In recent discussions about geopolitical tensions, Yves highlights Andrew Korybko’s assertion regarding the EU’s intent to exert greater control over Russian assets that have been seized. Korybko argues that this move is partly influenced by the US’s proposal for these assets as part of a 28-point peace plan. While this sheds light on one motivation, it is certainly not the sole factor at play.
Indeed, the revelation of this 28-item plan seems to have energized European leaders, providing them with a narrative to further their questionable objectives. Ursula von der Leyen has long championed the mantra of “seize not freeze,” advocating for more aggressive measures against Russian assets. It’s crucial to recognize that the likelihood of a US-Russian agreement remains exceedingly low. In fact, the US struggles to even return expropriated diplomatic properties to Russia. This raises doubts about their reliability in any cooperative endeavor. Moreover, the urgent tone from Europe appears misguided, especially considering that Russia has no incentive to allow the US to profit from managing its assets, particularly for a Ukraine reconstruction effort.
Additional motivations for this stance may include:
1. An ongoing power grab by Ursula von der Leyen and the European Commission.
2. Creating a platform for more Russia-related fearmongering to bolster the standing of unpopular leaders like Keir Starmer, Emmanuel Macron, and Friedrich Merz.
3. Supporting the notion that Ukraine remains a formidable force, aligning with the belief that if Ukraine can endure a bit longer, Russia will eventually concede.
4. Utilizing military Keynesianism as a strategy to counteract Europe’s declining competitiveness and economic stagnation, as noted by Lord Robert Skidelsky in a recent article. A key section states:
The momentum for rearmament in Europe is driven by factors that extend beyond the mere security rationale of countering Russia. An emerging strand of European policy suggests that this drive serves a secondary purpose not openly acknowledged: reviving Europe’s weakened productivity and faltering industrial base. As articulated by Berg and Meyers (CER, 2025), much of the rearmament agenda is couched in security language yet effectively functions as a cover for an industrial strategy aimed at revitalizing Europe’s economy.
I concur that Europe requires new avenues for growth, but disguising industrial policy as a wartime imperative is neither transparent nor justified. Fabricating a militaristic narrative to legitimize economic renewal may be convenient politically, but it undermines democratic discourse and risks entrenching a state of perpetual militarization disconnected from Europe’s actual economic challenges.
By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst specializing in the transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He holds a PhD from MGIMO, affiliated with the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published on his website
The underlying objective may be to prevent the US from negotiating a deal with Russia regarding point 14 of the leaked 28-point peace plan, which suggests investing significant portions of Russia’s seized assets into joint projects, potentially in the energy and rare earths sectors, after the conflict subsides.
Russia has condemned the EU’s recent decision to indefinitely immobilize its seized assets. The special procedure instituted to facilitate this circumvented member states’ veto powers, particularly blocking Hungary and Slovakia from intervening. This action could potentially lead to the bloc confiscating some of these funds for Ukraine or using them as collateral for loans, ostensibly to fund military purchases or aid reconstruction efforts post-conflict.
However, the initial goal of using these assets will not achieve the EU’s desired strategic defeat of Russia, while the successful reconstruction of Ukraine necessitates far more than just these seized resources. Regardless of the stated objectives, confiscating Russian assets or leveraging them for loans could have dire consequences for the EU’s financial reputation. Foreign investors might withdraw their assets, fearing for their safety in EU banks, leading to significant financial losses for the bloc.
Ultimately, the EU could risk sacrificing hundreds of billions, potentially even a trillion or more, all in the name of supporting Ukraine—despite the improbability of securing Ukraine’s complete reconstruction or defeating Russia through such means. This raises legitimate concerns that the EU has hidden motives behind its policy toward Russia’s seized assets, suggesting that the primary aim may not be aid for Ukraine.
The core intention may be to obstruct the US from striking any deals with Russia, as highlighted in point 14 of the leaked 28-point peace deal framework. This deal could facilitate significant investment in cooperative projects following the conflict, potentially altering the global economic landscape, thereby enhancing the EU’s diminishing relevance.
To avert such an outcome, the EU’s decision to indefinitely immobilize Russia’s seized assets may be a calculated first step toward legally asserting quasi-ownership over them. This move could pave the way for future confiscation or collateral use for loans to Ukraine, especially given that the employed procedure bypassed the veto powers of member states, jeopardizing countries like Hungary and Slovakia.
This strategy could be prematurely countered by Russia transferring legal ownership of its EU-seized assets to the US, which was proposed earlier in April. However, this potential transfer hinges on the establishment of a trustworthy agreement between Russia and the US regarding the use of these funds, a level of trust that is currently lacking. Progress on a NATO-Russian Non-Aggression Pact could facilitate this arrangement, ensuring that these assets are not misappropriated.
If the US gains legal ownership over these seized assets, it could leverage this control to demand their transfer under threat of sanctions, thus guaranteeing that they are neither redirected to Ukraine nor left immobile. The EU must weigh the monumental financial repercussions of damaging its reputation for the sake of obstructing US-Russian relations. Should the EU proceed in this direction, it risks provoking the US and Russia to collaborate against it in the future.
