Yves here. Addressing the question posed in the headline (and I hope Aurelien joins in), the answer is none. Just as NATO cannot procure weapons from the United States, it is also nearly impossible for the alliance to consent to anything outside its charter’s framework. This charter lacks mechanisms for NATO to form new agreements, and it has been designed to be a relatively weak organization to ensure that membership does not seem overly burdensome. In contrast to the European Union, which has specific rules about when a unanimous vote versus a “qualified majority” is necessary, NATO reportedly operates on a consensus basis. While there are stipulations regarding how new members can be admitted (as demonstrated by Sweden), even this requires unanimous consent and, when applicable, approval from national legislatures, such as those in Germany and Turkiye.
It’s perplexing how Putin envisions his “new European security architecture” coming to fruition without Russia joining NATO. Perhaps he imagines key European nations, particularly France and Germany, entering into parallel agreements with Russia?
Nevertheless, Alexander Korybko provides valuable insights below on Poland’s vital role in any new European alignment concerning Russia.
By Andrew Korybko, a political analyst based in Moscow, focusing on the global transition toward multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO,, affiliated with the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published on his website.
This approach could effectively reform the European security structure and help maintain peace, but a lot hinges on Poland, which plays a pivotal role among all of the US’ NATO allies.
Putin recently suggested that he would offer Europe—most of whose nations are NATO members—formal assurances against aggression. He remarked that those who spread fear about Russia are often serving the interests of the military-industrial complex or attempting to enhance their domestic image, revealing their ulterior motives. His proposal could potentially pave the way for a NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact (NRNAP), but only if both sides demonstrate the political will to follow through.
One of Russia’s objectives in its special operation is to reshape the European security structure, a goal that the US has also shown renewed interest in, as suggested by various elements in its draft for a Russian-Ukrainian peace agreement. This follows the Pentagon’s withdrawal from Romania, which could precede a broader pullback from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)—albeit not a complete withdrawal or abandonment of Article 5. Such a shift might alleviate the American dimension of the NATO-Russian security dilemma.
The greater the extent of the US’ “Pivot back to Asia,” particularly if it results in the redeployment of some forces away from Europe, the less likely NATO’s European members (excluding the UK) will engage in aggressive posturing towards Russia. They may doubt that the US would swiftly assist them in the event of a provocation. This newfound sense of vulnerability, stemming from their deep-seated fears and hostility towards Russia, could render them more amenable to a US-mediated NRNAP that they might otherwise reject.
As “The US Will Struggle To Get Europe To Abide By Putin’s Demand To Stop Arming Ukraine” indicates, the US may also face challenges getting European nations to agree to its proposals regarding a new security framework for Europe following the resolution of the Ukrainian conflict. However, the anticipated reduction of US military presence in CEE by that time may facilitate negotiations surrounding the status of NATO forces in the Arctic-Baltic region, CEE, and the Black Sea-South Caucasus.
This vast area aligns with the “cordon sanitaire” that Jozef Pilsudski, a leader from the interwar period, envisioned through his complementary “Intermarium” initiative (aimed at establishing a Polish-led security-centered regional integration bloc) and “Prometheism” (which sought to disintegrate the USSR). Although ultimately unsuccessful, current US support for the revival of Poland’s historical Great Power status might position Poland to lead efforts to contain Russia on behalf of the US within mutually agreed-upon boundaries.
Russian-NATO tensions can be effectively managed as long as the risk of conflict in CEE is minimized. This could involve placing restrictions on Poland’s militarization and the hosting of foreign troops, contingent upon Russia withdrawing some or all of its tactical nuclear weapons and other arms from Belarus. A mutually beneficial Polish-Belarusian agreement could therefore form the basis for any NRNAP. Successful mutual de-escalation in this central area would likely pave the way for agreements regarding the peripheral Arctic-Baltic and Black Sea-South Caucasus regions.
However, the implementation may prove challenging. Some NATO members might either obstruct discussions for a US-mediated NRNAP or undermine it afterward, so optimism should be tempered. That said, Russia and the US should aspire toward a finalized NRNAP, which could run parallel to talks aimed at modernizing the New START treaty. This represents the most effective approach to reforming the European security architecture and maintaining peace, contingent on Poland’s active participation, as it holds the most critical role among all of the US’ NATO allies.
