Introduction: The course of Cuban history took a dramatic turn on January 1, 1959, when Fidel Castro and his revolutionary forces descended upon Havana. This event, which marked the beginning of a new era on the island, established a regime characterized by oppression and deception. Now, after 67 years, signs of impending change are emerging.
On January 1, 1959, Fidel Castro and his bearded revolutionaries marched into Havana. Church bells rang across the island as Batista fled into exile.
This January 1st marked the 67th anniversary of that revolution. Sixty-seven years of a system built on deception, imposed through violence, and sustained through repression. But now, for the first time since Castro’s march into Havana, genuine change appears inevitable.
Throughout the 1950s, Castro repeatedly insisted he wasn’t a communist. He promised free elections, a free press, and the restoration of the 1940 Constitution. By April 1961—barely two years after marching into Havana—Castro declared the revolution socialist. Commanders such as Huber Matos and the American William Morgan, who believed his earlier promises and opposed this communist turn, paid dearly. Matos was convicted and spent 20 years in prison, while Morgan was tried and executed for treason.
What followed was swift and total. Between 1959 and 1968, the regime nationalized every sector of the Cuban economy.
Share of the Economy Under State Ownership (%)
Source: Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal, p. 15.
By 1963, roughly 95% of industry was under state control; by 1968, private enterprise had effectively been eradicated. Research conducted by Marianne Ward and John Devereux indicates that in the 1950s (before Castro’s takeover), Cuba enjoyed some of the highest living standards in Latin America, comparable to countries like Italy. However, this market-based economy was replaced by Soviet-style central planning, resulting in severe social ramifications. Between 1959 and 1981, estimates suggest that between 35,000 and 141,000 Cubans died under the regime. Dissent was swiftly quashed, papers were nationalized, and repression was particularly brutal against those who vocally opposed the government.
For decades, the system Castro built seemed unassailable. However, on July 11, 2021, an unprecedented event unfolded when thousands of young Cubans took to the streets of cities nationwide, crying out for freedom. “Libertad!” they shouted, and “Patria y vida!”—a direct counter to the revolutionary slogan “Patria o muerte.”
The regime’s response was brutal. According to Prisoners Defenders, Cuba currently has around 1,187 political prisoners, many of whom are young individuals demanding basic rights. Yet this time, the repression backfired. Instead of stifling dissent, it instigated the largest migration wave in Cuba’s history.
Between 2022 and 2023, Cuba lost approximately 20% of its population through emigration. The figures are staggering; entire neighborhoods in Havana are deserted. Skilled professionals such as doctors, engineers, and teachers have fled. Recently, The Economist published a sobering report, highlighting that “most Cubans with get-up-and-go have got up and gone—a manpower hole is gaping at the heart of Cuba’s economy.”
The economic situation exacerbates this crisis. Inflation is estimated to range from 20% to 100%. A recent survey indicates that 89% of Cubans now live in extreme poverty. As one 52-year-old Cuban told The Economist, “This system is so screwed up it’s unfixable. All you can do is get rid of it and start all over again.”
The regime has initiated certain reforms in response to the pressure to ease controls over imports. However, these have not constituted genuine market reforms, as access still depends on state discretion rather than clear regulations, open entry, and safeguarded property rights. Such limited liberalization fosters rent-seeking behavior, where businesses focus more on pleasing party officials than competing in open markets.
Yet, there are tangible reasons to believe that change is on the horizon. A recent poll conducted by CubaData shows a remarkable shift in ideology: 21.7% of Cubans now consider themselves “liberal or pro-market”—seven times the 3% who still identify as “staunchly socialist.” Among these pro-market Cubans, 65% believe the regime must undertake substantial structural reforms. The broader demographic is even more revealing: 79% of all Cubans believe socialism is in decline, and 78.8% no longer find revolutionary principles relevant.
Even among Cuban economists, there is a consensus that the island’s troubles arise not from the U.S. embargo, but from the regime’s own policies. Additionally, recent findings by João Pedro Bastos, Jamie Bologna Pavlik, and Vincent Geloso indicate that the embargo accounts for only 3% to 10% of Cuba’s economic decline. The primary issues lie in nationalizations, the obliteration of private property, and their substitution with centralized economic planning. As early as 1989, prior to the collapse of Soviet support, these policy choices had already rendered Cuba approximately 55% poorer than it might have been otherwise.
This is significant because it means Cuba’s challenges are surmountable. They stem from specific institutional decisions that can be undone.
The regime now confronts a perfect storm. It has lost people through mass emigration and, consequently, the necessary human resources to maintain even basic services. It has forfeited its ideological legitimacy and can no longer attribute its failures to external forces.
I believe we will witness the regime’s downfall in the coming years. When that moment arrives, Cuba could follow the paths of Estonia or Poland, countries whose market reforms dramatically enhanced living conditions. Such a transformation will necessitate intellectuals, political leaders, and organizations capable of enacting market reforms, property rights, and the rule of law.
Ironically, the significant emigration may also supply the human capital necessary for this transformation. As Cubans assimilate into market economies abroad, they acquire the skills and institutional knowledge required for Cuba’s future. The exile community has already established a foundation to educate new generations about the atrocities of communism and the realities of prerevolutionary Cuba. These Cubans, experienced in functional democracies and motivated to aid their homeland, are likely to play a pivotal role in Cuba’s revitalization.
Sixty-seven years ago, Castro marched into Havana with promises of freedom but delivered tyranny. Now, his regime is losing its grip. The Cubans who risked everything in 2021 to demand liberty, who have chosen not to submit through exile, and who have turned away from socialism, are the authors of Cuba’s next chapter. The question is no longer if the regime will collapse. It is whether Cubans will seize this moment to create a free and prosperous nation on their own terms.
Conclusion: The current moment in Cuba stands at a crossroads, where a tide of change is palpable. As the island’s residents embrace a new vision for their future, the foundation for a new chapter—one built on freedom and prosperity—begins to take shape. The outcome will ultimately depend on their resolve and commitment to reshape their nation.
