestion to regain Afghanistan’s Bagram airbase to counter China, if genuine, reflects the persistence of traditional strategic perspectives. Analysts pointed out that the majority of the surveillance and strike capabilities he referenced can already be fulfilled through long-endurance drones, sensor arrays, and satellites. The vulnerability of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to drone and missile attacks during the ongoing conflict with Ukraine illustrates the new limitations of static bases in contested regions.

Under the Obama administration, the U.S. had begun pivoting its military strategy towards targeted strikes, cyber operations, and space-based surveillance—collectively known as “triple canopy.” These strategies expanded under both the Trump and Biden administrations, as the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) introduced significant advancements in biometric drones capable of more precisely identifying and targeting individuals.

Space is regaining its crucial role in alleviating the extensive burden of the American military. In September 2025, the Space Development Agency launched the first phase of its Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture, establishing a network of low-Earth orbit satellites for global surveillance and communication.

Other initiatives like the Golden Dome, an evolution of Reagan’s “Star Wars” and Obama’s triple canopy strategies, aim to integrate space, land, and cyber operations into an automated U.S. defense grid connected with the private sector. AI and autonomous ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems are progressively outsourcing more decision-making to automated systems.

Much of this technological framework extends beyond military applications. Dual-use systems like Starlink and integrated AI tools have become essential for governments and populations alike. Numerous nations store their public data on American cloud servers, while their citizens communicate through WhatsApp and make transactions via Google Pay—daily dependencies upheld without a single U.S. soldier present.

China’s Challenge

China is also actively developing counterspace weaponry and satellite systems to counter U.S. dominance in space. Its military capabilities are complemented by strategic and commercial elements. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, along with its digital counterpart, the Digital Silk Road, have developed to rival U.S. efforts. For the first time, Washington encounters a competitor able to provide countries similar material advantages that even the Soviet Union’s international infrastructure projects never achieved.

Despite Western concerns regarding the security hazards of Chinese technology, many developing nations continually adopt Chinese digital infrastructure. The superior quality of equipment, low costs, and state-backed financing have made Chinese systems vital even for governments aware of the potential for surveillance and dependency, a situation that equally applies to U.S. technology.

China’s digital infrastructure is intentionally designed for compatibility with future Chinese technologies, ensuring that upgrades and maintenance are reliant on ongoing Chinese support.

As economist Dev Nathan noted, a primary mechanism of 21st-century imperialism operates via global value chains (GVCs) and worldwide production networks. China’s expertise in production allows its GVCs to extract value without directly exporting capital. By saturating markets with critical technologies, aiding competitors in smartphones, energy grids, payment applications, and communication systems, it is creating layered dependencies across various sectors.

The manufacturing and logistics aspects of China’s overseas influence are evident throughout Europe, once the hub of global industry and imperial power. Belgium’s port of Zeebrugge is now 85.5 percent controlled by China’s Cosco, which also holds stakes in ports such as Antwerp and Rotterdam. Automated Chinese cranes unload cargo with the aid of Chinese logistics software and tracking systems, giving Beijing a presence across the entire supply chain.

Nevertheless, U.S. influence remains embedded, and Washington has pressured European allies to prevent Huawei from undertaking infrastructure projects and to limit Chinese access to advanced technology sectors. Platforms based in the U.S., including social media, cloud services, and software systems, continue to dominate Europe’s digital ecosystem. Moreover, under U.S. pressure, Denmark has recently seized a China-owned chipmaker operating in the country, Nexperia, citing “serious governance issues.”

While China encounters significant resistance to expanding its technological presence in Europe, it has positioned itself as a favored development ally for much of the Global South. Companies like Huawei and ZTE now command a substantial share of the global 5G market, supplying infrastructure and equipment to numerous nations. “China plays a significant role in the digital development of Global South countries, with considerable implications for their digital economies, societies, and policies,” asserted a piece in the journal Information Society.

Chinese exports of electronics and electric vehicles have also surged, with over half now directed towards non-OECD nations. In the first eight months of 2025, exports to Latin America and the Caribbean increased by 11 percent compared to 2024, while shipments to the Middle East rose by 72 percent, 75 percent to ASEAN countries, and a staggering 287 percent to Africa year-on-year. In sectors like renewable energy, China excels in solar panel and wind turbine manufacturing, helping to drive down global costs and accelerating green transitions.

These emerging technologies confer an early advantage to China, creating dependencies that could endure for years.

Although China lacks a formal military footprint abroad, its security protocols still bolster its ambitions. The Global Development Initiative for infrastructure-led advancement is paired with the Global Security Initiative focused on cooperative stability. Furthermore, Chinese law enforcement programs provide training and joint security patrols in partner nations, and private military firms secure BRI infrastructures alongside local forces.

Diffusion of Tech Power

Challenging the US-China tech infrastructure duopoly presents a significant obstacle, and the conflict in Ukraine illustrates Russia’s reluctance to move beyond the traditional paradigm of territorial dominance, partially due to its limited ability to adapt in the realm of modern networked influence.

Nevertheless, Russia has explored a technology services-based imperial model, achieving some success in deploying surveillance systems in Belarus and Central Asia, alongside its GLONASS global navigation service. In 2024, Russia signed agreements with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to provide satellite and telecommunications systems, while the Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 is in the process of developing a global broadband network.

Despite these efforts, Russia remains behind the curve, and its opportunity to expand its influence may diminish as a broader flattening of technological capacities becomes prevalent. Factories, technologies, and resources have become more localized, reducing the advantages once held by larger powers.

For instance, “lights out” automated factories reduce the reliance on foreign labor, while factory establishment has become less complex. During the Biden administration’s reshoring and friendshoring manufacturing initiatives, for example, China rapidly established industrial facilities in Mexico. While this highlighted China’s manufacturing superiority, it also underscored how easily industrial capabilities can be replicated elsewhere. India and Southeast Asian nations have also scaled up their manufacturing sectors in recent years, distributing China’s previously concentrated power.

This same trend of decentralization is observable in financial technology. Brazil’s Pix system, launched in 2020, demonstrates that middle-tier nations can now build independent digital payment infrastructures without relying on Chinese or American financial systems.

The significance of resource control is also diminishing. Afghanistan’s mineral resources, once viewed as a crucial asset for dominance, hold less importance as advances in renewable energy and mineral mapping technologies have broadened the supply. Following years of focus on South American lithium reserves, Germany recently announced one of the world’s largest lithium deposits, likely not the last significant discovery.

As scarcity may decrease and technology and manufacturing capabilities become widely distributed, the competition for resources and monopolies that once characterized imperialism could begin to ease. Yet, the decline of technological empires might lead to a return of military force as the primary instrument of power, as evidenced by Russia.

Another concern is that American and Chinese entities may simply solidify their technological dominance, suppressing or co-opting innovation, thus hindering new systems from emerging. Even as global capabilities start to level out, both nations appear more fixed on maintaining their rivalry than fostering a more open global order.